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Major Professor: Timothy S. Simcoe, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Strategy & Innovation
ABSTRACT
This dissertation contains three studies on the patenting process and standard
essential patents. The first study analyzes the matching of patent applications to ex-
aminers at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. The analysis uses statistical tests
originally developed to study industry agglomeration and finds strong evidence that
examiners specialize in particular technologies. Specialization is more pronounced in
the biotechnology and chemistry fields, and less in computers and software. Evidence
of specialization becomes weaker conditioning on technology subclasses. There is no
evidence that certain examiners specialize in applications that have greater impor-
tance or broader claims. Finally, the study shows that more specialized examiners
have a lower grant rate and produce a larger narrowing of claim-scope during ex-
amination. The results have implications for the growing literature that exploits
examiners characteristics to study the effects of patenting.
In the second study, I analyze the strategic behavior of applicants for Standard
Essential Patents. Owners of these patents (and especially those that rely more on
patents to generate revenues) use the mechanisms provided by the patent system to
delay issuance more often than owners of similar patents. The analysis also shows
vii
that applicants for Standard Essential Patents may delay issuance to obtain the right
balance between patent breadth and strength, and that companies prolong prosecu-
tion until the standard is set, possibly to cover the standard with additional claims.
Finally, I find a positive correlation between the issuance lag and the probability of
patent litigation. This suggests that owners of Standard Essential Patents may delay
issuance to obtain patents that are more valuable, or that longer lags are associated
with failures in licensing negotiations.
The third study exploits Standard Essential Patents as a window on standardiza-
tion and analyzes the direction of technical progress that builds upon compatibility
standards. It uses patent citations to characterize the dispersion of cumulative inven-
tive activity across technological areas. The overall pattern of results suggests that
Standard Setting Organizations select technologies that are important in a relatively
narrow technological area, and their adoption as input for following inventive activity
broadens after standardization.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
Whether the patent system encourages or hinders innovation and economic growth is
heavily debated. A very large literature in economics analyzes costs and benefits of
patents and several trade-offs involved in the design of a patent system (Arora et al.,
2001; Arrow, 1962; Boldrin and Levine, 2008; Bessen and Maskin, 2009; Gans and
Stern, 2003; Hall, 2007; Heller and Eisenberg, 1998; Nordhaus, 1967).
The traditional rationale for patents is to increase the appropriability of the re-
turns to investments in innovation. Inventive activity is often affected by a market
failure that justifies some form of government intervention. Innovators often do not
appropriate all the returns of their investments because of knowledge spillovers and
imitation by competitors. This can lead to underinvestment in innovation. Patents
are designed to increase the incentives to innovate by granting a temporary monopoly
on the economic exploitation of an invention. Furthermore, reducing the threat of
expropriation of the original inventor and reducing the risk of imitation, patents may
enable market transactions of ideas and technologies, generating gains from trade
(Arora et al., 2001; Arrow, 1962; Gans and Stern, 2003; Griliches, 1992; Jaffe et al.,
1993; Nelson, 1959; Nordhaus, 1967; Teece, 1986; Thompson and Fox-Kean, 2005;
Wright, 1983).
Patents may also have negative effects. When innovation is cumulative, patents
raise the costs for inventors that use previous research as input. Moreover, in many
industries they are not an effective mechanism for appropriating the returns of re-
2search and companies often patent just for strategic reasons. Especially in industries
characterized by complex technologies, in which companies need to combine multiple
components protected by patent rights, this may create a patent thicket. The patent
thicket not only increases transaction costs for firms that need to negotiate with many
patent holders, but also raises the risk of hold up for companies that can inadver-
tently infringe patents of other companies. To respond to these threats, companies
have developed institutions to navigate the patent thicket, such as patent pools and
intellectual property policies of standard setting organizations (Boldrin and Levine,
2008; Bessen and Maskin, 2009; Cohen et al., 2000; Gallini and Scotchmer, 2002; Hall
and Ziedonis, 2001; Levin et al., 1987; Rysman and Simcoe, 2008; Shapiro, 2001).
To assess the effect of the patent system on innovation and economic outcomes,
it is fundamental to understand how patents are produced. An emerging literature
is improving our understanding of the production of patents and its consequences
(Carley et al., 2015; Cockburn et al., 2002; Frakes and Wasserman, 2014; Hall and
Ziedonis, 2001; Lemley and Sampat, 2012; Ziedonis, 2004). The first two studies in
this dissertation aim to contribute to this literature.
The first study focuses on a key stage of the production of patents: the matching of
patent applications to patent examiners. Patents are the product of a long interaction
between applicants and the patent office, and patent examiners have an important
role in determining what is eventually patented and the quality of patents.
A recent stream of papers is trying to exploit variation in the characteristics of
examiners to estimate the effects of patents on economic outcomes. The empirical
strategies in these studies are based on the assumption that applications are randomly
assigned to examiners at the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).
In chapter 2, a joint project with Timothy Simcoe, we test whether this assumption
holds. While other studies test whether application characteristics are correlated with
3examiner characteristics, in this work we address the question from a different per-
spective. Our approach is new and analyzes explicitly the allocation of applications to
examiners (within art units, i.e. groups of examiners working on similar technologies)
using statistical tests originally developed to study industry agglomeration.
We find strong evidence that examiners within art units of the USPTO special-
ize in particular technologies. Interestingly, there are significant differences across
technological areas. Examiners in the technology centers (i.e. groups of art units)
in biotechnology and chemistry seem to be more specialized than those in comput-
ers and communications. We also detect some sorting of applications based on the
identity of the assignee. However, this may be due technological specialization of
the inventors. Evidence of specialization becomes weaker, but does not completely
disappear, if we condition on the primary classification of applications (technology
class-subclass), again with differences across fields.
An important assumption for many studies that want to exploit the supposedly
random assignment of applications to examiners is that important characteristics of
applications are not correlated with the type of examiner they are assigned to. We
use two (imperfect) proxies of the ex ante value of applications (scope of the first
independent claim and number of patent family members) to test whether or not
we observe agglomeration driven by patent value. We find no evidence that certain
examiners specialize in applications that have greater importance or broader claims.
We also explore the implications of examiner specialization for the outcomes of
patent examination. In the last part of the analysis we show that more specialized
examiners have a lower grant rate and are more likely to narrow the claims of a patent
during examination.
The results of this study have important implications for the emerging literature
that relates differences in the examination process to economic outcomes. While
4randomization may make an instrumental variable constructed on examiner char-
acteristics more credible, our analysis does not imply that those instruments are
invalid. However, researchers willing to pursue that approach should be careful in
their applications, taking into account the details of the institutional environment.
Some assumptions may be more plausible than others, depending on the particular
research question and setting analyzed.
The second study in this dissertation analyzes the patenting process from the
perspective of the applicant, focusing on strategic behavior. In particular, in chapter
3 I analyze the prosecution strategy of the applicants for a very valuable subset of
patents: Standard Essential Patents (SEPs).
The U.S. patent system provides unique opportunities to patent applicants to de-
lay the prosecution of their patents and modify the claims of applications. Delays and
changes to claims can be used by companies to cover recent technical developments
and even new technologies developed by competitors. These opportunities are partic-
ularly appealing to companies involved in standardization, because they can exploit
them to make their patents essential or more essential for the implementation of a
standard after observing how a proposed standard evolves.
I compare SEPs with applications similar at the time of filing and likely exposed
to similar examination and find that applicants for SEPs use more often mechanisms
provided by the U.S. patent system to delay issuance and modify claims. This leads
to longer lags between priority and issuance.
Companies involved in “upstream” activities such as pure knowledge developers,
patent holding companies or producers of components use these mechanisms more
aggressively. A simple explanation for this result is that upstream companies rely
more on patents to generate revenues, thus have more incentives to increase the value
of their patents.
5I also analyze how the scope of the claims changes over time and find that owners
of SEPs may delay issuance to obtain the right balance between patent breadth and
strength. While SEPs and similar patents have more or less the same scope at filing,
SEPs have broader scope at issuance. However, longer prosecution is associated with
claim narrowing. As narrower claims are less likely to be invalidated in a court,
this suggest that applicants for SEPs may want first to obtain a relatively stronger
patent that is broad enough to cover a number of implementations of a standard,
and then file continuations to cover additional implementations. This interpretation
is reinforced by the findings that the probability of issuance increases significantly
after SEP disclosure (which I use as a proxy for standardization timing) and that the
latter is positively correlated with the filing of continuation applications.
Finally, I find that an increase in the lag between priority and issuance of SEPs is
correlated with an increase in the probability of patent litigation. This suggests that
owners of SEPs may delay issuance to obtain patents that are more valuable, or that
longer lags are associated with failures in licensing negotiations.
These results help us to understand the formation of the patent thicket and the
consequences in terms of holp-up, and are therefore relevant for the design of public
policies and rules of standard setting organizations to limit the negative consequences
of patents.
The last study in this dissertation is a joint work with Timothy Simcoe. In chap-
ter 4 we study the relationship between technology endorsement by Standard Setting
Organizations (SSOs) and the direction of inventive activity. SSOs are institutions
that coordinate the collective development of new compatibility standards and are
particularly important in Information and Communication Technology (ICT) indus-
tries. An important role of SSOs is to design Intellectual Property (IP) policies to
partially reduce the threat of hold-up related to the inclusion of patented technology
6into technical standards. Chapter 4 contributes to the literature that studies the
performance of SSOs, and more in general to the literature that studies the role of
institutions in the process of cumulative inventive activity.
We develop a theoretical framework that combines the concepts of direct and indi-
rect network effects with the insights of the literature on cumulative inventive activity
to understand how SSOs shape the scope of inventive activity upon compatibility
standards. We introduce the concepts of “deepening” (cumulative technical progress
characterized by relatively low dispersion across technological areas) and “broaden-
ing” (cumulative technical progress characterized by relatively high dispersion across
technological areas) and relate them to the activities of SSOs.
In the empirical analysis, we exploit the disclosure of SEPs as a window on stan-
dardization within SSOs and compare the dispersion of patent citation flows to SEPs
and similar patents. In the first part of the analysis we use a measure of patent-to-
patent text similarity and a new measure that takes into account the probability of
inter-class citation to estimate the balance between deepening and broadening. In
the second part of the analysis we separate deepening and broadening using citations
from technological classes that repeatedly cite a patent as a measure of deepening
and citations from new classes as a measure of broadening. The results provide ev-
idence that both trends are occurring. The overall pattern of results suggests that
SSOs select technologies that are important in a relatively narrow technological area,
and their adoption as input for following inventive activity broadens after standard-
ization. We also explore the heterogeneity across SSOs and licensing terms and find
substantial differences.
The three studies in this dissertation are all related by the goal to improve our
understanding of the patent system and the institutions developed to manage the
trade-offs related to patents. The first two studies analyze the production of patents
7from different perspectives. Chapter 2 focuses on a key stage of the production of
patents, the assignment of patent applications to examiners. This is an early stage
that has important consequences for the outcomes of the examination process and
eventually for innovation and economic outcomes. The role of patent examiners is
fundamental because they determine what inventions are patented and the charac-
teristics of patent rights. Chapter 3 focuses on the strategies of applicants during the
patenting process. As patents are the product of an interaction between the patent
office and the applicants, the strategies of applicants are also important to deter-
mine the characteristics of the patents produced and affect innovation and economic
outcomes. The setting analyzed in this chapter is the production of SEPs, which
are a subset of very valuable patents with great importance for technical progress
in complex industries. In these industries, a patent thicket can be detrimental for
innovation. SSOs, not only with their IP policies but also with other activities such
as coordination of research efforts and certification of technical merits, are key players
in those contexts. Chapter 4 studies their role in shaping the direction of inventive
activities.
8Chapter 2
Patent Examiner Specialization
2.1 Introduction
In 2015, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) received 589,410 utility
patent applications. Matching each application to a qualified examiner is a funda-
mental part of the examination process. This matching proceeds in two steps. First,
each application is assigned to an “art unit” comprised of several examiners who
specialize in a particular technology. Then the patent is assigned to an individual
examiner within that art unit. Several studies have suggested that the second step
in this process is more-or-less random, and then, building on an idea first proposed
by Sampat and Williams (2015), used examiner characteristics as an instrumental
variable for examination outcomes.1
We re-examine the random matching assumption, and find strong evidence of
technological specialization by examiners within art units. While this does not in-
validate the use of instrumental variables based on examiners’ characteristics, it does
imply that the exclusion restriction cannot be justified on the basis of random assign-
ment. We show that examiner specialization is more pronounced in some technology
areas (Biotechnology and Chemistry), and less in others (Computers and Software).
Evidence of specialization becomes weaker, but does not completely disappear, if we
condition on U.S. Patent Classification System (USPC) sub-classes. However, we
1Papers adopting variants on this identification strategy include Farre-Mensa et al. (2015), Feng
and Jaravel (2016), Gaule´ (2015), Kuhn (2016), Kuhn et al. (2016), and Sampat and Williams
(2015).
9find no evidence that certain examiners specialize in applications that have greater
importance or broader claims. Finally, we show that more specialized examiners
have a lower grant rate and produce a larger narrowing of claim-scope during the
examination process.
This is the first paper to systematically test the random matching hypothesis
across all of the technology areas examined by the USPTO. Our methods for detecting
specialization are borrowed from the literature on industry agglomeration (Mori et al.,
2005). Specifically, we compute a pair of test statistics that ask whether application
characteristics (e.g. technology subclass) are less dispersed across examiners than
we would expect under random assignment. These methods focus specifically on
the null hypothesis of random assignment, unlike IV falsification tests that ask the
slightly different question of whether examiner and application characteristics are
correlated.2 Each of our calculations is performed at the art-unit-year level, and
we examine the entire distribution of p-values for various characteristics, including
technology subclass, assignee, and indicators of patent value (family size) and scope
(first independent claim length).
At a substantive level, our findings illustrate how the USPTO manages a tension
between efficiency and fairness. One way to promote fairness is through uniform
application of patentability criteria, but prior research suggests that this is difficult.
Some examiners are simply tougher than others (Sampat and Williams, 2015; Kuhn
et al., 2016), and experienced examiners are more lenient on average, partly because
of time constraints (Lemley and Sampat, 2012; Frakes and Wasserman, 2014). Ran-
dom matching provides another path to fairness, but forgoes the efficiency benefits of
further technological specialization. Our analysis shows that the amount of special-
ization varies across art units, leading some applicants to get tougher examiners on
2Even if examiners are highly specialized by technology, other characteristics (e.g. propensity to
grant) might be randomly distributed. This is why the IV strategy described above could still be
valid.
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average. But we find no evidence that particularly important applications (with large
families) or broad applications (with short first independent claims) are assigned to
specific examiners.
We discuss two plausible explanations for our finding that examiners are more spe-
cialized in Chemistry and Biotechnology than in the computer-related art units. One
possibility is that “generalist examiners” are able to evaluate computing inventions,
while more specialized skills and knowledge are required in chemistry and life sciences.
Another possibility is that the USPC technology classification system works better
in chemistry and biotech, so we fail to observe much of the specialization that takes
place within computer-related art units. Distinguishing between these hypotheses is
good topic for future research.
Finally, we find a positive correlation between specialization and a more stringent
examination process, suggesting that it is easier for examiners to find relevant prior
art when working in a more familiar field. Under random matching, these estimates
have a causal interpretation. Alternatively, they remain important for showing how
non-random matching is related to important patent examination outcomes.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 describes how the USPTO assigns
applications to examiners. Section 2.3 explains our methods and data. Section 2.4
presents results and Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Patent Examiner Assignment at the USPTO
When a patent application is filed, the Office of Patent Application Processing re-
views the formality requirements of the application and assigns it a serial number.
A contractor defines the technological classification of the application using USPC
class and subclass codes.3 Each application has at least one mandatory classification,
3The two main purposes of the USPC are to facilitate the retrieval of technical documents
and to ease the allocation of applications to the examining personnel specialized in a particular
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which is defined as a unique combination of class and subclass identifiers. The current
version of the USPC has roughly 450 classes and more than 150,000 subclasses.
The USPTO has eight Technology Centers (TCs) responsible for examination of
utility patent applications in broad technological areas. Each TC is comprised of
several art units, or teams of patent examiners who specialize in a particular technol-
ogy. Technological classifications are used to assign each new patent application to a
specific art unit.4
Within each art unit the initial assignment of a new application is handled by a
Supervisory Patent Examiner (SPE). The SPE can refine the technological classifica-
tion of a new application if it is incorrect, or request that an application be transferred
to another art unit.5 But in most cases, the SPE will assign the application to an
examiner within her art unit. This is the step we analyze below.
Previous research documents that SPEs have substantial discretion in examiner
assignment. Some SPEs interviewed by Lemley and Sampat (2012) mention assigning
applications to examiners essentially randomly within subclasses. Other SPEs give
the oldest unassigned application to an examiner when she finishes the examination of
another application. Cockburn et al. (2002) suggest that the degree of technological
specialization varies across art units – in some art units an individual examiner is
responsible for almost all applications in a specific technology class, and in others the
examiners are less specialized.
While the USPTO constantly monitors the performance of art units and examiners
to ensure a certain level of quality of the examination process, the assignment to a
technology. For details, see http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/patents/resources/
classification/overview.pdf. Although it was replaced by the Cooperative Patent Classification
(CPC) on January 1, 2013, the USPC is the relevant classification for the entire period of our study.
4For the current list of classes and subclasses examined by each art
unit, see http://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/patent-search/
understanding-patent-classifications/patent-classification.
5The Manual of Patent Examining Procedure sec. 903.08 describes the rules governing assignment
and transfer of applications between art units.
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particular art unit and to a specific examiner can have important consequences for
an application. Different practices across art units and the personal approach of
each examiner can affect whether an application is eventually granted (Sampat and
Williams, 2015), how quickly a decision is reached (Farre-Mensa et al., 2015), and
the scope and strength of an issued patent (Kuhn et al., 2016). This variation in
standards led Cockburn et al. (2002) to conclude that “there may be as many patent
offices as patent examiners.”
2.3 Methods and Data
We use two statistical tests originally developed to analyze industry agglomeration. In
our application, patent examiners are analogous to cities, and technology subclasses
(or other application characteristics) are analogous to industries. Each test might
be viewed as a multivariate generalization of a t-statistic, which compares observed
frequencies to the distribution under random assignment.
2.3.1 Agglomeration Test Statistics
Divergence Index
The D-index was developed by Mori et al. (2005), building on Kullback and Leibler
(1951), and is based on the concept of relative entropy. Suppose we have a set of
applications characterized by category i ∈ I = {1, ..., I}, assigned to a set of examiners
denoted by r ∈ R = {1, ..., R}. In our application, the categories i may correspond to
USPC subclasses, assignees or any other predetermined observable characteristic of a
patent application. Under random allocation, examiner r’s share of all applications
from category i should equal her share of the overall population.
To formalize that idea, define nir as the number of applications in category i
assigned to examiner r, and Ni =
∑R
r=1 nir as the total number of applications in
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category i. The reference distribution p0 = (p0r : r ∈ R), where p0r =
∑I
i=1 nir∑I
i=1Ni
measures examiner r’s share of all applications, is the share we expect her to be
allocated from each category under the null of random assignment.
Let pir denote the true probability that a randomly sampled application in cate-
gory i is assigned to examiner r, so the distribution across examiners for the category
is pi = (pir : r ∈ R). We can measure the divergence between pi and p0 using the
relative entropy of pi with respect to p0, called the D-index by Mori et al. (2005):
D(pi|p0) =
∑
r∈R
pir ln
(
pir
p0r
)
.
D(pi|p0) is nonnegative, achieves its minimum at pi = p0 and its local maxima when
all applications in category i are assigned to a single examiner.
To estimate the D-index, we use the observed data to estimate the probabilities
pir, with pˆir =
nir
Ni
, thus estimating:
D(pˆi|p0) =
∑
r∈R
pˆir ln
(
pˆir
p0r
)
. (2.1)
These probability estimates converge to the true value exponentially fast with the
increase in sample size for a given category Ni.
As shown by Mori et al. (2005) the D-index can be related to the the log likelihood
ratio (λ):
− lnλ
Ni
=
∑
r∈R
nir
Ni
ln
(
pˆir
p0r
)
= D(pˆi|p0).
Given that −2 lnλ is distributed asymptotically as a chi-square with R−1 degrees
of freedom, we can use this relationship for testing the null hypothesis pi = p0 against
the alternative of a more agglomerated distribution (see Mori et al. (2005) for details).6
In our application, the number of tests will equal the number of categories (e.g. one
6In practice, we compute 2NiD(pˆi|p0) and use it for a one-tailed chi-square test with R−1 degrees
of freedom.
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per technology subclass) and we examine the distribution of p-values from all of these
tests conditional on a given sample-size threshold (e.g. Ni > 20).
Multinomial Test for Agglomeration and Dispersion
MTAD computes multinomial likelihood functions for an allocation of agents to a set
of discrete locations. In our application, the agents are patent applications and loca-
tions correspond to examiners. If the likelihood of the observed data is lower (higher)
than the likelihood under random choice, MTAD indicates that the agents are ag-
glomerated (dispersed). This approach differs from the D-index because the statistic
is computed for an entire art unit, and because it can detect both agglomeration and
over-dispersion relative to the null of random allocation.
To provide a brief formal description of MTAD, we adapt the notation provided
in Rysman and Greenstein (2005). Suppose we have R examiners, each receiving nr
applications, with r = 1, ..., R. The variable nr is bounded between n = 0 and n =∞
and distributed according to the discrete distribution f(nr). Each examiner can be
assigned applications of c types. The unconditional probability of being assigned
type c is pc for c = 1, ..., C. The observed number of applications of type c assigned
to examiner r is xcr. Define xr as the vector of elements x
1
r, ..., x
C
r , p as the vector
of probabilities p1, ..., pC , n as the R × 1 vector of applications assigned to each
examiner, and X as the R × C matrix of allocations. If examiners are assigned
applications independently, the likelihood of observing outcome xr for examiner r is
the multinomial pdf
L(xr, nr,p) =
(
nr
x1r, ..., x
C
r
)
p
x1r
1 ... p
xCr
C
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and the average log-likelihood for the data is
l(X,n,p) =
1
R
R∑
r=1
ln
(
L(xr, nr,p)
)
.
We want to compare this log-likelihood with the value we would observe under
independent random assignment. Let the random variable l(f,p) be distributed ac-
cording to the distribution l(X,n,p) if X was actually drawn from a multinomial
distribution and nr was drawn from f . Then the expected log-likelihood under ran-
dom allocation is given by
E[l(f,p)] =
∑
nr
( ∑
z∈Φ(nr)
lnL(z, nr,p)× L(z, nr,p)
)
f(nr)
where Φ(nr) is the set of all possible allocations of the nr applications. To compute
E[l(f,p)] we treat p as known and take f to be the empirical distribution of nr. The
MTAD test-statistic is
t(X,n,p) = l(X,n,p)− E[l(f,p)]. (2.2)
A negative (positive) value of t(X,n,p) signals agglomeration (dispersion) of
patent applications compared to the null of random assignment. This statistic is
distributed asymptotically normal and we use simulation to generate its confidence
intervals.7
2.3.2 Data
Our main data source is the USPTO Patent Examination Research Dataset (Graham
et al., 2015), which is based on information from the Public Patent Application In-
formation Retrieval system (Public PAIR). We also use information from PATSTAT,
7See Rysman and Greenstein (2005) for details on the test. Timothy Simcoe developed a software
module to easily perform this test in Stata, available at the following link: https://ideas.repec.
org/c/boc/bocode/s457205.html
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the USPTO Patent Assignment Dataset (Marco et al., 2015) and the Patent Claims
Research Dataset (Marco et al., 2016).
We restrict our analysis to “regular” utility patent applications filed on or after
the enactment of the American Inventor’s Protection Act of 1999 (November 29,
2000) and before January 1st 2013, whose examiner is affiliated with one of the eight
technology centers responsible for the examination of utility patent applications.8 9
Under the AIPA, regular utility patent applications are generally published eighteen
months after the filing date.10
The data have several limitations. First, applications will not appear in our data
if they are abandoned before publication, or if the applicant files only in the United
States, requests that the application not be published and is not granted a patent.
Previous research suggests that these outcomes are relatively rare. A second problem
is that we do not observe whether applications are transferred from one examiner to
another before or after the information on the examiner is recorded in our data.
We exclude applications filed after 2012 to avoid problems related to publication
lags and a change in the USPTO technological classification scheme. We also ex-
clude serialized continuations (continuation applications, continuations in part and
divisional applications) because these applications are usually assigned to the same
examiner of the original application, and would therefore lead us to overstate the ex-
tent of agglomeration. Our primary analysis sample contains 2,931,713 applications
8The USPTO Patent Examination Research Dataset provides the information on the examiner
of record of an application as of January 24, 2015. This is the examiner as of that date for pending
applications and the examiner at the time of disposal for disposed applications. The art unit is the
art unit of the examiner of record for the application as of the last office action recorded for the
application.
9We report the distribution of applications by TC in our sample in figure A1.
10While granted applications have always been available for public inspection after the grant date,
this was not the case for rejected applications before the AIPA. Under the AIPA, inventors can avoid
publication after eighteen months if they forgo foreign patent protection (Graham and Hegde, 2014,
2015). However, Graham et al. (2015) show that about 95% of the regular non-provisional utility
patent applications filed between 2001 and 2012 can be found in Public PAIR.
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examined by 12,389 examiners affiliated with 590 art units.
2.3.3 Variables
We focus on several application characteristics (indexed by i or c above) that may
influence the assignment of applications to individual patent examiners within an
art-unit-year. We use the filing date of the applications to assign them to art-unit-
year cells. Grouping applications also by year helps account for possible changes
in assignment practices over time and turnover in the pool of examiners. The first
of these characteristics is the primary USPC subclass of the application. If patent
examiners specialize in evaluating applications related to particular technologies, we
expect to see agglomeration on this variable.
The identity of the applicant may also influence the allocation of applications —
either directly or due to technological specialization. We measure this with the as-
signee of an application. Specifically, we retrieve information on the assignment of
applications, identify the assignments made by the inventors to their employers before
the application is docketed to an examiner, clean and standardize the assignee names
and create clusters of names that are likely to belong to the same organization, to
which we assign a unique identifier.11 After completing this process, we have missing
assignee data for 668,642 applications. To check the robustness of our assignee mea-
surement, we utilize a second measure of the applicant identity: the customer number
assigned by USPTO to each application. This number identifies the correspondent
for application-related matters and is usually either the law firm representing the
applicant or the legal department of the firm filing the application.12
11We employ an assignee name cleaning and standardization routine that builds upon
Thoma et al. (2010) and the name standardization routines developed for the NBER Patent
Data Project available at https://sites.google.com/site/patentdataproject/Home/posts/
namestandardizationroutinesuploaded. Details are available upon request.
12Results of the customer-number analysis are similar to those for the assignee and are available
upon request.
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We would like to examine whether some examiners are assigned a larger share of
“high value” applications. The size of a patent family is often used as a proxy for
economic value of the invention because increased value leads patentees to file in more
countries (Harhoff et al., 2003; Putnam, 1996). We count the number of applications
in the same DOCDB patent family, with filing dates on or before the focal application
date, to construct an indicator variable that equals one if a focal application is above
the 95th percentile in the family size distribution (within an art-unit and filing-year).
We call this variable “DOCDB Family Size.”13
Finally, we consider whether some examiners are assigned applications seeking
greater scope of protection. Kuhn et al. (2016) show that the length of the first in-
dependent claim in a patent is a good measure of patent scope. The idea behind this
measure is that shorter claims provide broader scope of patent protection because
every word added to the text of the claims can potentially introduce additional ele-
ments or characteristics that must be present to establish infringement. We create an
indicator variable that equals one if and only if a patent application falls below the
5th percentile of the word count distribution for the first independent claim in the
subsample of applications with the same filing year examined by the same art unit.14
We call this variable “Words in 1st Claim.”15
2.4 Results
This section presents evidence of patent examiner specialization, and then regression
results linking specialization to examination outcomes.
13We test the robustness of these results using the INPADOC patent families. The results are
similar to those for DOCDB patent families and are available upon request.
14Kuhn et al. (2016) note that this measure of scope is not suitable for the analysis of patent
scope in biotechnology. So we exclude the technology center responsible for biotechnology from the
analysis of this variable. We also check the robustness of the results based on the length of the first
independent claim utilizing measures built upon the number of claims and independent claims. The
results are similar and available upon request.
15We provide summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis in table A1.
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2.4.1 Examiner Specialization
Figure 2·1 shows that patent examiners handle more applications from a given USPC
subclass or assignee than we would expect under random allocation. Specifically, each
panel shows a histogram of p-values from a sample of hypothesis tests. For the D-
index (top row), we run a separate test for each art-unit-year by subclass or assignee
cell containing more than 20 applications, and for the MTAD (bottom row) we run a
separate test for each art-unit-year cell containing more than 50 applications.16
Under the null of random assignment, the p-values in Figure 2·1 should be uni-
formly distributed between zero and one. However, in each panel a large share of
the test-statistics fall below the usual 1% statistical significance threshold, providing
strong evidence of specialization. The two histograms in the left column indicate
that about 35 percent of the D-index and MTAD tests for random USPC assignment
have a p-value below 0.01. The two histograms in the right column show somewhat
weaker evidence of specialization by assignee, with 10 to 20 percent of the p-values
falling below the 1-percent threshold. The agglomeration by assignee becomes much
weaker if tests are conducted within USPC subclasses (see below), suggesting that
these findings are primarily a result of technological specialization of examiners and
applicants. Overall, Figure 2·1 shows that the allocation of applications within art
units is often far from random, and that SPEs take into account the technological
classification when they assign applications to the examiner, as described in previous
research (e.g. Lemley and Sampat (2012)).
Table 2.1 examines the degree of examiner specialization in different Technology
Centers, and for an additional pair of application characteristics. Specifically, the
table reports the share of D-index or MTAD tests that reject the null hypothesis
of random allocation at a 5-percent significance level. Panel A shows that there is
16All of our results are robust to varying the within-cell sample size cutoffs, but going much below
these thresholds leads to large numbers of uninformative tests.
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evidence of examiner specialization in every technology center. However, the “Com-
puter Architecture” and “Computer Networking” areas are less agglomerated than
Biotechnology, Chemistry, Semiconductors and Mechanical Engineering. The results
in Panel B are similar.
Although our data do not speak to the underlying causes of variation in examiner
specialization across technology centers, there are at least two possible explanations
for this pattern. First, examiners in the less agglomerated technology centers may
be “generalists” who are capable of evaluating most applications within their art-
unit. This would naturally lead SPEs to adopt a more random allocation process.
Alternatively, patent examiners in the Computers and Communications technology
centers might be just as specialized as their counterparts, but this is not apparent to
us because the USPC classification system is less representative of actual differences
in these fields than in the other technology centers.
The lower half of Table 2.1 examines agglomeration for a pair of dichotomous
variables: “DOCDB Family Size” and “Words in 1st Claim”. Both of these variables
focus on extreme outcomes because we are interested in whether SPEs assign unusual
applications to a specific set of examiners. The data suggest that, for the most part,
they do not. There is some evidence that very large families are concentrated among a
smaller set of examiners for Semiconductors and Mechanical Engineering. And there
is some evidence that certain examiners specialize in broader patents (as measured
by length of the first claim) in the Chemical and Materials Engineering technology
center. But these effects are not large, and might easily be caused by the technological
specialization observed in Panel A.
The results presented thus far beg the question of whether examiner specializa-
tion is purely technological. To explore that idea, we test for agglomeration within
art-unit-year-USPC-subclasses to see whether conditioning on observed technological
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heterogeneity changes our results. There are two caveats to keep in mind. First,
we cannot condition on unobserved technological heterogeneity. And second, many
USPC subclasses receive only a few applications per year, so these tests exclude a large
amount of data. However, if examiners seem to be randomly assigned within large
sub-classes, we might be more comfortable that most of the specialization we observe
within art-unit-years is based on technology rather than other patent characteristics.
Figure 2·2 examines agglomeration by assignee, within art-unit-years, both within
and without conditioning on USPC subclass. Each panel presents a quantile-quantile
plot that compares the distribution of the D-index (top row) or MTAD (bottom row)
for the observed data to the distribution under simulated random assignment. The
left column shows that the observed quantiles of the D-index are higher, and the
observed quantiles of MTAD are lower, than the simulated quantiles under random
allocation. In other words, there is strong evidence of specialization, as we saw above.
However, the righthand column shows that the evidence for agglomeration is much
weaker once we condition on the USPC subclass. Note how the sample size falls
dramatically in the right column.17 Although this may affect the precision of the
tests, we think that the samples in our analysis are large enough to detect significant
departures from random assignment.
Table 2.2 examines agglomeration within art-unit-year-USPC subclasses for in-
dividual Technology Centers. Panel A focuses on the allocation of assignees. The
D-index tests reject the null of random assignment in a substantial share of tests
for the Biotechnology, Chemistry and Miscellaneous technology centers. The results
for MTAD are weaker. For the Computer Architecture and Computer Networking
technology centers, there are too few subclasses of sufficient size to make any reli-
able inference, and the others seem to match examiners to applications randomly
17The D-index discards any assignee that does not submit more than 20 applications to a given
art-unit in a particular year, which excludes the large majority of applicants. MTAD retains more
data because it uses all applications filed in a year to an art unit.
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conditional on technology. Although we do not have a large number of tests for the
Biotechnology and Chemistry art units, the evidence of agglomeration by assignee
within a art-unit-year-USPC subclass for those fields suggests to us that examin-
ers are specializing based on unobserved differences in technology. In other words,
conditioning on subclass may not ensure random assignment. Panels B and C find
no evidence that SPEs in any technology center allocate “outlier applications” (in
terms of family size or independent claim scope) to a specific set of examiners after
conditioning on observed technological differences.
Overall, these results show that patent examiners specialize in particular tech-
nologies, even within relatively homogeneous art units. We find no evidence that
certain examiners specialize in “outlier” patent applications. Moreover, much of the
agglomeration by assignee disappears if we condition on USPC subclasses. However,
we do find evidence of agglomeration by assignee, even within USPC subclasses, for
the Biotechnology and Chemistry technology centers. This last result suggests that
there may be examiner specialization based on unobserved technological differences
in some art units even after conditioning on the observed USPC subclasses.18
2.4.2 Specialization and Examination Outcomes
As a final step in our empirical analysis, we explore the relationship between examiner
specialization and patent prosecution outcomes. We focus on three outcomes: (i)
whether an application is granted, (ii) the change in the number of words in the first
independent claim between the published application and the granted patent, and (iii)
the number of days required to process the application.19 Our sample consists of all
18To complement the analysis describe in this section, we also run a set of Kolmogorov-Smirnov
tests of the equality of distributions of the p-values for the tests on the real allocations and the
simulations of random assignment. The results are consistent with those reported in the paper and
are available upon request.
19It is important to note that an application is never ultimately rejected by the USPTO. If an
applicant is not granted a patent, she can file a Request for Continued Examination (RCE), a
continuation application or a continuation-in-part. We do not study the implications for RCE or
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applications belonging to an art-unit by examiner by filing year cell containing more
than 10 applications. To account for truncation, we exclude pending applications and
those filed after year 2009.
Our unit of analysis is the application, and we adopt a measure of specialization
that varies across both examiners and applications. Specifically, our main explanatory
variable is the share of an examiner’s applications (within an art unit-filing year cell)
having the same USPC subclass as a focal application. To be more precise, define the
set kit(j) of all patents (except for patent i) assigned to examiner j in year t. Let njt
represent the total number of patents reviewed by examiner j in year t, and define
an indicator 1mn that equals one if and only if two patents (m and n) have the same
USPC subclass. Our main explanatory variable can be written as:
Shareijt =
∑
m∈kit(j) 1mi
njt − 1 .
Intuitively, Shareijt equals the probability that a random draw from the pool of
applications assigned to examiner j in year t has the same USPC subclass as the
focal application.
Table 2.3 presents estimates from a series of OLS panel-data regressions that
examine the correlation between Shareijt and prosecution outcomes. To ease inter-
pretation, we standardize Shareijt and the outcome variables except the dummy for
granted patents.20 All models include art unit-by-filing year effects, and standard
errors are clustered at art unit-filing year level.
Columns (1) through (3) report coefficient estimates from a within-examiner re-
gression that has both art-unit-year and examiner fixed effects. In column (1), the
coefficient on Shareijt is -0.03, indicating that examiners are less likely to grant
patents in subclasses where they are assigned more applications. Column (2) finds no
continuation filings in this paper.
20Table A2 displays summary statistics for all variables used in this part of the analysis.
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relationship between within-examiner specialization and the number of words added
to the first claim. In column (3) we find a statistically significant but very small neg-
ative relationship between specialization and processing time: examiners are slightly
faster in the subclasses they see most often.
Columns (4) through (6) report the results from a between-examiner analysis,
where we regress the mean outcome for each examiner on the mean of Shareijt (i.e.
the probability that two random draws from the pool of patents assigned to that
examiner will belong to the same USPC subclass). As before, we standardize all
variables except for the grant rate.
The coefficient in Column (4) indicates that a one standard deviation increase in
Shareijt leads to a 6 percentage point drop in the grant rate. This reinforces the
result in column (1) that specialized examiners are more stringent. The coefficient
in column (5) also suggests that specialization leads to more stringent examination.
However, the economic magnitude of this result is rather small: a one standard de-
viation change in Shareijt produces a 0.10 standard deviation change in the number
of words added to the first claim. Finally, in column (6) we find a small but statisti-
cally significant positive association between specialization and the time required to
process a patent examination.21
The overall message of Table 2.3 is that examiner specialization leads to more
stringent examination, although the economic magnitudes are not dramatic. One
plausible explanation for the finding is that it is easier for an examiner to find relevant
prior art if she is more familiar with a given field of technology, leading to narrower
claims and an increased probability that the application is abandoned. Under random
assignment, these estimates are causal. We prefer a descriptive interpretation.
21We examined whether the results presented in Table 2.3 varied substantially across technology
centers and found that they do not. Those results are available on request.
25
2.5 Conclusions
We study a key stage of patent prosecution: the assignment of applications to ex-
aminers. The first half of our empirical analysis focuses on characterizing the de-
gree of examiner specialization. Using two statistical tests designed to study indus-
try agglomeration, we find strong evidence that examiners specialize in particular
technologies, even within relatively homogenous art units. The degree of specializa-
tion varies across fields. The USPTO technology centers associated with Computers
and Communications exhibit relatively little specialization, while examiners in the
“Biotechnology and Organic Chemistry” and “Chemical and Materials Engineering”
technology centers appear highly specialized. In the latter technology centers, we find
assignee agglomeration even after conditioning on USPC subclasses.
The second part of our analysis shows that more specialized examiners are more
stringent on average. They have a lower grant rate, and produce a larger reduction
in the scope of the first independent claim for granted patents.
It may not seem surprising that we can reject the hypothesis of random matching
between applications and examiners. After all, one reason for having a patent classifi-
cation system is to help route applications to appropriate examiners. However, several
studies have argued that more-or-less random matching (within art-units) provides
a justification for using examiner characteristics as an instrument for examination
outcomes. While our findings do not invalidate this identification strategy – patent
examiner characteristics might still satisfy the relevant exclusion restrictions – they
do imply that we cannot rely on random assignment to justify the approach. Our
findings suggest that random assignment is more plausible within USPC-subclasses,
though not in every technology center.
On a more positive note, our results suggest that the USPTO’s patent examination
process strikes a reasonable balance between efficiency and fairness. Technological
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specialization is efficient. Fairness can be achieved by enforcing uniform examination
standards, which is difficult, or through random assignment, which guarantees all
applicants an equal shot at the more friendly examiners. Conditional on technology,
examiner assignment appears relatively random in the Computing and Communica-
tions areas. And even without controlling for technology, there is no evidence that
certain examiners within a given art unit handle more patents with large families
or broad claims. We leave to future researchers the question of whether procedural
fairness to applicants is also the best policy in terms of social welfare.
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Tables and Figures
Figure 2·1: Distribution of P-values from D-index (top) and MTAD
(bottom) for USPC subclass and Assignee.
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Distribution of p-values of D-index and MTAD analysis for USPC subclass and
Assignee codes. Tests on subsamples with more than 20 applications for D-index and
50 applications for MTAD. Vertical red lines are standard thresholds for statistical
significance (0.01, 0.05 and 0.10).
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Figure 2·2: Quantile-Quantile Plots of D-index (top) and MTAD (bot-
tom) by Art-Unit-Year (left) and Art-Unit-Year-USPC-Subclass (right)
for Assignee.
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Each panel plots the quantiles of the D-index (top row) or MTAD statistic (bottom
row) for the observed distribution (X-axis) against a simulated distribution under
random assignment (Y-axis). Tests on subsamples with more than 20 applications
for D-index and 50 applications for MTAD. If the observed distribution is random,
the quantiles should be the same and the scatter points will fall along the 45-degree
line. We observe large deviations from random assignment at the art-unit-year level,
but much less evidence within art-unit-year-USPC-subclasses.
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Table 2.1: D-index and MTAD Tests within Art-Unit-Years for Ran-
dom Allocation by Technology Center.
Panel A: USPC subclass
D-index MTAD
Technology Center Agg. N Agg. Disp. N
Biotechnology and Organic Chemistry 58.5 1,225 44.9 0.0 563
Chemical and Materials Engineering 82.8 1,393 80.7 0.0 726
Computer Architecture, Software, and Security 11.5 1,766 8.3 0.0 733
Computer Networking and Video Distribution 15.9 968 4.9 0.0 639
Communications 30.8 2,777 56.6 0.0 711
Semiconductors, Electrical and Optical Systems 52.5 4,335 41.8 0.8 848
Miscellaneous† 31.2 1,530 41.8 0.8 756
Mechanical Engineering, Manufacturing, Products 53.9 2,082 61.5 0.0 688
All tests 43.3 16,076 41.8 0.1 5,664
Panel B: Assignee
D-index MTAD
Technology Center Agg. N Agg. Disp. N
Biotechnology and Organic Chemistry 66.8 253 13.5 0.0 533
Chemical and Materials Engineering 57.7 901 41.2 0.0 707
Computer Architecture, Software, and Security 12.2 1,017 0.6 0.0 720
Computer Networking and Video Distribution 15.7 516 0.6 0.0 623
Communications 17.3 1,972 11.7 0.0 686
Semiconductors, Electrical and Optical Systems 31.3 3,640 23.0 0.1 838
Miscellaneous† 40.0 875 21.7 0.0 711
Mechanical Engineering, Manufacturing, Products 51.4 1,141 29.2 0.0 664
All tests 32.1 10,315 18.1 0.0 5,482
Panel C: DOCDB Family Size
D-index MTAD
Technology Center Agg. N Agg. Disp. N
Biotechnology and Organic Chemistry 3.4 795 6.6 0.0 560
Chemical and Materials Engineering 7.7 1,030 9.7 0.0 722
Computer Architecture, Software, and Security 1.8 902 5.3 0.0 730
Computer Networking and Video Distribution 0.8 754 3.1 0.0 637
Communications 4.4 1,034 7.2 0.0 706
Semiconductors, Electrical and Optical Systems 8.6 1,472 12.4 0.2 847
Miscellaneous† 5.5 1,172 8.9 0.3 754
Mechanical Engineering, Manufacturing, Products 8.4 1,113 11.4 0.0 686
All tests 5.5 8,272 8.3 0.1 5,642
Panel D: Words in 1st Claim
D-index MTAD
Technology Center Agg. N Agg. Disp. N
Chemical and Materials Engineering 7.2 1,129 10.8 0.0 721
Computer Architecture, Software, and Security 0.1 895 1.0 0.0 723
Computer Networking and Video Distribution 0.0 755 0.0 0.0 627
Communications 0.5 1,052 0.9 0.0 693
Semiconductors, Electrical and Optical Systems 5.0 1,524 8.8 0.2 843
Miscellaneous† 3.4 1,194 4.9 0.0 741
Mechanical Engineering, Manufacturing, Products 3.2 1,160 4.4 0.0 679
All tests 3.1 7,709 4.6 0.0 5,027
Columns labeled “Agg.” (“Disp.”) report the share of tests that reject the null hypothesis of
random allocation at 5% level in favor of agglomeration (dispersion). All tests are conducted
within art-unit-year cells with more than 20 applications for the D-index and more than 50
applications for MTAD. † Miscellaneous = “Transportation, Construction, Electronic Commerce,
Agriculture, National Security and License & Review.”
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Table 2.2: D-index and MTAD Tests within Art-Unit-Year-USPC-
Subclasses for Random Allocation by Technology Center.
Panel A: Assignee
D-index MTAD
Technology Center Agg. N Agg. Disp. N
Biotechnology and Organic Chemistry 41.4 58 10.0 1.5 200
Chemical and Materials Engineering 17.8 73 5.4 4.7 148
Computer Architecture, Software, and Security 0.0 9 0.0 0.6 162
Computer Networking and Video Distribution 0.0 1 0.0 0.0 63
Communications 0.8 123 0.9 0.0 539
Semiconductors, Electrical and Optical Systems 0.0 92 0.0 0.2 487
Miscellaneous† 11.1 18 3.3 1.7 181
Mechanical Engineering, Manufacturing, Products 3.6 55 1.6 0.0 126
All tests 9.8 429 2.2 0.8 1,906
Panel B: DOCDB Family Size
D-index MTAD
Technology Center Agg. N Agg. Disp. N
Biotechnology and Organic Chemistry 0.0 1,107 2.6 0.0 273
Chemical and Materials Engineering 0.0 1,270 1.1 0.0 185
Computer Architecture, Software, and Security 0.0 1,608 0.0 0.0 228
Computer Networking and Video Distribution 0.0 879 0.0 0.0 78
Communications 0.0 2,609 0.8 0.0 621
Semiconductors, Electrical and Optical Systems 0.0 4,034 0.5 0.0 599
Miscellaneous† 0.0 1,427 0.7 0.0 285
Mechanical Engineering, Manufacturing, Products 0.0 1,922 0.5 0.0 208
All tests 0.0 14,856 0.8 0.0 2,477
Panel C: Words in 1st Claim
D-index MTAD
Technology Center Agg. N Agg. Disp. N
Chemical and Materials Engineering 0.0 1,270 2.2 0.0 184
Computer Architecture, Software, and Security 0.0 1,608 0.0 0.0 197
Computer Networking and Video Distribution 0.0 879 0.0 0.0 77
Communications 0.0 2,609 0.2 0.0 609
Semiconductors, Electrical and Optical Systems 0.0 4,034 1.0 0.0 573
Miscellaneous† 0.0 1,427 0.8 0.0 260
Mechanical Engineering, Manufacturing, Products 0.0 1,922 0.0 0.0 220
All tests 0.0 14,856 0.6 0.0 2,120
Columns labeled “Agg.” (“Disp.”) report the share of tests that reject the null hypothesis of
random allocation at 5% level in favor of agglomeration (dispersion). All tests are conducted
within art-unit-year cells with more than 20 applications for the D-index and more than 50
applications for MTAD. † Miscellaneous = “Transportation, Construction, Electronic Commerce,
Agriculture, National Security and License & Review.”
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Table 2.3: Examiner Specialization and Examination Outcomes.
Model Within Examiner Between Examiner
Outcome Granted Words Days Granted Words Days
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Shareijt -0.03*** 0.00 -0.03*** -0.06*** 0.10*** 0.08***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Art-Unit-Year Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Examiner Effects Y Y Y
Observations 1,936,297 1,935,940 1,077,041 50,579 50,579 45,486
Examiners 50,579 50,579 45,486
All models estimated with OLS. Unit of observation is a patent application. Variables
Shareiijt, Words and Days are standardized. Standard errors clustered by art unit-filing
year in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Chapter 3
Strategic Delays in Prosecution of
Standard Essential Patents at the USPTO
3.1 Introduction
Patents that would be infringed by any implementation of a standard, or Standard
Essential Patents (SEPs), are increasingly important in complex industries. Compa-
nies in the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) sector are investing
significant resources to obtain them (see for example Google’s acquisition of Motorola
for its big patent portfolio or the auction for Nortel’s patents) because they provide
great benefits in terms of licensing revenues and advantages in cross-licensing nego-
tiations. Many SEPs have been involved in important lawsuits (e.g. those between
Apple and Samsung) and there are concerns about the possibility of abuse of the
market power created by SEPs.
In this paper I study how company obtain SEPs. I focus on U.S. SEPs because
these are the largest subset of SEPs from a single country and, more importantly,
because the U.S. patent system provides unique mechanisms that applicants can
exploit to increase the value of their patents. In particular, strategies that give the
opportunity to the applicants to delay the issuance of their patents and to modify
their claims enable companies to cover recent technical developments.
This paper addresses the question of whether applicants for SEPs pursue these
strategies more intensively than other applicants, possibly to cover developments
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of the standardization process. Moreover, I identify the SEP applicants that rely
more on patents in their business models and test whether they use those strategies
more frequently. I also estimate the correlation between standardization timing and,
respectively, issuance of pending applications and filings of continuation applications
to see how the resolution of uncertainty on the content of a standard is associated
with behavior in prosecution. Finally, I analyze the relationship between length of
prosecution and litigation of SEPs.
Standardization often requires cooperation of different parties to develop a com-
mon technological platform and trigger networks effects (Farrell and Simcoe, 2012b;
Katz and Shapiro, 1985; Simcoe, 2012). Participants in standardization have incen-
tives to include their own patented technologies into a standard because technologies
that could be substitutes for the focal patented technology before standardization
become less attractive for standard implementers after the adoption of the standard
(Lerner and Tirole, 2015). While there is evidence of significant selection on economic
and technical importance, Rysman and Simcoe (2008) and Bekkers et al. (2016) show
that forward patent citations significantly increase after a patented technology is in-
cluded into a standard and interpret this finding as positive influence of Standard
Setting Organizations (SSOs) endorsement on the adoption of the technology pro-
tected by a SEP. SEPs are also litigated more often than similar patents, suggesting
that they are more valuable. Ownership of SEPs may also improve the position in
a network of alliances within an industry and confer market power (Bekkers et al.,
2002).
On the other hand, SEPs can be problematic. Many SEPs on a standard may
increase the implementation costs because of royalty stacking. Moreover, the increase
in the bargaining power of SEP owners after standardization may create serious hold-
up problems. After the implementers have incurred technology-specific investments
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in a standard and this has become widely adopted, SEP owners may demand higher
royalties for licensing their patents (Farrell et al., 2007; Lemley and Shapiro, 2007;
Lerner and Tirole, 2015; Shapiro, 2001).
SEP disclosures and the cumulative number of SEPs that cover active standards
are increasing over time. While the share of standards covered by declared SEPs is
still relatively small, the number and the share of new standards subject to SEPs
have also increased over time, especially in ICT. Furthermore, standards subject to
SEPs seem to be more important, complex and innovative (Baron and Pohlmann,
2016; Baron et al., 2016; Bekkers et al., 2016).
It is therefore important to understand how companies obtain SEPs. In this
study I focus on the prosecution of SEPs at the USPTO, with a focus on applicants’
strategic behavior. Other studies analyze the behavior of SEP applicants and how
companies may act strategically to obtain SEPs. Berger et al. (2012) analyze a sample
of European SEPs related to standards developed by the European Telecommunica-
tions Standards Institute (ETSI) and find that SEPs are amended more often than
matched control patents, and SEPs related to UMTS filed after the standard is set
have shorter pendency. Kang and Bekkers (2015) show that owners of SEPs related
to W-CDMA and LTE often file patent applications with low technical merit just
before standardization meetings and negotiate their inclusion in a standard. Kang
and Motohashi (2015) study the relationship between meeting attendance of patent
inventors and their likelihood of obtaining SEPs. Nagaoka et al. (2009) show that
a significant share of SEPs related to MPEG2, DVD and W-CDMA are filed after
the standards are set and exploit continuation applications to benefit from earlier
priorities. Kuhn et al. (2016) find that an outcome of prosecution, the narrowing of
claims, is associated with the probability a patent is declared as essential.
This paper contributes to the literature on the relationship between patents and
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standards analyzing differences in the strategies of applicants for SEPs and those of
similar applications in their prosecution at the USPTO. I use a large sample of SEPs
from multiple important SSOs, matching them with control applications on several
characteristics that are related to both the inclusion into a standard and differences
in prosecution. To my knowledge, this paper is the most comprehensive study of SEP
prosecution to date. Detailed data on the patenting process allow me to measure
various determinants of prosecution time more directly than in previous research.
I find that owners of SEPs are slower to reply to office actions and exploit some
peculiar mechanisms of the U.S. patent system such as chains of continuations and
provisional applications more intensively, possibly to make their patents more relevant
for standards under development and thus increase their value. These differences
persist when I control for application characteristics correlated with the quality of
the technology and the scope of protection sought by the applicant.
Another contribution of the paper is to show with a longitudinal analysis on a
relatively large sample that application disclosure, which I use as a proxy for stan-
dardization, is positively related to both issuance of U.S. SEPs and filing of continu-
ation applications. Previous research relies on cross-sectional evidence from smaller
samples of patents for a limited number of standards.
While in previous works the attention has been often on the achievement of
broader patent scope, I find that SEP applicants behave in a more nuanced way.
Longer prosecution may give more time to SEP owners to achieve the right balance
between broad scope and patent strength. On the one hand, while SEPs and control
applications have similar scope at the beginning of examination, I find that SEPs are
broader when they issue. On the other hand, longer prosecution of SEPs is correlated
with claim narrowing. One possible interpretation is that applicants for SEPs may
want to obtain patents that are broad enough to cover multiple implementations of
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the standards, but not so broad that they would be invalidated in a court.
This paper also contributes to the literatures on how patents are produced and
strategic patenting (Carley et al., 2015; Cohen et al., 2000; Hall and Ziedonis, 2001;
Harhoff and Wagner, 2009; Lemley and Sampat, 2012; Ziedonis, 2004). I find not
only differences between applicants for SEPs and those of other applications, but
also that SEPs held by “upstream” organizations such as knowledge developers and
producers of components have longer lags between priority and issuance than those
owned by “downstream” organizations like producers of end products. Upstream SEP
holders rely more intensively on the main prosecution strategies of SEP applicants, i.e.
continuation applications and provisional applications, and are also slower at replying
to office actions. A simple explanation for this result is that upstream organizations
rely more on patents to generate revenues, and so have higher incentives to obtain
more valuable patents.
Finally, this paper contributes to the literature on patent litigation and in partic-
ular on the litigation of SEPs (Bekkers et al., 2016; Cockburn et al., 2002; Galasso
and Schankerman, 2010; Galasso et al., 2013; Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001; Sim-
coe et al., 2009). My analysis confirms the result of Allison et al. (2004) that longer
prosecution of a patent is positively correlated with litigation even in the context of
SEPs, which are a subset of the population of patents with above-average value.
I provide a short description of the patenting process at the USPTO in section
3.2 and explain how applicants for SEPs can act strategically in their patent pros-
ecution at the USPTO in section 3.3. Section 3.4 presents the methods used to
study the prosecution strategies for SEPs, the relationship between standardization,
patent issuance and continuation filings, and finally how I estimate the association
between issuance lags from priority and litigation. Section 3.5 describes the data for
the empirical analysis. I discuss the results in section 3.6. Section 3.7 concludes.
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3.2 Patenting Process at the USPTO
This section describes the patenting process at the USPTO.1 After an applicant files
a patent application, a central office of the USPTO reviews its formality requirements
and assigns it a serial number. A contractor assigns at least one mandatory techno-
logical classification to the application. This classification is utilized by the USPTO
to assign the application to a group of examiners specialized in relatively similar tech-
nologies called art unit. The supervisory patent examiner of the art unit assigns the
application to an examiner, who is responsible for determining the patentability of
the invention.
The patenting process involves a substantial interaction between the examiner and
the applicant. The examiner inspects the description of the invention and the claims
of the application and searches for relevant prior art that may make an application
unpatentable. To receive patent protection, inventions in patentable subject matter
must be novel (the invention must be different from the prior art), non-obvious (the
invention must be non-obvious for a person with ordinary skills in the invention’s
field) and useful (the invention must have a useful purpose). Also, the application
must disclose the invention in sufficient detail for any person skilled in the art to make
and use the claimed invention. The claims must be clear and use a definite language.
Once the examiner has determined if the application meets the patentability re-
quirements, he sends the First Office Action on the Merits (FOAM) to the applicant.
This action notifies the examiner’s decision to allow or reject the claims in the appli-
cation, supporting the decision with a search report of the relevant prior art. Though
sometimes the examiners allow a patent application at this stage of the process, usu-
ally the FOAM is a non-final rejection.2
1This section draws significantly on chapter 2 and references therein, Carley et al. (2015) Cock-
burn et al. (2002) and Lemley and Sampat (2012).
2Carley et al. (2015) show that about 86% of the applications not originating from continua-
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After a non-final rejection, the applicant can abandon the application, amend the
claims or dispute the rejection. If the applicant submits a revised version of the ap-
plication, the examiner can decide to allow the application or deliver a final rejection.
However, this “final” rejection is by no means really final, because the applicant can
again decide to amend the claims, request an interview with the examiner, appeal the
decision of the examiner, or exploit one of the various continuation options. There are
two types of continuations available to the applicants: serialized and non-serialized
continuations. The first type includes continuation applications, continuations in
part and divisional applications. They are treated as new applications. The second
type includes Requests for Continued Examination (RCEs) and other rare types of
continuations (Cotropia et al., 2013). This second type of continuations reopens the
prosecution of the original application.
It is important to note that applicants can file continuations at any time while
the “parent” application is pending. Divisional applications are usually filed when
the examiner finds that the original application contains more than one invention,
violating the principle of “unity of invention”. RCEs are normally utilized after a
rejection or after the notice of allowance if the applicant is not satisfied with the
allowed claims. Continuation applications and continuations-in-part are utilized to
obtain different claims from those in the parent application or to have another chance
to obtain those that were rejected. Continuation applications cannot add additional
disclosure of the invention and have the benefit of the priority of the original ap-
plication. Continuations-in-part can add additional disclosure, but only the claims
supported by the disclosure in the parent application have the benefits of the priority
of the parent.
The use of continuations, and in particular RCEs and continuation applications,
tions receive a non-final rejection as FOAM. They also provide statistics for allowances, rejections,
abandonments and appeals for the following stages of the examination process.
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is particularly controversial. Some scholars argue that continuations increase the
workload of the USPTO and slow down the patenting process. Continuations also
provide the opportunity to “wear down” the examiners and obtain claims that were
previously rejected or broad claims that the examiners would not otherwise grant,
leading the USPTO to grant “low quality” patents. Moreover, they provide the
opportunity to obtain claims that cover products and technologies developed before
the claims are actually drafted but after the priority date, because the latter defines
the relevant prior art. Companies can therefore exploit continuations of pending
applications to wait for the development of competitors’ new technologies, draft new
claims, and then sue infringers with patents designed to cover those technologies
(Cotropia et al., 2013; Lemley and Moore, 2004).
The examination process ends with either an abandonment of the application or
its issuance. Applications are abandoned for failure to reply to an office action within
a specified period of time or with an express abandonment by the applicant at any
point during prosecution. If the examiner concludes that the application is entitled
to issue as a patent, the applicant receives a notice of allowance and the application
is published as an issued patent, provided the applicant pays the fee on time and does
not reopen prosecution.
There are two ways to modify a patent even after its issuance: reissue patents and
reexaminations. A patent owner that finds an error in an issued patent can file an
application for a reissue.3 On the one hand, a patent owner can narrow the claims of
a patent if she realizes that they are too broad and there is the risk that this would
invalidate the patent. On the other hand, reissues can also be utilized to broaden
the scope of the claims. If a patent owner realizes that the claims do not cover the
3Examples of errors that may be corrected with a reissue are typographical mistakes in the
specification or the drawings, or the exclusion of an inventor from the application. On the contrary,
a patent owner cannot file a reissue application for errors like intentionally failing to disclose relevant
prior art.
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entire scope of the disclosed invention, she can file a reissue application to broaden
the scope of protection within two years from the issue date.
Requests for reexaminations can be filed either by the patent owner or by a third
party at any time during the life of the patent. Third parties can file a request for
reexamination to challenge the validity of a patent. Patent owners often file requests
for reexamination to test the validity of their patents against newly discovered prior
art to make sure the patent is “strong” before enforcing it. If necessary, the patent
owner can narrow the existing claims of the patent to strengthen the patent. After
reexamination, a certificate of correction containing the required changes to the claims
is issued.4
This process offers several opportunities to the applicants to amend the claims
of their patents and manipulate strategically the timing of patent issuance. These
opportunities may be particularly appealing to owners of SEPs. In the next section
I describe how owners of SEPs can act strategically during the prosecution of their
patents at the USPTO.
3.3 Prosecution Strategies for SEPs
While delay strategies and opportunities to modify claims are available to all appli-
cants, they may be particularly appealing for SEP applicants because of the high
economic value of SEPs. Moreover, these strategies may be related to the timing of
standardization. Often the drafting of standards and related patents occurs simul-
taneously. Applicants for SEPs can exploit various strategies enabled by the U.S.
patent system to delay patent issuance and modify claims. A longer prosecution pro-
4The Central Reexamination Unit of the USPTO is responsible for reexaminations. Before year
2012, a patent owner could appeal an unfavorable decision of reexamination to the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences. This was replaced with the Patent Trial and Appeal Board by the
America Invents Act of 2012. This law also substituted inter partes reexaminations with post grant
proceedings. Ex partes reexaminations is still available after 2012.
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cess gives more opportunities to SEP holders to modify the scope of their claims to
make the SEPs more relevant for the related standards and therefore more valuable.
Frequently companies file patent applications that may be related to a standard just
before a standardization meeting. Attending meetings inventors may acquire knowl-
edge relevant to the standardization process and then modify the claims or file patent
applications that cover possible developments of a standard. As long as the applica-
tion is still pending, applicants can amend the claims, possibly to cover the scope of
a standard under development (Bekkers et al., 2016; Berger et al., 2012; Kang and
Bekkers, 2015; Kang and Motohashi, 2015; Nagaoka et al., 2009).
A first strategy that applicants for SEPs can exploit is to delay the start of ex-
amination without losing priority. They can do this using provisional applications
and PCT applications. Provisional applications are not examined and cannot issue
as patents, but the applicant for a provisional applications has 12 months to file a
regular application and claim the benefits of the filing date of the provisional applica-
tion. A provisional application provides a description of the invention but it does not
contain claims, which are included in the regular application filed later. So, provi-
sional applications give the opportunity to applicants for SEPs to delay the drafting
of claims and observe the developments of standardization.5
A PCT application provides a similar opportunity. An applicant exploiting the
PCT route can file a national stage entry application within 30 months from the
priority date (Berger et al., 2012).6
A second strategy is to proceed slowly during examination with the goal of delaying
the issuance of a patent. An applicant can delay the issuance of a patent at the
USPTO by simply taking more time to respond to office actions. The deadline to
respond to office actions is typically within 3 months from the mailing date of the office
5Provisional applications are available to applicants since 1995.
6The USA joined the Patent Cooperation Treaty in 1978.
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action, but applicants can request an extension of time and postpone the deadline 3
months. Applicants for SEPs may be more likely to take more time to reply to office
actions and make more requests for extension of time.
Applicants can also exploit the continuation options to delay prosecution and
modify the claims. Applicants for SEPs may have higher incentives than the average
applicant to reopen prosecution with an RCE after a notice of allowance to gain time
and have a chance to obtain a patent with higher value than the one already allowed.
After applicants observe the final content of a standard, they can make the last
amendments and then close the prosecution of their patents, eventually profiting from
higher bargaining power with potential implementers. Therefore, it is likely to observe
a positive association between the approval of a standard and issuance of the related
patents.
Companies can also exploit serialized continuations, and especially continuation
applications, to obtain SEPs or make them more valuable. Given the high economic
interest at stake, applicants for SEPs have higher incentives to negotiate more ag-
gressively with the USPTO to obtain the claims they want. This may lead to filing
more continuations to have a second chance with the claims of original applications
that were rejected or filing new claims that cover recent developments in standard-
ization. Companies may also exploit continuation applications to cover a standard
after major decisions regarding the design of a standard have been made. As long as
an application is pending, they can file children of the application and possibly cover
the developments of the standardization process with them.
Since the relevant prior art for a continuation application is determined by the
priority date of the parent application, companies have incentives to keep a parent
application pending and delay continuation filings until they observe the final content
of a standard. This gives them the opportunity to cover the content of a standard with
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new claims drafted after a standard has been set, provided that these are supported
by the disclosure in the parent application. Therefore, we should observe an increase
in continuation application filings when a standard is approved (Lemley and Moore,
2004; Nagaoka et al., 2009).
Applicants for SEPs can exploit these strategies to obtain the right balance be-
tween claim breadth and strength. After they observe the content of the standard
related to their SEPs, they can draft a set of claims to obtain a patent that is broad
enough to cover multiple implementations of the standard, but not so broad that it
would be easily invalidated in a court. Broad claims are generally considered more
valuable because they are more difficult to invent around (Kuhn, 2016; Kuhn et al.,
2016). However, overly broad claims may be easier to invalidate. They may be too
broad with respect to the invention disclosed in the patent, their language may be too
vague, or it may be easier to find prior art to invalidate them. Knowing the content
of a related standard, companies can tailor their patents to the main implementations
of the standard and obtain a patent soon after a standard is set, then exploit con-
tinuation applications to obtain additional claims to increase the value of their SEP
portfolio.
SEP holders may also have higher incentives to apply for reissues and SEPs may
be more likely to be involved in reexaminations than other patents. First, SEPs are
more likely to be involved in lawsuits. SEP owners may want to exploit reissues
and reexaminations to improve their bargaining power with potential infringers and
have higher chances of winning a validity challenge. Second, SEP owners may ex-
ploit reissues to modify the claims of their patents because of important events in
standardization that happen after patent issuance.7
Even among SEP owners, organizations with different business models may apply
7SEPs may also have higher reexamination rates because third parties may have higher interests
to question the validity of SEPs with reexaminations.
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different prosecution strategies. In particular, organizations that are more “upstream”
in the value chain may have business models that rely more on the production and sale
or licensing of intellectual property, as opposed to “downstream” companies for which
patents are mainly necessary to obtain freedom to operate and as bargaining chips in
cross-licensing negotiations (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001). Upstream organizations may
have higher incentives to have stronger patents or patents that are more important
for the implementation of a standard. They may apply the prosecution strategies
typical of the SEPs more aggressively.
Finally, companies often try to profit from the assertion of their SEPs once their
value is increased by standardization (Bekkers et al., 2016; Simcoe et al., 2009). A
longer prosecution may increase the value of SEPs making them “more essential” and
may be exploited to draft a stronger patent that would be less likely invalidated in
a court. It can also be exploited to cover implementations of a standard and then
assert the patent against those implementers unwilling to pay licensing fees to the
SEP owner. Therefore, a longer prosecution is likely to be positively correlated with
litigation.
3.4 Methods
In this section I describe the methods utilized to analyze the prosecution strategies of
applicants for SEPs and the relationship between length of prosecution and litigation.
3.4.1 Prosecution Strategies
Suppose we have a sample of patent applications. The ideal setting to study the
effect of potential standard essentiality on prosecution strategies would be an exper-
iment in which half of these applications become at risk of becoming essential for a
standard, while the others do not and are in the control group. In other words, in
this experiment the “treatment” would be the random assignment of standard pro-
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posals that may cover the technology protected by the application. The comparison
in mean outcomes between potentially essential applications and controls would pro-
vide an estimate of the average treatment effect of potential standard essentiality on
prosecution strategies.
This experiment is not available, but we can compare the prosecution strategies of
SEPs and other patent applications with observational data. However, the potential
inclusion of a patented technology into a standard is not random. To compare SEP
applications to similar applications, I identify “control” applications that are similar
to the SEP applications with respect to a set of observable characteristics that are
related to the inclusion of an application into a standard and are also related to
differences in prosecution.
There is substantial technological specialization at the USPTO (see chapter 2).
Differences across art units and even across examiners working in the same art unit
are related to differences in prosecution (Farre-Mensa et al., 2015; Frakes and Wasser-
man, 2014; Kuhn et al., 2016; Lemley and Sampat, 2012; Sampat and Williams, 2015).
Since SEPs are mostly concentrated in ICT-related fields (Baron and Pohlmann,
2016), it is important to take these differences into account. Moreover, small and
large organizations may have different propensities to participate in standardization
and to include patented technologies into a standard, and previous research shows
a relationship between firm size, propensity to patent and differences in prosecution
(Carley et al., 2015; Griliches, 1990; Scherer, 1983). Also, there are significant differ-
ences in prosecution between foreign and domestic applicants (Carley et al., 2015),
and U.S. SEPs are less likely than the average application to have a foreign priority.
Finally, different cohorts of applications may have a different probability of being
included into standards and to be prosecuted differently because of changes in SSOs
IP policies, in patent laws, in examination at the USPTO and in prosecution strate-
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gies of the applicants over time (e.g. Baron and Spulber (2016) and Sukhatme and
Cramer (2014)).
To take into account these differences, I match each SEP application with a ran-
domly selected regular utility patent application filed in the same year, classified in
the same USPC class, assigned to the same art unit and the same examiner, with
the same small entity status of the applicant (i.e. small entity or not) of the SEP
application.8 I also match on two indicator variables equal to one if the filing dates of
the applications are respectively on or after June, 8, 1995 (enactment of the TRIPS)
and on or after November, 29, 2000 (enactment of the American Inventor’s Protec-
tion Act - AIPA) to take into account two major law changes that may have affected
the prosecution strategies of applicants, and an indicator variable equal to one if
the application claims the benefit of a foreign patent application to identify foreign
applicants.
If one is willing to assume that the matched control applications are a valid coun-
terfactual for the matched SEPs, the comparison of the mean outcomes between
matched SEPs and matched controls would provide an estimate of the effect of po-
tential standard essentiality on prosecution strategies. However, previous research
provides evidence of substantial selection into standards based on quality of tech-
nologies and patents (Rysman and Simcoe, 2008; Bekkers et al., 2016). Valuable
applications are likely prosecuted differently, so these simple comparison may have
an endogeneity problem due to unobserved heterogeneity. For example, more valuable
applications usually have longer prosecution (Allison et al., 2004). So the exclusion
of application value from an empirical model would lead to an upward bias in the
estimated correlation between SEP status and length of prosecution.
It is hard to find good measures of patent application value. To partially reduce
8So-called small entities receive discounts on various fees of the patenting process. The USPTO
considers as small entities universities, nonprofit organizations, individual inventors and “small busi-
ness concerns”. The latter are businesses with no more than 500 employees or affiliates.
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the endogeneity concerns related to its omission, I estimate regression models on the
matched sample controlling for some observables that may be related to technical or
economic value. These characteristics include the number of claims, the number of
words in the first independent claim and the number of inventors. The claims of a
patent define the scope of patent protection and the number of claims in a patent is
positively correlated with its private value (Gambardella et al., 2008). Kuhn et al.
(2016) and Kuhn (2016) advocate for the use of the length of the first independent
claim as a better measure of patent scope, and show that this is negatively correlated
with patent value as measured by patent sale and payment of patent maintenance
fees. The number of inventors may also be correlated with the value of an invention,
as patents produced by teams of inventors receive more forward patent citations,
which are often utilized to measure the value of a patent (Wuchty et al., 2007).
Therefore, to estimate the correlation between SEP status and prosecution strate-
gies, I estimate the following regression:
Yi = SEPiα +Xiβ + εi (3.1)
where Yi is the outcome of the regression (for example, the length of prosecution) for
application i, SEPi is an indicator variable equal to one for SEP applications and zero
for the matched controls, Xi is a vector of control variables that includes a small entity
status indicator, a foreign priority indicator, a set of filing year effects, a set of art
unit effects and the natural logarithms of the number of claims, the number of words
in the first independent claim of the application and the number of inventors. The
coefficient of interest is α, which estimates the correlation between SEP status and
prosecution strategies and outcomes. εi represents the error term. I also estimate
similar models in which Yi is either an application characteristic, a prosecution or
post-grant outcome to compare SEPs and controls on these variables as well.
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Another major threat to the identification of the effect of potential standard essen-
tiality is reverse causality. Prosecution strategies may make an application essential
for a proposed standard even if it was not essential originally or make it more likely
to become essential, and some variables that I use as outcomes in the regressions are
measured before a patent becomes a SEP. Moreover, many patents are declared es-
sential after they are granted. So the causal flow may go from prosecution strategies
to SEP status. Examples of this are the filing of continuation applications or RCEs
to cover a standard after a standard is set, or the use of provisional applications to
delay the drafting of claims. In this scenario, a regression of the use of continuation
procedures or provisional applications against SEPi would produce a coefficient α
biased upwards. Ideally, I would use an instrumental variable to instrument SEP
status. I leave this analysis for future work, but it is important to keep in mind this
issue when interpreting the results.
Then, I discard the control group and focus on the relationship between the busi-
ness model of the applicants for SEPs and prosecution strategies. To do that, I drop
the SEP indicator from model 3.1 and add an indicator variable equal to one for
“upstream” applicants.
3.4.2 Standardization, patent issuance and continuation filings
Suppose we observe a sample of applications at risk of becoming essential for a pro-
posed standard under development. In the ideal experiment to estimate the relation-
ship between standardization and patent issuance, I would treat a subsample of these
SEP applications with resolution of uncertainty over the content of the related stan-
dards. The comparisons of the issuance rates after a given amount of time between
treated and control SEPs would provide estimates of the effect of standardization on
issuance.
I use a sample of SEPs declared essential for a standard before they issue as
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patents to estimate this relationship in a longitudinal analysis, exploiting variation
in standardization over time. It is hard to link SEP disclosures to specific standard
documents and observe when uncertainty on standard proposals is resolved, so I
utilize the date of disclosure of a SEP as a proxy for standardization (Rysman and
Simcoe, 2008; Simcoe et al., 2009; Bekkers et al., 2016). I match these SEPs to control
applications using the same matching strategy I utilized above. Utilizing application-
month as unit of observation, I estimate OLS models based on the following regression:
Issuedit = Discloseditα +Xitβ + εit (3.2)
where Issuedit is a binary variable equal to one if application i issues as patent in
month t, Disclosedit is a binary variable equal to one since the month of disclosure of
a SEP, Xit is a vector of control variables and εit is the error term. SEPs are at risk
of issuance from their filing month to the month of issuance (and dropped from the
estimation sample afterwards) or to the end of the sample period if they do not issue
as patents (and censored). Depending on the model, the control variables include an
indicator for the SEPs, calendar month effects, age (in months) since filing effects,
art unit effects, indicators for serialized continuations, use of provisional and PCT
applications, small entity status of the applicant and foreign priority, and the natural
logarithms of the number of inventors, the number claims of the application and the
number of words in the first independent claim of the application.
The coefficient of interest is α and measures the correlation between standardiza-
tion, as proxied by disclosure, and the probability of issuance. On the one hand, if
one is willing to assume that there are no unobservable time-varying factors related
to both disclosure and issuance, model 3.2 estimates the effect of standardization
on issuance. On the other hand, it is possible that companies disclose their SEPs
when they observe signals from the examiners that they have high chances to ob-
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tain a patent. As these signals are unobservable to me, they would bias upwards my
estimates of α.
To estimate the correlation between the filing of continuation applications and
standardization, I use as outcome the count of continuation applications of an appli-
cation i filed in month t (CONsit). The models are based on
E[CONsit|Xit] = exp(Discloseditα +Xitβ) (3.3)
where Disclosedit is a binary variable equal to one since the month of disclosure of a
SEP and Xit is a vector of control variables as above. I estimate these models with
Poisson regressions. Applications can have continuations from their filing month to
the month of issuance or abandonment or to the end of the sample period if they do
not issue as patents.
3.4.3 Prosecution length and litigation
The final part of the empirical analysis studies the relationship between the length
of prosecution and litigation. I use a cross-section of SEPs disclosed as essential for
a standard before their issuance to estimate models based on the following equation:
Yi = log(Pendencyi)α +Xiβ + εi (3.4)
where Yi is an indicator for litigated patents, log(Pendencyi) is the natural logarithm
of the number of days between the earliest priority date of SEP i and its issuance, Xi
contains the control variables and εi is the error term.
The coefficient of interest is α, which estimates the correlation between the length
of prosecution and litigation. We should interpret the results of these models with
caution, because the estimates are only cross-sectional and vulnerable to omitted
variable bias. It is hard to include in the empirical model all the characteristics of
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a patent that may be related to litigation and prosecution length. For example, one
can imagine that more important SEPs may have a longer prosecution because the
applicants may want to invest more resources in drafting their claims or may spend
more time negotiating with the patent examiners to obtain the claims they want or a
stronger patent. As the value of a patent is also likely correlated with the probability
it is enforced, the coefficient of prosecution length may be biased upwards in a simple
regression of litigation against prosecution length.
To attempt to control for the heterogeneity across patents related to prosecution
length and litigation, I include in the models issue year effects, indicators for small
entity status of the applicant and foreign priority, a set of USPC class effects to
control for differences across technological fields, and the natural logarithms of the
number of inventors, the number of claims of the patent and the number of words of
the first independent claim of the patent. The next section describes the data I use
in the empirical analysis.
3.5 Data
I combine data from several sources. The data on SEPs come from the Disclosed
Standard Essential Patents (dSEP) Database. This database provides the SEPs dis-
closed to 13 major SSOs as of March 2011 and it is described in details in Bekkers
et al. (2016).9 10 I match the SEPs with the USPTO Patent Examination Research
9The SSOs covered by declared SEPs database are: the American National Standards Institute
(ANSI), the Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions (ATIS), the Broadband Forum
(BBF), the European Committee for Standardization (CEN), the European Committee for Elec-
trotechnical Standardization (CENELEC), the European Telecommunications Standards Institute
(ETSI), the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), the Institute of Electrical and Elec-
tronics Engineers (IEEE), the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), the International Organiza-
tion for Standardization (ISO), the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the Open Mobile
Alliance (OMA) and the Telecommunications Industry Association (TIA).
10The use of these data relies on the assumption that the patents listed in the dSEP database
are at risk of being essential for the implementation of a proposed standard. The dSEP database
is based on the disclosure letters submitted to SSOs by participants in the development of new
standards. During the standardization process many SSOs require their members to list the patents
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Dataset (Graham et al., 2015), which provides the information available in the Pub-
lic Patent Application Information Retrieval system (Public PAIR) as of January 24,
2015. This is the source of information on the prosecution strategies. I supplement
these data with patent citation data from PatentsView11 and claims data from the
Patent Claims Research Dataset (Marco et al., 2016). Data on patent litigation in
U.S. district courts come from Thomson Innovation.12
The sample of SEPs contains 4,479 U.S. regular utility patents and patent ap-
plications, of which 85 are abandoned and 48 are still pending at the beginning of
2015. 881 SEPs are disclosed while they are still pending applications. Table B1
shows the descriptive statistics for this sample of SEPs. These SEPs were classified
in 103 USPC classes and examined by 1,174 examiners affiliated with 353 art units.
Because of the technological scope of the SSOs covered by the dSEP database, most
of these SEPs cover technologies related to Computers and Communications or Elec-
trical components (table B2 shows the distribution of SEPs by Technology Center of
the USPTO). 9% of the SEPs in this sample were litigated at least once before year
2015.
To study differences in prosecution related to the business model of applicants, I
exploit the information on the business model of SEP owners provided in the dSEP
database and the information on the assignees from the USPTO Patent Assignment
Dataset (Marco et al., 2015). I retrieve the identity of the first assignee of each
SEP in my sample and match the assignees with the information on the business
model from the dSEP database to create two groups of organizations: “upstream”
and “downstream”, which filed 725 and 2,505 SEPs respectively.13 Table B3 provides
(or the patent applications) that would be infringed by a proposed standard.
11Data downloaded from http://www.patentsview.org on February 26, 2016 with coverage
through July 21, 2015.
12Data downloaded on April 28, 2016.
13I only keep the first assignee from the filing date of the application. When there are mul-
tiple assignments on the same date, I randomly pick one. Then, I clean the assignee names for
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the list of assignees that have more than 30 SEPs, along with their business model.14
I use the data from Public PAIR to characterize the prosecution strategies of ap-
plicants. For each patent application, I identify the number of “children” continuation
applications, continuations-in-part and divisionals and whether it is a continuation,
continuation-in-part or divisional of other applications. I also identify whether the ap-
plication claims the benefit of a provisional or PCT application. For granted patents,
I use the filing date, the earliest priority from the continuity data (serialized continu-
ations, provisional and PCT applications) and foreign priorities to construct variables
that measure the number of days between each of these dates and the issue date of the
patent. I use the transaction histories of the applications to retrieve the information
on the requests for extension of time, the filings of RCEs after a notice of allowance
and to measure the time between the first non-final rejection of an application and
the response of the applicant. For granted patents, I also identify the filings of reis-
sues and reexaminations. In the next section, I describe the results of the analysis
of the prosecution strategies, their relationship with standardization and finally with
litigation.
3.6 Results
In this section I describe the results of the empirical analysis. I start with the com-
parison of SEPs and matched control applications. Then I analyze the relationship
between standardization, SEP issuance and filing of continuation applications of the
an easier match with the dSEP database using an automated name cleaning routine that builds
upon the one developed for the NBER Patent Data Project (https://sites.google.com/site/
patentdataproject/Home/posts/namestandardizationroutinesuploaded) and Thoma et al.
(2010). Details on my routine are available upon request.
14Upstream organizations include pure upstream knowledge developers and patent holding com-
panies, universities and public research institutes, nation states, as well as producers of components
(including semiconductors). Downstream organizations include those whose business model is clas-
sified as “Software and software-based services”, “Equipment suppliers, product vendors, system
integrators”, “Measurement and instrument, test systems”, “Service providers (telecommunications,
radio, television, etc.)” or “SSOs, fora and consortiam, technology promotors” in the dSEP database.
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SEPs. Finally, I estimate the correlation between the length of SEP prosecution and
litigation.
3.6.1 Prosecution strategies
To construct the sample of matched SEPs and control applications, I first discard
applications with missing values for the variables utilized to match. I could find
a good match for 4,253 of the 4,470 SEP applications without missing values for
filing date, examiner, art unit or USPC class (i.e. 95%). Table 3.1 compares the
prosecution strategies of matched SEPs and control applications along with other
observable characteristics of the applications, prosecution outcomes and litigation, by
displaying the means of the variables of interest, the p-values of t-tests for differences
in means and the normalized differences between SEPs and controls.15 16
Post-grant outcomes are markedly different for SEPs and control patents. Con-
ditional on issuance, SEPs have a much higher probability of being litigated (9%
against 2%) and receive a higher number of forward citations, which are often consid-
ered measures of patent value. This confirms previous findings (Bekkers et al., 2016;
Rysman and Simcoe, 2008). SEPs also seem to provide broader protection than the
control patents: they have shorter first claims and a higher number of claims. They
are also more likely to have reissue applications and being involved in reexamination.
Consistent with the view that SEPs are more likely to be part of chains of con-
tinuations, SEPs have a number of children continuations between twice and three
15Table B4 compares the SEPs with all regular utility patent applications in Public PAIR.
16For each variable X, the normalized difference between SEPs and controls is defined as:
∆X =
Xt −Xc√
(S2X,t + S
2
X,c)/2
where Xt is the mean of variable X for the SEPs, Xc is the mean of the variable for the controls,
and SX,t and SX,c are their standard deviations. It provides a comparison of the means for the
groups alternative to a t-test, because the t-statistics may be very large just because the sample is
large (Imbens, 2014).
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times that of the matched controls.
While the time between the filing date of the application and issuance is about
the same for SEPs and control applications, the lag between the earliest priority and
issuance is substantially longer for SEPs: SEPs take about 5 more months to issue
as patents when the lag is computed utilizing either the priority from the continuity
data (i.e. continuations, PCT applications and provisional applications) or the earliest
priority (which takes into account also foreign priorities). This is consistent with a
more intense use of strategies to delay the filing of the SEP application: SEPs are
more likely to claim the priority of provisional applications and PCT applications,
and to be serialized continuations.
Applicants for SEPs are also more likely to take actions that prolong examination
or delay issuance: they are 5 days slower to respond to the first non-final rejection,
file about 0.14 more requests for extension of time, accumulate about 25 more days
of applicant delay for the computation of the patent term adjustment, and are 2%
more likely to file an RCE after a notice of allowance.17
Even after matching on relevant observables, SEPs seem to be more valuable
applications. SEPs have a slightly higher number of inventors. While the difference
in length of the first independent claim of the application is small and not statistically
significant at conventional levels, SEPs have about 2 more claims. Taken together
with the results on claim length and number for the granted patents, these results
support the view that patents that are narrowed less during prosecution are more
likely to be included into a standard (Kuhn et al., 2016).
Table 3.2 analyzes the differences between SEP applications and matched control
applications in a regression framework, controlling for differences in observables. It
17The U.S. patent system provides additional days of patent term to patents that experience a
reduction of the patent term due to delays of the USPTO. Applications filed on or after May 29, 2000,
receive additional days of patent term for various types of delays in examination. This adjustment
is reduced by delays of the applicant to respond to office actions within certain deadlines.
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reports a series of coefficients of an indicator variable equal to one for SEP appli-
cations, together with their standard errors and p-values. We can interpret these
coefficients as the differences between SEPs and control patents in the variables of in-
terest controlling for art unit, filing year, small entity status, foreign priority, number
of inventors, number of claims and scope of the application.18
The results of these regressions largely confirm those of the differences in means.
Conditional on being granted, SEP applications receive more citations, are broader
both in terms of claims and in length of the first independent claim, and are 2%
more likely to be litigated. However, the differences in the probability of reissues and
reexaminations are now very small and statistically insignificant.
The regressions also confirm that SEP applications are more likely to have contin-
uation applications, continuations-in-part and divisionals. They are also more likely
to be serialized continuations and to benefit from provisional applications. However,
the difference in the probability of utilizing a PCT application is now statistically
insignificant.
The regressions also confirm the difference in the issuance lag when we compute it
from the earliest priority: prosecution of SEPs is about 5% longer than the prosecution
of the controls, ceteris paribus.
The differences in terms of actions taken to delay prosecution are also confirmed:
applicants for SEPs take about 4% more time to reply to the first non-final rejection,
file 11% more requests of extension of time, are 4% more likely to file an RCE after
the notice of allowance, and accumulate almost 80% more applicant delay for the
computation of the patent term adjustment. Interestingly, the USPTO is slower
18The sample used in these regressions is different from the sample used in table 3.1 because I
exclude applications filed before the enactment of the AIPA, unpublished applications, and applica-
tions with missing values for the explanatory variables in the regressions from the potential matches.
I do not include a set of indicators for the USPC classes because many of these are collinear with
the art unit effects. This is due to the technological specialization of most art units in a relatively
small number of technological classes.
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to process SEPs applications and accumulates 63% more delay for the computation
of the patent term adjustment. This may be due to their complexity or because the
interaction with more aggressive applicants is more time consuming for the examiners.
To analyze differences in prosecution strategies of SEPs related to different busi-
ness models, I discard the matched sample and use all the SEPs whose business model
of the original assignee was classified as either upstream or downstream. Table 3.3
shows the coefficients of the upstream indicator, their standard errors and their p-
values from regressions of the variables of interest against the upstream indicator and
control variables.
The results show that upstream SEP owners exploit some prosecution strategies
more aggressively. Upstream SEP owners are more likely to file SEPs that are contin-
uation applications and continuations-in-part and file continuation applications of the
SEPs. They also use provisional applications more often. However, SEPs of down-
stream organizations are more likely to claim priority to PCT applications. This
result is not surprising, since the group of downstream players contains many big
manufactures of end products active on a global scale.
Upstream organizations are 8% more likely to file an RCE after the notice of
allowance, take 18% more days to respond to non-final rejections, request 9% more
extensions of time and accumulate 70% more days of applicant delay.
Taken together, these prosecution strategies result in issuance lags from the prior-
ity date that are 13% longer for upstream players. These results are consistent with
the idea that upstream organizations have higher incentives to delay issuance because
patents are more relevant for their business models.19
In the analysis reported in table 3.4 I estimate the contribution of the main pros-
ecution strategies to the lag between the earliest priority date and SEP issuance. I
19I also estimates models that pool together upstream players and unclassified assignees. Unclas-
sified assignees are often small organizations that are likely to behave as the upstream players. I
report the results in table B5. The results are consistent with those reported in the main text.
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run a set of OLS regressions with the natural logarithm of the number of days from
the earliest priority to the grant date as outcome variable. The main explanatory
variables include (i) an indicator variable equal to one for patents from serialized
continuations, (ii) an indicator variable for patents claiming priority to a provisional
application, (iii) an indicator variable for patents claiming priority to a PCT applica-
tion, (iv) the count of requests for extension of time between the filing date and the
grant date of the patent and (v) an indicator for the filing of an RCE after the notice
of allowance of the patent.
Model (1) includes only the main five explanatory variables. Model (2) controls
for the number of inventors, filing year effects, art unit effects, small entity status
and foreign priority. Model (3) adds the logarithms of applicant and USPTO delays
as well as binary variables to control for no delays due to applicant and USPTO.
Model (4) adds the measures of application claim scope. Finally, model (5) adds the
indicator for upstream organizations.
Serialized continuations have longer lags. Depending on the specification, the
lag for serialized continuations is between 48% and 56% longer than for other SEPs,
ceteris paribus. SEPs claiming the benefits of provisional applications and PCT appli-
cations also have longer lags on average: the coefficients of the provisional application
indicator imply an increase by 7%-26% in the lags, and those of the PCT dummy by
25%-51%, ceteris paribus.
Requests for extension of time also significantly delay the grant date of a patent:
depending on the model, each request delays the issue date by between 7% and 15%.
Similarly, filing an RCE after the notice of allowance is associated with lags longer
by 9%-31%.
The prosecution of SEPs assigned to upstream organizations is 5% longer than
the prosecution of SEPs assigned to downstream organizations even after controlling
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for the main observable strategies and application characteristics. This suggest that
upstream organizations may delay prosecution using other strategies (unobservable
to us), for example simply taking more time to respond to office actions.20
It is also interesting to test whether the scope of the claims of SEPs that spent
more time in prosecution is actually modified more. Ideally, we should read the
original applications, compare them to the granted SEP and assess how the scope of
protection changes. In practice this is not possible, but we can test whether they are
modified more. For example, Berger et al. (2012) show that SEPs in their sample
have more amendments than matched controls. In the next step of the analysis, I
estimate the relationship between the change in the number of words to the first
independent claim between the granted patent and the published application and the
time between the filing date and issuance. So I regress the change in the number of
words in the first independent claim against the natural logarithm of the number of
days between the filing date of the application and the issue date of the patent and a
set of control variables. I estimate the models with OLS on the sample of SEPs that
were filed after the enactment of the AIPA and published before issuance. I report
the results in table 3.5.21
The model in column (1) includes only the main explanatory variable, the days
between filing and issuance, and control variables for USPTO delays for the computa-
tion of the patent term in order to better measure delays due to applicant decisions.
The coefficient of the filing-issuance lag is statistically significant at 1% and implies
that a 1% increase in the filing-issuance lag is associated with an increase in the length
of the first independent claim by 0.5 words. I add a set of filing year effects and in-
20I check the robustness of the OLS regressions estimating Poisson models (table B6). The results
are similar to those commented in the main text. Unreported results of OLS models using only the
SEPs disclosed as essential before they issue as patents are also similar.
21I restrict the analysis to the prosecution of the SEP between the filing date and issuance because
I compare the issued patent to the published application.
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dicators for serialized continuations, provisional and PCT applications, small entity
status, foreign priority and control for the number of inventors in model (2). The
coefficient is essentially unchanged. Adding a set of art unit effects greatly reduces
the magnitude of the coefficient of interest, which now implies a 0.3 increase in claim
length associated with a 1% increase in days between filing and issuance. Finally,
I add controls for the initial scope of the application in column (4). The coefficient
drops and is less precisely estimated, but it is still statistically significant at 10% level
and implies an increase by almost 0.2 words associated with a 1% increase in time
between filing and issuance.
Interpreting claim length as a measure of patent scope, the results imply that
longer prosecution of a SEP is associated with claim narrowing. Given that SEPs have
broader scope at the end of prosecution but are similar to matched control applications
in terms of scope at filing, one possible explanation is that applicants for SEP use a
longer prosecution to achieve a good balance between obtaining a sufficiently broad
and strong patent. Narrower patents may be less likely to be invalidated in a court.
So SEP owners may want to tailor the claims to cover development in standardization
and obtain patents that are just broad enough to cover them without risking their
invalidation.22 23
Now I move to the results of the analysis of the relationship between standardiza-
tion, patent issuance and continuation filings.
22I estimate these models also only on subsample of SEPs disclosed before issuance (table B7).
The magnitude of the coefficient of time between filing and issue dates is even bigger in these models,
though the model in column (4) is not statistically significant at conventional levels, probably for
the big drop in sample size.
23The observed relationship may be due also to delays of the patent office. However, I partially
control for this with use of control variables related to USPTO delays for the computation of the
patent term.
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3.6.2 Standardization, patent issuance and continuation filings
In the first part of this section I analyze the relationship between standardization and
patent issuance. Taking the disclosure date as proxy for the standardization date, I
focus on SEPs that are declared essential for a standard before they issue as patents
and observe whether disclosure is associated with a higher probability of issuance.
Table 3.6 shows the results of the OLS models in which each observation is an
application-month, the outcome is an indicator for issuance and the main explanatory
variable is an indicator equal to one starting in the month of disclosure of a SEP. The
models are estimated using the sample of SEP applications declared essential for a
standard before their issuance and with filing date on or after the date of enactment
of AIPA. This is to reduce concerns of selecting on the outcome that may arise using
older applications, because before the AIPA only granted patents were published.
I use a sample of SEPs and matched control applications, matched using the same
strategy adopted above. Applications are at risk of issuance from their filing month
to the month of issuance (and dropped from the estimation sample afterwards) or to
the end of year 2014 if they do not issue as patents (and censored).24
Models (1)-(3) compare the matched SEPs with their matched controls. Model (1)
includes only the indicator variable for SEP application disclosure, the indicator for
SEPs, calendar month effects to control for changes in the grant rate of the USPTO
over time and a set of age-since-filing-month effects to control for the increase in the
probability of issuance over time. The coefficient of SEP disclosure is statistically
significant at 1% level and implies a 0.7% increase in the probability of issuance after
disclosure. This may seem a small increase in absolute terms but it is relatively
24The last SEPs in this sample were filed in 2011. This ensures enough time for their publication
before the end of the sample period (and the publication of their matched controls, which have the
same filing year). About 17% of the applications in the estimation sample are abandoned before
issuance (this percentage is about 10% for the SEPs). For these applications the last month in the
sample is the month of abandonment.
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very large: the probability of issuance in a given month in the sample is about 1.3%.
Models (2) and (3) control for characteristics of the application that are fixed at filing,
such as indicator variables for serialized continuations, provisional applications, PCT
applications, small entity status, foreign priority, number of inventors (model 2),
length of the first independent claim and the number of claims of the application
(model 3). The coefficient of disclosure in both models is still statistically significant
at 1% level and very similar to the one of the previous model. It is interesting to
note that the coefficient of the SEP indicator is negative and statistically significant
at 1% level in all models. Ceteris paribus, SEPs have a longer prosecution than the
controls.
Models (4)-(6) discard the control applications and are estimated on the sample
of SEP applications declared essential for a standard before their issuance and with
filing date on or after the date of enactment of AIPA. The specifications are the same
used in models (1)-(3), but they do not include the SEP indicator. The coefficient
of SEP disclosure is statistically significant at 1% level in all models and implies an
increase in the probability of SEP issuance between 1% and 1.2% after disclosure.
I check the robustness of this analysis to the exclusion of ETSI SEPs (and their
control applications) in table B8. Bekkers et al. (2016) show that the particular rules
of this SSO lead companies to disclose a high number of SEPs compared with other
SSOs, and that these SEPs may have lower importance. The results are essentially
unchanged.
In the second part of this section I analyze the relationship between standard-
ization and continuation application filings. I estimate Poisson models on samples
similar to those for patent issuance. The outcome in this models is the number of
continuation applications claiming priority to the focal application. The results are
reported in table 3.7.
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Applications are at risk of having continuation applications from their filing month
until they are either issued or abandoned. I truncate the sample period at the end of
year 2012 to allow enough time for the publication of applications for the construction
of the outcome.
Models (1) and (2) are estimated on the matched sample. Model (1) is a very
simple model that includes only the SEP disclosure dummy and the SEP indicator.
The coefficient of the SEP indicator is statistically significant at 1% level and implies
a number of continuations higher by 38% for the SEPs compared with the controls.
Surprisingly, the coefficient of the disclosure dummy is negative but its standard error
is very large. Model (2) is estimated with conditional fixed-effect Poisson regression
and also includes month effects and the non-linear terms of a fourth degree polynomial
of age since filing month. The coefficient of disclosure is positive but imprecisely
estimated.
Models (3) and (4) are estimated with the same specifications, but discard the
control applications and use all SEP applications declared essential for a standard
before their issuance and with filing date on or after the date of enactment of AIPA.
The coefficient of the disclosure indicator in model (3) is positive but not statistically
significant at conventional levels. The coefficient of disclosure in the fixed-effects
model is statistically significant at 1% level and very large: it implies an increase by
125% in the number of continuations filed after SEP disclosure.25
To summarize the results of these section, standardization (as proxied by disclo-
sure of SEPs) is positively correlated with patent issuance and continuation applica-
tion filings, even if the evidence for continuations is weaker. In the next section, I
analyze how the lag between priority and issuance is related to litigation.
25The results of this analysis are robust to the exclusion of SEPs declared to ETSI. See table B9.
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3.6.3 Prosecution length and litigation
In the last part of the empirical analysis I analyze the association between the length of
prosecution of SEPs and litigation. Table 3.8 presents the results of linear probability
models that estimate the association between length of prosecution and probability
of litigation. The sample for these regressions is a cross-section of SEPs disclosed
before their issue date. I limit the analysis to this sample because I want to focus
on patents that are included into a standard while they are still prosecuted. The
outcome is a binary indicator equal to one if a SEP is litigated before year 2015. The
main explanatory variable is the natural logarithm of the number of days between
the earliest priority of the patent and its issuance.
Model (1) includes only the issuance lag and issue year effects. The coefficient
of the issuance lag is statistically significant at 1% and implies that a 10% increase
in the issuance lag is associated with a 0.7% increase in the probability of litigation.
Model (2) adds indicators for small entity status and foreign priority and controls for
the number of inventors. Model (3) adds control variables for the scope of the patent.
Model (4) adds a set of USPC class effects. In these three models the coefficient of
the issuance lag is statistically significant at 1% and implies that a 10% increase in
the issuance lag is associated with a 0.9% increase in the probability of litigation.
Given that the percentage of litigated patents in the estimation sample is about 4%,
this is a non-negligible increase.26
To summarize, SEPs with a long time period between priority and issuance are
more likely to be litigated even after controlling for differences across technologies,
type of applicant, time trends and proxies for patent value. This may be because
26I check the robustness of the results excluding SEPs disclosed to ETSI (table B10), using as
outcome an indicator equal to one if the SEP is litigated within 5 years from the issue date (table
B11), estimating logit models and using litigation data from an alternative source (Lex Machina).
The results are qualitatively similar, even though those for the models that use the 5-year window
are less precise, possibly because of the drop in sample size related to the use of the time window.
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applicants exploit a longer prosecution to change the claims of their SEPs to cover
a related standard and make them more valuable. On the other hand, unobserved
differences across patents may also explain the results. So I suggest interpreting this
result carefully.
3.7 Conclusions
In this paper I analyze the prosecution strategies of applicants for SEPs at the
USPTO. The central hypothesis of the study is that applicants for SEPs have in-
centives to delay the issuance of their patents, especially when standards and patents
are developed at the same time. Applicants for SEPs can exploit several options pro-
vided by the U.S. patent system to delay the prosecution of their patents, observe the
developments of the standardization process and draft claims that cover a standard.
I compare the prosecution strategies of SEPs and very similar patents, and find
that SEPs have significantly longer issuance lags from the priority date. This is ob-
tained using more intensively peculiar instruments of the U.S. patent system, such as
provisional applications, chains of continuations and filings of RCEs. Moreover, appli-
cants for SEPs take more time to respond to office actions. The idea that SEP owners
delay patent issuance to cover standards is supported by the positive correlation be-
tween standardization and patent issuance. Moreover, standardization is positively
related with the filings of continuation application, which suggest a strategic use of
the continuation procedure to cover standards with additional claims.
It is possible that SEP owners exploit the delays to achieve the right balance be-
tween patent breadth and patent strength in order to obtain more valuable patents:
while SEPs are broader than comparable patents, longer prosecution of SEPs is pos-
itively correlated with patent narrowing. This may make their patents “more essen-
tial”, i.e. tailored on the standard, and also less likely to be invalidate in a court.
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SEPs are indeed litigated more often than similar patents, and longer issuance lags
are positively correlated with the probability of litigation.
Another interesting result is the systematic difference between the use of certain
strategies between upstream and downstream organizations. Upstream organizations,
which rely more on patents, use more intensively continuation applications and pro-
visional applications, and are also slower at replying to office actions. This leads to
longer issuance lags.
While essentially descriptive in nature, this study has implications for the design
of the patent system and for SSOs’ IP policies. Policy makers should think carefully
about the potential abuse of instruments that allow strategic delays in patent prose-
cution, possibly limiting their use or increasing their cost. For example, some scholars
have advocated limiting continuation applications (Lemley and Moore, 2004). SSOs’
licensing policies may also require to commit to license all the members of a patent
family. Furthermore, SSOs may design their policies to discourage strategic delays
or promote the exchange of information on claim amendments. Early disclosure has
its merits, but it has limited effectiveness when claims change over time. SSOs may
encourage early disclosure and complement it with requirements to timely update
disclosures with changes to the scope of the claims of potentially essential patents.
Cooperation between SSOs and patent offices on the amendments to claims of poten-
tially essential patents may also help to reduce the threats of hold-up.
In this paper, I rely on the assumption that patents disclosed as SEPs are at risk of
being essential for a standard. However, strategic considerations and the IP policies of
SSOs may lead to over- or under-disclosure of SEPs. Further research may analyze the
prosecution of patents that are known (or more likely) to be essential for standards, for
example those identified by experts and patent pools. Another limitation of the study
is that I can only use an indirect measure of the standardization date. Further research
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may exploit the link between patents and standards to obtain a better measurement of
the timing of standardization. Another limitation of this study is that I do not know
how the claims of SEPs are changing during prosecution and I do not have a direct
way to test the idea that continuations are really filed to cover a standard. Finally,
the estimates in this paper are essentially correlational. While I try to compare SEPs
with similar patents, control for important application characteristics and can control
in some parts of the analysis for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity, there may
be important unobservables I cannot control for. Future research may try to address
the issue of causality more explicitly. Another interesting topic for further research
is the study of the consequences of strategic delays in patent prosecution on the
development and subsequent adoption of standards.
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Tables
Table 3.1: Comparison of SEPs with matched regular utility patent
applications: differences in means.
Variable
Mean
control
applications
Mean
matched
SEPs
p-value
t-test
Normalized
difference
Litigated a 0.02 0.09 0.00 0.30
Cites a 24.35 44.96 0.00 0.31
Granted 0.87 0.97 0.00 0.39
Abandoned 0.12 0.02 0.00 0.41
Words in patent’s 1st ind. claim a 169.08 163.49 0.00 -0.06
Claims in patent a 19.94 23.64 0.00 0.21
Reissue a 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.15
Reexamination a 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.12
CON children 0.41 0.92 0.00 0.31
CIP children 0.10 0.26 0.00 0.12
DIV children 0.07 0.17 0.00 0.12
Days earliest priority-issue (all) a 1,527.78 1,674.21 0.00 0.18
Days earliest priority-issue (continuity) a 1,455.93 1,596.36 0.00 0.17
Days filing-issue a 1,177.95 1,177.89 1.00 0.00
Days to respond to non-final rejection b 105.36 110.05 0.00 0.09
Requests for extension of time 0.58 0.72 0.00 0.14
RCE after notice of allowance c 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.12
Applicant delays (days) d 49.66 74.22 0.00 0.23
USPTO delays (days) d 515.07 540.58 0.11 0.05
CON 0.13 0.20 0.00 0.17
CIP 0.05 0.09 0.00 0.15
DIV 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.12
Provisional application e 0.13 0.21 0.00 0.21
PCT application f 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.07
Published 0.36 0.38 0.13 0.03
Words in application’s 1st ind. claim g 112.79 116.22 0.25 0.04
Claims in application g 24.29 26.60 0.00 0.12
Inventors 2.46 2.76 0.00 0.17
Small entity 0.03 0.03 1.00 0.00
Foreign priority 0.21 0.21 1.00 0.00
Filing year 1,998.74 1,998.74 1.00 0.00
SEPs and “control” patents are all regular utility patent applications and are matched on
filing year, art unit, examiner, USPC class, foreign priority, small entity applicant, an indicator
variable equal to one if the filing date is on or after June 8, 1995, and an indicator variable
equal to one if the filing date is on or after November 29, 2000. The sample contains 4,253
SEP applications and 4,253 controls. The samples used for individual tests may be different
because of variable definitions and missing values. Details on the samples for each test are
available upon request. a Variable defined only for issued patents. b Variable defined only for
applications with a reply to the first non-final rejection. c Variable defined only for applications
that receive a notice of allowance. d Variable defined only for applications filed after May 29,
2000. e Provisional applications available since June 8, 1995. f USA joined the PCT in 1978.
g Variable defined only for published applications.
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Table 3.2: Comparison of SEPs with matched regular utility patent
applications: OLS regressions.
Outcome
Coefficient
SEP
Standard
error
SEP
p-value
SEP
Litigated a 0.02 0.01 0.00
Cites (log) a 0.30 0.05 0.00
Granted 0.15 0.02 0.00
Abandoned -0.16 0.02 0.00
Words in patent’s 1st ind. claim (log) a -0.04 0.01 0.00
Claims in patent (log) a 0.08 0.03 0.02
Reissue a 0.00 0.00 0.73
Reexamination a 0.00 0.00 0.15
CON children (log) 0.20 0.02 0.00
CIP children (log) 0.04 0.01 0.00
DIV children (log) 0.03 0.01 0.00
Days earliest priority-issue (all) (log) a 0.05 0.02 0.03
Days earliest priority-issue (continuity) (log) a 0.05 0.02 0.03
Days filing-issue (log) a -0.03 0.01 0.02
Days to respond to non-final rejection (log) b 0.04 0.02 0.06
Requests for extension of time (log) 0.11 0.02 0.00
RCE after notice of allowance c 0.04 0.01 0.00
Applicant delays (days) (log) 0.79 0.09 0.00
USPTO delays (days) (log) 0.63 0.11 0.01
CON 0.06 0.02 0.00
CIP 0.03 0.01 0.03
DIV 0.03 0.01 0.03
Provisional application 0.14 0.02 0.00
PCT application 0.00 0.01 0.67
The regression models are estimated on a sample of SEPs and matched control ap-
plications filed on or after November 29, 2000, that were published as applications.
The sample contains 1,551 SEP applications and 1,551 controls. The samples used
for individual regressions may be different because of variable definitions and miss-
ing values. Outcomes taken in logarithms may be either the natural logarithm of
the variable or the natural logarithm of one plus the variable if the latter contains
zeros. Details on samples, variables and regressions are available upon request. SEP
and control applications are matched on filing year, art unit, examiner, USPC class,
foreign priority and small entity applicant. All regressions are estimated by OLS
and include art unit effects, filing year effects, indicators for small entity status and
foreign priority and control for the natural logarithms of the number of words in the
first independent claim of the application, the number of claims in the application
and the number of inventors. Applications with missing values for these variables
are excluded from the potential matches. Robust standard errors are clustered at
art unit level. a Variable defined only for issued patents. b Variable defined only for
applications with a reply to the first non-final rejection. c Variable defined only for
applications that receive a notice of allowance.
70
Table 3.3: Comparison of SEP applications assigned to upstream and
downstream organizations: OLS regressions.
Outcome
Coefficient
upstream
Standard
error
upstream
p-value
upstream
Litigated a 0.01 0.01 0.64
Cites (log) a 0.06 0.11 0.57
Granted 0.01 0.02 0.73
Abandoned 0.00 0.02 0.79
Words in patent’s 1st ind. claim a 0.01 0.03 0.77
Claims in patent a -0.06 0.06 0.26
Reissue a 0.01 0.01 0.41
Reexamination a -0.01 0.00 0.07
CON children (log) 0.25 0.05 0.00
CIP children (log) 0.03 0.03 0.36
DIV children (log) 0.02 0.02 0.33
Days earliest priority-issue (all) (log) a 0.13 0.04 0.00
Days earliest priority-issue (continuity) (log) a 0.13 0.04 0.00
Days filing-issue (log) a 0.05 0.03 0.15
Days to respond to non-final rejection (log) b 0.18 0.05 0.00
Requests for extension of time (log) 0.09 0.05 0.04
RCE after notice of allowance c 0.08 0.02 0.00
Applicant delays (days) (log) 0.70 0.16 0.00
USPTO delays (days) (log) 0.18 0.19 0.32
CON 0.06 0.03 0.07
CIP 0.05 0.02 0.03
DIV 0.00 0.02 0.97
Provisional application 0.18 0.04 0.00
PCT application -0.06 0.02 0.00
The sample contains only regular utility SEP applications whose first assignee after
the filing date is either an “upstream” or a “downstream” organization. The sam-
ple contains 946 SEP applications assigned to downstream organizations and 338 SEP
applications assigned to upstream organizations. The samples used for individual re-
gressions may be different because of variable definitions and missing values. Outcomes
taken in logarithms may be either the natural logarithm of the variable or the natu-
ral logarithm of one plus the variable if the latter contains zeros. Details on samples,
variables and regressions are available upon request. All regressions are estimated by
OLS and include art unit effects, filing year effects, indicators for small entity status
and foreign priority and control for the natural logarithms of the number of words in
the first independent claim of the application, the number of claims in the application
and the number of inventors. Applications with missing values for these variables are
excluded from the sample. Robust standard errors are clustered at art unit level. a
Variable defined only for issued patents. b Variable defined only for applications with
a reply to the first non-final rejection. c Variable defined only for applications that
receive a notice of allowance.
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Table 3.4: Individual strategies and issuance lag of SEP applications:
OLS regressions.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Outcome
Issuance
lag (log)
Issuance
lag (log)
Issuance
lag (log)
Issuance
lag (log)
Issuance
lag (log)
Serialized Continuation 0.48*** 0.48*** 0.56*** 0.56*** 0.48***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Provisional application 0.26*** 0.13*** 0.09*** 0.07*** 0.12***
(0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
PCT application 0.51*** 0.26*** 0.33*** 0.25*** 0.33***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Requests for extension of time 0.15*** 0.11*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.07***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
RCE after NOA 0.31*** 0.16*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.09***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Upstream 0.05**
(0.03)
Filing year effects N Y Y Y Y
Art unit effects N Y Y Y Y
Small entity N Y Y Y Y
Foreign priority N Y Y Y Y
Inventors N Y Y Y Y
Applicant delay (days) N N Y Y Y
Applicant delay (binary) N N Y Y Y
USPTO delay (days) N N Y Y Y
USPTO delay (binary) N N Y Y Y
Words & Claims N N N Y Y
Observations 4,344 4,340 1,868 1,535 1,167
R-squared 0.40 0.68 0.68 0.70 0.75
All regressions estimated by OLS on the sample of granted SEPs. Outcome in all re-
gressions is the natural logarithm of the number of days between the earliest priority
and the issue date of the SEP. The variables “Applicant delay (days)”, “USPTO delay
(days)”, “Inventors”, “Words” and “Claims” are the natural logarithms of, respectively,
one plus the number of days of applicant delay for the computation of the patent term
adjustment, one plus the number of non-overlapping days due to delay of the USPTO for
the computation of the patent term adjustment, the number of inventors, the number of
words in the first independent claim of the application and the number of claims in the
application. The variables “Applicant delay (binary)” and “USPTO delay (binary)” are
binary indicators equal to one if the application has days of, respectively, applicant delay
and USPTO delay (zero otherwise). Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at
art unit level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Table 3.5: Prosecution time and claim changes.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Outcome
Words
added
Words
added
Words
added
Words
added
Days filing-issue (log) 51.19*** 52.73*** 31.11*** 16.56*
(9.30) (8.89) (9.73) (9.44)
USPTO delay (binary & days) Y Y Y Y
Filing year effects N Y Y Y
Serialized continuation N Y Y Y
Provisional application N Y Y Y
PCT application N Y Y Y
Small entity N Y Y Y
Foreign priority N Y Y Y
Inventors N Y Y Y
Art unit effects N N Y Y
Words & Claims N N N Y
Observations 1,533 1,533 1,533 1,533
All regressions estimated by OLS on the sample of granted SEPs filed on or after
November 29, 2000, and published before issuance. Outcome in all regressions
is the number of words added to the first independent claim between the pub-
lished application and the issued patent. The variables “USPTO delay (days)”,
“Inventors”, “Words” and “Claims” are the natural logarithms of, respectively,
one plus the number of non-overlapping days due to delay of the USPTO for
the computation of the patent term adjustment, the number of inventors, the
number of words in the first independent claim of the application and the num-
ber of claims in the application. The variable “USPTO delay (binary)” is a
binary indicators equal to one if the application has days of USPTO delay (zero
otherwise). Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at art unit level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Table 3.6: SEP disclosure and patent issuance.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome Issued Issued Issued Issued Issued Issued
Sample
Matched
sample
Matched
sample
Matched
sample
SEPs SEPs SEPs
Disclosed 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.010***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
SEP -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Month effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Age effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Art unit effects N Y Y N Y Y
Serialized Continuation N Y Y N Y Y
Provisional application N Y Y N Y Y
PCT application N Y Y N Y Y
Small entity N Y Y N Y Y
Foreign priority N Y Y N Y Y
Inventors N Y Y N Y Y
Words and Claims N N Y N N Y
Observations 61,984 61,984 61,984 42,236 42,073 39,088
Number of applications 1,060 1,060 1,060 696 694 641
All regressions estimated by OLS. Unit of observation is application-month. The matched sam-
ple contains SEPs declared before their issue date and matched control applications filed on or
after November 29, 2000, that were published as applications. SEP and control applications are
matched on filing year, art unit, examiner, USPC class, foreign priority and small entity applicant.
Applications with missing values for variables used to match or control variables are dropped from
potential matches. The SEPs sample contains only SEPs declared before their issue date with
filing date on or after November 29, 2000. Applications at risk of issuance from their filing month
and observed until issuance month or abandonment month or end of calendar year 2014 if they
do not issue as patents. Outcome in all regressions is an indicator variable equal to one in the
month of issue. The variables “Inventors”, “Words” and “Claims” are the natural logarithms of,
respectively, the number of inventors, the number of words in the first independent claim of the
application and the number of claims of the application. Robust standard errors are clustered at
art unit level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Table 3.7: SEP disclosure and continuation application filings.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Outcome
# of CON
children
# of CON
children
# of CON
children
# of CON
children
Sample
Matched
sample
Matched
sample
SEPs SEPs
Disclosed -0.16 0.13 0.17 0.81***
(0.16) (0.18) (0.14) (0.20)
SEP 0.32**
(0.13)
Month effects N Y N Y
Age2, Age3 and Age4 N Y N Y
Application Fixed Effects N Y N Y
Observations 58,275 19,523 39,743 15,605
Number of applications 1,060 359 696 270
Unit of observation is application-month. All models estimated with Poisson re-
gressions. The matched sample contains SEPs declared before their issue date
and matched control applications filed on or after November 29, 2000, that were
published as applications. SEP and control applications are matched on filing
year, art unit, examiner, USPC class, foreign priority and small entity applicant.
Applications with missing values for variables used to match or control variables
are dropped from potential matches. The SEPs sample contains only SEPs de-
clared before their issue date with filing date on or after November 29, 2000.
Applications at risk of filing continuation applications from their filing month and
observed until their issue month or their abandon month or the end of calen-
dar year 2012 if they are still pending. Robust standard errors in parentheses,
clustered at application level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Table 3.8: SEPs’ issuance lag and litigation.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Outcome Litigated Litigated Litigated Litigated
Issuance lag (log) 0.07*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Issue year effects Y Y Y Y
Small entity N Y Y Y
Foreign priority N Y Y Y
Inventors N Y Y Y
Words & Claims N N Y Y
USPC class effects N N N Y
Observations 686 684 680 680
All regressions estimated by OLS. Unit of observation is a SEP. Sam-
ple contains only SEPs declared before the issue date. Outcome in
all regressions is an indicator variable equal to one if the patent is
litigated before year 2015. The variables “Inventors”, “Words” and
“Claims” are the natural logarithms of, respectively, the number of
inventors, the number of words in the first independent claim of the
patent and the number of claims of the patent. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Chapter 4
Standard Setting Organizations and the
Scope of Cumulative Inventive Activity
4.1 Introduction
Compatibility standards are very important for innovation in industries in which in-
teroperability is fundamental. In Information and Communication Technology (ICT)
Standard Setting Organizations (SSOs) often develop these standards. They have a
key role in coordinating research efforts, reaching consensus on shared technological
platforms and providing solutions to the threat of holdup related to the inclusion
of patented technologies into a standard. Their activities promote the adoption of
new standards and encourage potential inventors to build on them. However, little is
known on the direction of follow-on inventive efforts.
In this paper we study the relationship between SSO endorsement of a technology
and the direction of inventive activity that builds on it. While other works already
try to estimate the contribution of SSOs to the rate of cumulative inventive activity,
in this paper we focus on its direction. Our theoretical framework combines insights
from the literature that studies standards, direct and indirect network effects with
the concept of cumulative technical progress. We go beyond the study of adoption of
a standardized technology to analyze its use as an input for inventive activity across
technological areas. We define two types of possible directions of cumulative inven-
tive activity: “deepening” (cumulative technical progress characterized by relatively
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low dispersion across technological areas) and “broadening” (cumulative technical
progress characterized by relatively high dispersion across technological areas).
We use the disclosure letters provided by the public archives of thirteen major
SSOs to identify pieces of technology endorsed by SSOs. Assuming that Standard
Essential Patents (SEPs) disclosed to these SSOs protect technologies embodied into
their standards, we analyze the dispersion in technological space of the flow of patent
citations to these SEPs relative to control patents with same vintage, in the same
technology class and having the same citation trend over time.
The first part of our empirical analysis uses two measures of similarity between the
citing and the cited patents to estimate the balance between deepening and broaden-
ing. The estimates show that SSOs select patents that are relatively more important
in a narrow technological space and increase the breadth of cumulative improvements
after standardization.
The second part of the analysis tries to separate the trends in deepening and
broadening utilizing citations from “new” and “old” technological classes. We find
that both deepening and broadening occur, with stronger evidence for broadening.
Previous research analyzes various roles of SSOs. Lerner and Tirole (2006) develop
a model that focuses on the certification role of SSOs. Chiao et al. (2007) extend this
model to study the policies of SSOs and test the predictions of their model on a
database of SSOs. Lemley (2002) and Baron and Spulber (2016) also study the
policies of SSOs. Rysman and Simcoe (2008) show empirically that the endorsement
of an SSO leads to an increase in use of a technology as an input for inventive activity,
and Bekkers et al. (2016) extend this analysis taking into account different SSO
policies. We combine the insights of these studies with those from the literatures on
cumulative inventive activity and network effects to analyze what type of technologies
are selected by SSOs and the direction of the effect of the endorsement of SSOs (Katz
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and Shapiro, 1985; Furman and Stern, 2011).
This study contributes to the literature on SSOs (Baron and Spulber, 2016; Chiao
et al., 2007; Lerner and Tirole, 2006; Rysman and Simcoe, 2008; Simcoe, 2012). In
particular, we analyze how the endorsement of SSOs is related to the direction of tech-
nical progress that builds on their standards, examining the technological dispersion
of marginal and selection effects already documented in the literature.
This paper also contributes to the literature on the relationship between insti-
tutions and rate and direction of cumulative inventive activity (Aghion et al., 2008;
Furman and Stern, 2011; Murray et al., 2009). Combining network effects and cumu-
lative inventive activity, our theoretical framework distinguishes between two types of
technical progress that differ in terms of dispersion in technological space. Our empir-
ical analysis also shows considerable differences across SSOs with different IP policies
and licensing terms provided by the patent owners. This suggests that institutional
details are important for the direction of inventive activity.
Finally, this study contributes to the literature that uses patent data to study
inventive activity (Hall et al. (2001) and the vast literature that builds on them). We
introduce a simple measure of similarity between citing and cited patents based on
interclass citation flows that other scholars can easily adopt and adapt to their needs.
This measure weights each citation by the probability that a patent from the citing
technology class cites a patent in the cited class in a given time period. The measure
is easy to compute and less dependent on the technological classification adopted than
existing alternatives in the literature.
We provide a description of the role of SSOs in the standardization process, explain
the main factors that may shape deepening and broadening, and relate them to the
selection and marginal effects of SSOs in section 4.2. We describe our empirical
strategy in section 4.3 and report our results in section 4.4. Section 4.5 concludes.
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4.2 What SSOs Do
Voluntary SSOs are institutions for solving industry-wide problems that have an im-
portant element of collective action, such as governing a shared technology platform.
These organizations may play several different roles. Various authors have suggested
that SSOs act as a certification agent (Lerner and Tirole, 2006), a forum for bargaining
over design decisions (Simcoe, 2012; Farrell and Simcoe, 2012a), a cooperative R&D
organization (Weiss and Sirbu, 1990) and a partial solution to hold-up problems pro-
duced by widespread adoption of patented technology (Shapiro, 2001; Lemley, 2002).
One shared prediction of these diverse theoretical perspectives is that SSOs encourage
coordinated adoption of key technologies.
Rysman and Simcoe (2008) provide one of the first attempts to measure the impact
of SSOs on the utilization of standardized technology. They show that patents asso-
ciated with an industry standard receive more citations than does a set of observably
similar control patents. This difference in citation rates exists prior to standardiza-
tion, and increases afterwards, leading them to conclude that SSOs produce both
a selection effect (they identify and endorse promising technologies) and a marginal
effect (they contribute to the widespread adoption of those technologies). Bekkers
et al. (2016) confirm these results with updated data and new methods.
This paper goes beyond Rysman and Simcoe (2008) and Bekkers et al. (2016)
by examining the dispersion in citations received by patents linked to industry stan-
dards. If we observe an increase in dispersion following SSO endorsement, it would
suggest that the standards promulgated by SSOs facilitate an inter-industry division
of innovative labor. If instead we observe an increase in the rate of citation, but not
in the dispersion of citing technology classes, it would suggest that the marginal effect
identified by Rysman and Simcoe (2008) and Bekkers et al. (2016) is produced by a
set of activities that facilitate coordination within a specific industry or technological
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field.
In what follows, we refer to increased citation of standardized technology within
an industry or technical field as deepening, and an increase in the dispersion of citing
areas as broadening.1 The next part of this section describes the theoretical underpin-
nings for these two distinct effects. It is important to note that these two effects may
happen simultaneously, i.e. SSOs may positively affect both deepening and broaden-
ing at the same time. For part of our empirical analysis we measure the balance of
these two types of developments, and then try to distinguish them.
We are also interested in the analysis of the selection of technologies for SSO
standards. SSOs may select technologies that are technically important within a
relatively narrow area or may pick technologies adopted more broadly. The final part
of this section discusses also the selection of technologies for standards.
4.2.1 Deepening
The formulation of new standards often requires coordination of many interested
parties within a single industry (Simcoe, 2012). The basic challenge is to persuade
independent implementors to adopt a new standard, thus triggering demand-side
economies of scale (Katz and Shapiro, 1985). Bresnahan and Greenstein (1999)
coined the term “divided technical leadership” to describe this process of coordinated
technology adoption within a particular industry. We use the term “deepening” to
emphasize the idea of cumulative technical progress characterized by relatively low
dispersion across technological areas. Though one could argue that deepening is just
a particular application of direct network effects, the concept of deepening goes be-
yond that. With the concept of deepening we aim to capture both the adoption of
1Although it might seem natural to call increased dispersion a horizontal effect, and increased
within-sector utilization a vertical effect, both deepening and broadening arguably have a verti-
cal dimension when the citing patent represents a cumulative improvement upon the standarized
technology.
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a specific standardized technology typically analyzed in the literature that refers to
direct network effects and the cumulativeness of inventive activities within a specific
technological area that uses standardized technology as an input for further technical
improvements.
The adoption of the Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) provides
a good example of how standards can promote deepening. GSM was originally de-
veloped by the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) with the
goal of designing a pan-European mobile communication network. The standard is
currently implemented on 80 percent of all mobile phones, and there have been sub-
stantial improvements in price and performance of GSM technology. Later-generation
standards, such as the Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) and
Long Term Evolution (LTE) build directly upon GSM. However, the use of GSM tech-
nology remains concentrated within a single large technology area – mobile telecom-
munications – with relatively little adoption in other devices or applications.
SSOs promote deepening and coordinate cumulative technological progress in a
variety of ways. For example, the endorsement of a particular technological solution
by an SSO contributes to the formation of the expectations about future adoption,
leading to self-fulfilling prophecies (Katz and Shapiro, 1985; Besen and Farrell, 1994;
Liebowitz and Margolis, 1994). In this respect, SSOs may also be seen as certifiers
of the quality of a technology that shape users’ opinion about the merits of a specific
technological solution (Lerner and Tirole, 2006). The endorsement by an SSO of a
new standard can also help to overcome the excessive inertia that characterizes the
replacement of old generations of technical standards (Farrell and Saloner, 1985).
The activities of SSOs can also ease information flows among the members of
the organizations, facilitating technological forecasting by providing a road-map for
firms in the industry. Participants in the activities of SSOs can monitor the techno-
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logical advances in their area, learn from other participants about recent technical
improvements and anticipate the developments of the technologies in the near future.2
Companies can use this information to invest in the right direction, starting early to
develop products and services that will be related to proposed standards.
Many SSOs require the disclosure of patents that may be required to implement
standards, and the provision of liberal licensing terms for standards implementers
(Baron and Pohlmann, 2016; Bekkers et al., 2016; Chiao et al., 2007; Lemley, 2002;
Simcoe, 2013). These policies not only reduce the cost of cumulative follow-on in-
ventive activity (Scotchmer, 1991; Gallini and Scotchmer, 2002; Bessen and Maskin,
2009), but also reduces the risk of hold-up typical of complex industries in which
a patent thicket may increase licensing costs from royalty stacking, uncertainty and
transaction costs caused by negotiations with multiple parties (Cohen et al., 2000;
Farrell et al., 2007; Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Heller and Eisenberg, 1998; Lemley and
Shapiro, 2007; Lerner and Tirole, 2015; Shapiro, 2001; Ziedonis, 2004).
By triggering network effects, providing a technological road-map, lowering the
cost of cumulative inventive activity and reducing the risk of hold-up, the activities
of SSOs may encourage investments in new technologies that build upon the standard
by companies within an industry. This may lead to an increase in patent citations
to patents related to the standard concentrated in the same technological area that
cited the focal patents before the endorsement by an SSO. Moreover, if deepening
is stronger than broadening, we should observe a decrease in the average “distance”
between the standardized technologies and those building upon them.
2For example, Waguespack and Fleming (2009) find that simple attendance to meetings of the
Internet Engineering Task Force (IEFT, the SSO that sets protocols used to run Internet) is beneficial
for start-ups.
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4.2.2 Broadening
In addition to promoting coordinated adoption within a single industry, standards can
provide a shared interface that facilitates use of a single component technology across
many different applications. For example, the three-pronged electrical plug and outlet
are used by nearly all electrical devices in the USA. This type of broadening across
application areas is closely related to the idea of indirect network effects that occur
when many application developers share a common platform, and to the horizontal
externalities discussed in the literature on general purpose technologies (Bresnahan
and Trajtenberg, 1995; Bresnahan, 2010). Similarly to deepening, our concept of
broadening goes beyond indirect network effects by combining adoption across many
application areas and cumulative invention in diverse areas fostered by a standardized
technology characterized by high generality.
The Wi-Fi or IEEE 802.11 standards provides a good example of broadening. The
initial promoters of Wi-Fi technology within the Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers (IEEE) came from NCR Corporation and its partner, AT&T, who shared
the goal of developing a technology standard for wireless cash registers. Since that
time, Wi-Fi has been adopted in many diverse industries such as personal computers,
video-game consoles, smart-phones, tablets, digital cameras, digital audio players and
home appliances. Over time, the adoption of Wi-Fi in these diverse areas, and the
creation of application-specific complements, has arguably produced an increase in
the dispersion of the cumulative Wi-Fi improvements across different technological
areas.
The basic economics of broadening is closely related to the logic of scope-economies.
Cooperative development of a new standard within an SSO allows developers to share
the fixed costs of innovation, lowers the cost to future developers of accessing the
platform, and in some cases provides a credible commitment whereby large firms
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can delegate control over key technologies (Gawer and Henderson, 2007). This not
only enhances division of labor and gains from specialization, but also allows the de-
velopment of totally unexpected complementary products. In fact, companies from
outside the technological area can adapt the standardized technology at relatively low
cost and low risk of expropriation. This promotes both mix-and-match compatibility
(Matutes and Regibeau, 1988) and increased experimenting with new technologies
that utilize the standardized interface. Various empirical studies of cumulative in-
vention find that a decline in the cost of accessing research inputs is associated with
increased diversity of follow-on research lines (Murray et al., 2009; Furman and Stern,
2011).
Increasing the number and variety of complementary products can generate a
positive feedback loop when network effects are important. Not only the number
of producers on a platform can trigger network effects and thus attract more com-
plementors, but it can also stimulate the production of new varieties of products.
Boudreau (2012) shows empirically that the incentives to innovate for a complemen-
tor are increased by the number of producers of other products on the same platform.
This can generate a virtuous cycle for both the number of new specialized innovators
on the platform and their heterogeneity.
Facilitating access to and experimentation on the technology platform by spe-
cialized innovators and the increase in their heterogeneity should therefore lead to
a boost in the dispersion of the cumulative improvements on the standardized tech-
nology across different technological areas. As a consequence, after a (patented)
technology is endorsed by an SSO we may observe an increase in new inventive activ-
ities (and thus patent citations) on it in technologies in areas that have never built
upon it before. What is more, should broadening be stronger than deepening, we
may observe an increase in the technological “distance” between SEPs and patents
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that cite them as new experimentation in different technological areas takes place.
4.2.3 Selection and Marginal Effects
Thus far, our discussion has emphasized the idea that SSOs could have a marginal
impact on technology utilization and inventive activity through either broadening or
deepening effects. However, it is equally possible that SSOs could select technologies
based on either their suitability for cumulative progress within the focal industry, or
for widespread adoption across different sectors. In fact, there is no reason why SSOs
could not produce both selection and marginal effects that reflect a combination of
broadening and deepening.
On the one hand, SSOs may be interested in selecting unusually “broad” tech-
nologies. Especially when compatibility issues are involved, SSOs can recognize the
importance of adopting technical solutions that facilitate the interactions among dif-
ferent technological areas. This means that they can have an interest in selecting
technologies that are inherently more general and can be applied in a variety of set-
tings for their standards. Therefore, it is possible that they select technologies that
are more general and “broader” even before standardization.
On the other hand, SSOs may want to select technologies that are important in a
relatively narrow area. One of the functions of SSOs is to select technologies among
the potential alternatives available to firms in an industry. It is reasonable to think
that they can pick above-average technologies for the formulation of a new standard.
Indeed, Rysman and Simcoe (2008) show that SSOs select technologies that receive
more patent citations than similar technologies even before standardization. More-
over, while SSOs have an interest in a wide adoption of their standards, participants
in the standardization process are interested in their private returns to their invest-
ments, and may push for adoption of technologies for which they have complements.
As companies often specialize in a relatively limited set of technologies, the selection
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may be focused on technologies that are important in a relatively narrow technical
area.
Table 4.1 summarizes the main arguments related to deepening and broadening.
Deepening and broadening are not mutually exclusive, and actually may reinforce each
other. The next section of the paper describes our empirical strategy for quantifying
the relative importance of each of these four different potential effects of SSOs and
our approach to try to disentangle them.
4.3 Empirical Strategy
This section describes how we identify technologies endorsed by SSOs and how we
test the association of this endorsement with deepening and broadening.
4.3.1 Data Sources
We use SEPs to identify technologies that are endorsed by SSOs. During the formu-
lation of new technical standards, SSOs typically require their members to disclosure
the patents that would be infringed by any implementation of the proposed standards.
Some SSOs publish on-line the disclosure letters listing these patents. Bekkers et al.
(2016) collected the letters made available by thirteen major SSOs and identified the
declared SEPs listed on these letters. We use these declared SEPs as a window on the
technologies endorsed by these SSOs, assuming that the declared SEPs are eventually
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essential for their standards.3 4 5
The technologies endorsed by SSOs may not only be covered by the declared SEPs,
but also by other patents within the same “family”. In this paper we use only patents
granted by the USPTO. U.S. patents are the largest group of SEPs in all the major
databases of SEPs we are aware of (Bekkers et al., 2016; Baron and Pohlmann, 2016)
and we can focus on patents produced within the same institutional environment. We
use an algorithm developed by Bekkers et al. (2016) to identify all the U.S. members
of the “extended family” of the declared SEPs. For the sake of simplicity, for the
remainder of the paper we call SEPs the members of these “extended families”.6
We complement the information on the SEPs with information on application and
patent characteristics from the Public Patent Application Information Retrieval sys-
tem (Public PAIR) provided by the USPTO Patent Examination Research Dataset
3This database of declared SEPs is available online at http://www.ssopatents.org/.
4These declared SEPs likely include many “true” SEPs but may include also some “false pos-
itives”. These false positives may be patents disclosed early during standardization that are not
essential because of changes in their claims or in the proposed standards. The policies of SSOs
may also affect the number of false positives. For example, the provision of strong incentives to
disclose may lead companies to list many patents that are not likely to be infringed by a standard.
Companies may also have incentives to over-disclose patents to improve their bargaining power in
cross-licensing negotiations. Some SEPs may also be excluded from the dSEP database. Some SSOs
provide the option of submitting blanket disclosures that do not list specific patents and provide
general licensing commitments for the patents owned by a company. Finally, some patents may be
owned by companies that do not participate in the standardization process and so are not required
to file these disclosure letters. See Bekkers et al. (2016) for more details on this. Nevertheless, the
results of previous research support our assumption, showing that the timing of SEP disclosure has
a positive relationship with their citation rates, suggesting that disclosure is related to the inclusion
of those technologies into a standard and to the subsequent adoption of the latter (Rysman and
Simcoe, 2008; Bekkers et al., 2016).
5The SSOs covered by declared SEPs database are: the American National Standards Institute
(ANSI), the Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions (ATIS), the Broadband Forum
(BBF), the European Committee for Standardization (CEN), the European Committee for Elec-
trotechnical Standardization (CENELEC), the European Telecommunications Standards Institute
(ETSI), the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), the Institute of Electrical and Elec-
tronics Engineers (IEEE), the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), the International Organiza-
tion for Standardization (ISO), the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the Open Mobile
Alliance (OMA) and the Telecommunications Industry Association (TIA).
6Specifically, we exploit the link between the dSEP database and PATSTAT to identify all the
members of the DOCDB family of all the SEPs in the database, all the continuations of those
patents and all the priorities of the SEPs. Then, we take all the SEPs, their family members, their
continuations and their priorities and identify those that are granted by the USPTO.
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(Graham et al., 2015), from PatentsView and from the Patent Claims Research
Dataset (Marco et al., 2016), and information on patent litigation in U.S. district
courts from Thomson Innovation.7
As it is common in the literature, we use forward patent citations to measure
cumulative inventive activity that builds upon a patent (Hall et al., 2001; Galasso and
Schankerman, 2015). While patent citations have well-known limitations, patents are
an abundant source of data and have very wide coverage in terms of technological
fields and over time. Previous research shows that patent citations received by patents
are positively correlated with the economic value of a technology and firm value
(Trajtenberg, 1990; Harhoff et al., 1999; Hall et al., 2005; Gambardella et al., 2008).
Jaffe et al. (2000a) and Jaffe et al. (2000b) show that patent citations are indicators
of technology and knowledge flows, and many works have used patent citations to
measure knowledge spillovers and technology diffusion (Jaffe et al., 1993; Thompson
and Fox-Kean, 2005; Henderson et al., 2005). On the other hand, limitations of
patent data are well-known. Not all inventions are patented or even patentable;
the propensity to patent varies across industries and technological areas; and even
if patent citations may track spillovers and knowledge flows, they are only noisy
indicators.
4.3.2 Measures of similarity between cited and citing patents
A major contribution of this paper is to take into account the technological similarity
between citing and cited patents in our analysis of the dispersion of cumulative inven-
tive activity upon standards. We use two measures of technological similarity that we
descrive below. First, we propose a measure that exploits inter-class citation flows to
quantify the distance between citing and cited patents in technological space. This
7We downloaded the data on patent litigation from Thomson Innovation on April 28, 2016 and
cleaned them to identify the patents that were litigated in U.S. district courts.
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measure is based on the idea of giving different weights to citations that are more or
less likely to cite a patent. The second one is a measure of the similarity between the
text of two patents developed by Younge and Kuhn (2016).
A natural candidate to measure the dispersion of patent citations to a focal patent
is the generality index (Trajtenberg et al., 1997; Henderson et al., 1998; Hall et al.,
2001; Hall and Trajtenberg, 2004; Hall, 2005).8 However, a common critique to the
generality index is that it treats all classes as equidistant in technological space, and
therefore depends on the particular technological classification used. For example, for
the computation of the generality index for a patent in “Multiplex communications”
(USPC class 370) a citation from class “Pulse or digital communications” (USPC
class 375) has the same weight of a citation from “Plant protecting and regulating
compositions” (USPC class 504) even if the former two are closer in technological
space, as they are related to communication technologies, while the third one is
related to technologies used in agriculture. A citation to the focal patent from the
latter class is thus a signal of a broader impact of the cited patent.
Also, the generality index treats all classes as they have the same size. In actuality
some classes are more narrowly defined and others very wide (e.g. “Chemistry of
inorganic compounds” is a single class, while we have several “Organic compounds”
classes). This may result in differences in the number of patents in each class, and thus
in the probability of making and receiving citations. Moreover, this has implications
for the heterogeneity of technologies within classes (wider classes may be populated
by patents that are very different).
A further limitation of the generality index is that it does not take into account
8The generality index is defined as Generalityi = 1−
∑ni
j s
2
ij , where sij is the share of citations
received by patent i from patents in technological class j, and ni is the number of technological
classes citing patent i. Generality is bounded between zero and one, and higher values suggest that
the cited patent has citations more dispersed across technological fields. Hall (2005) shows how to
correct this measure to take into account the number of citations received.
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the timing of citations. Technologies in different classes may be more or less close
to each other over time. Moreover, the generality index is computed using all the
citations received by a patent, so its utilization in longitudinal analyses is limited.
To overcome these limitations, in this paper we first change the unit of analysis.
While the generality index is defined at the patent level, we propose to use a citation
as the unit of analysis.
Second, we use two measures of the similarity between citing and cited patents.
We propose a new measure to quantify the distance in technological space between
citing and cited patents, which we call “Citation Weighted Technological Similarity”
(CWTS). The idea behind our measure is to weight each citation by the probability
that a given class cites another class at a certain point in time.
We define the CWTS between a citing class a and a cited class b in year t as
CWTSabt =
ncitesabt
ncitesat
where ncitesat is the number of citations made by patents filed in year t classified
in class a and ncitesabt is the number of citations made by patents filed in year t
in class a to patents in class b. The intuition behind this measure is that classes
that are closer in technological space should cite each other at higher rates because
their technologies are more similar and so more likely to build on each other. In our
analysis, a citation from patent i filed in year t and classified in a to patent j classified
in b is weighted by CWTSabt and thus has value
ncitesabt
ncitesat
instead of one.9
The first advantage of CWTS is that it takes into account the probability of in-
terclass citation, giving a higher similarity score to citations that are more likely.
9Other measures may be computed building on this simple logic. For example, one may take the
average of CWTS for all the citations received by a given patent in a given year. However, we use
CWTS for an empirical analysis at the citation level and so we define CWTS in this simple form.
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The second advantage is that it depends less on the specific classification utilized,
because interclass citation flows should reveal differences that a mere application of a
classification scheme cannot capture. The third advantage is that the similarity be-
tween classes varies over time, taking into account possible convergence or divergence
between the underlying technological fields.
Of course, our measure has limitations. Most importantly, patent citations can
capture only imperfectly the links between technologies that we want to measure in
this study. Also, while less dependent than other measures, it still depends on the
technological classification used. It is also worth noting that it is not a measure of
similarity in a strict sense: it is not symmetric and the similarity between a citing
class and itself is usually different from one, the maximum value of CWTS as defined
above.
For illustrative purposes, we compute the CWTS between NBER technological
categories (Hall et al., 2001). We report the results in table 4.2. Please note that
we do not use this level of technological classification in our empirical analysis later
in the paper, and that we do not take into account the timing of citations for this
example.
The rows of table 4.2 represent the citing categories and the columns the cited
categories. The values in each cell are the share of citations made by the citing
category to the cited category. The first thing to notice is that the values on the main
diagonal are the highest for each citing category. This is not surprising: technologies
in an area are more likely to build on other technologies in the same area, and patent
citations capture this (at least partially).10 Second, technological areas that we may
think as more similar cite each other at higher rates. For example patents in the
“Chemical” category cite more often those in “Drugs & Medical” than those in any
10Another explanation is that examiners use the technological classification to find prior art to
narrow the scope of patent claims, and they typically add citations from the same technological
classes of the patent application they examine (Alcacer and Gittelman, 2006).
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other category, and vice versa. Similarly, those in “Computers & Communications”
cite more often those in “Electrical & Electronic” than those in other categories, and
the other way around. In our empirical analysis, we will use a more disaggregated
classification (the USPC 3-digit technological classes) and also take into account the
timing of citations.
We also borrow a measure of patent-to-patent similarity from Younge and Kuhn
(2016). They apply automated text analysis methods to compare the text of each pair
of patents for the entire set of regular utility patents granted by the USPTO from 1976
through 2014, and assign them a similarity score. They compute this similarity score
using a vector space model that uses as input the text of the technical description of
the patents. They utilize a “bag of words” approach to characterize each patent as a
weighted vector of words, in which weights are based on the frequency of terms within
a patent and in the entire population of patents. Essentially, for a given patent, they
give more weight to terms that are more frequent in its technical description and less
weight to those that are more common in the entire population of patents. To measure
the similarity score, they compute the cosine of the angular separation between the
weighted vectors for each pair of patents. This measure of similarity is bounded
between zero and one, and high values suggest two patents are very similar to each
other. We use this measure to quantify the similarity between citing and cited patents
in our data.11
We report the average text similarity by NBER category of the citations made by
all the SEPs in our data and the potential control patents with the same filing year,
grant year and USPC class in table 4.3.12 The rows represent the citing categories
11Younge and Kuhn (2016) provide a detailed description of the construction of the measure and
its validation. We thank Jeffrey Kuhn and Kenneth Younge for sharing their data on this measure
with us.
12We restrict the analysis to this sample because we do not have data for the entire population of
patents.
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and the columns the cited categories. As expected, the main diagonal has the highest
values, i.e. the text similarity between citing and cited patents is highest for patents
in the same NBER category.
The next section describes the econometric models we use in our analysis.
4.3.3 Econometric models
Suppose we observe a sample of technologies at risk of endorsement by an SSO and
that our outcome of interest measures the direction of inventive activity that builds
upon them. In an experimental setting, we would randomly assign the endorsement of
SSOs to a subsample of technologies, comparing them to a subsample of control tech-
nologies. The comparison in mean outcomes between “treated” and “controls”would
provide an estimate of the average treatment effect of SSO endorsement on the direc-
tion of cumulative inventive activity building upon the technologies.
We cannot run this experiment. Instead, we use observational data to estimate two
sets of econometric models that measure the relationship between SSO endorsement
and the direction of inventive activity.
The first set of models estimates the balance between deepening and broadening.
We use a sample of citations to compare the distance in technological space between
citing and cited patents for declared SEPs and controls patents. We use this sample
to estimate models based on
E[Ycit|Xcit] = exp(Disclosedcitα + SEPciβ +Xcitγ) (4.1)
where Disclosedcit is a binary indicator equal to one for citations c to patent i that
occur at year t greater or equal to the year of SEP disclosure and SEPci is a binary
variable equal to one for the citations to the SEPs. These are the two main ex-
planatory variables in the empirical analysis and capture the marginal and selection
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“effects” discussed above.
We use two outcomes Ycit. The first outcome is our measure of technology simi-
larity based on interclass citation flows, CWTS. For each citation c, we compute the
CWTS between citing and cited patent using the citations in year t.13 The second
outcome is the text similarity measure developed by Younge and Kuhn (2016). For
an easier interpretation of the results, we multiple CWTS and the text similarity
measure by 100, so that they are bounded between 0 and 100.
A major challenge to estimate the effect of SSOs on our outcomes is that SSOs
do not pick technologies randomly. The main threat is that it is hard to observe the
economic and technical value of a technology, which is likely an important factor in the
selection mechanisms. The direction of the possible bias is hard to establish ex ante,
as one can imagine different scenarios under which valuable technologies contribute
more to deepening or broadening. To reduce the endogeneity concerns related to the
non-random nature of technology selection, first we construct a matched sample of
SEPs and control patents that have similar citation trends. In particular, for each
SEP in our sample we identify a control patent with the same application year, grant
year, in the same 3-digit USPC class and with the same number of citations at the
age of SEP disclosure minus one.14 We discard unmatched SEPs and controls. When
multiple matches are available for a single SEP, we randomly pick one control patent.
Our final sample contains all the citations to these matched patents.
We also use a large set of control variables to reduce the threats related to omit-
ted variables. Depending on the specification, Xcit controls for the filing year and
the USPC technological class of the cited patent, whether the application of the cited
patent is a serialized continuation (continuation application, continuation-in-part or
13As it is common practice in the literature that uses patent citations, we assign citations to years
using the application year of the citing patent.
14Patent age is computed as the difference between grant year and calendar year as in Mehta et al.
(2010).
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divisional), whether it claims the benefits of a provisional application, a foreign appli-
cation or a PCT application, whether the application was published and was filed by
a “small entity” (i.e. an individual inventor, a nonprofit organization, a university or
a small firm), the year of citation, the age of the cited patent in the year of citation,
the number of backward patent and non-patent citations made by the cited patent,
the number of its inventors, claims and words in the first independent claim. In some
specifications we also include cited patent fixed effects and a dummy variable equal
to one for patents that are litigated before or in the citation year.
To estimate the semi-elasticity of our measures of similarity between citing and
cited patents with respect to our two main explanatory variables, we follow Silva
and Tenreyro (2006) and estimate model 4.1 with Poisson regressions. Silva and
Tenreyro (2006) show that under heteroskedasticity, the log-linear OLS models com-
monly utilized to estimate elasiticities can be biased. We also estimate OLS models
as robustness checks.15
The second set of models tries to distinguish deepening and broadening. To do
that we use the matching strategy utilized to construct the citation sample, but make
a panel dataset retaining also the patents without citations and aggregating the data
at cited patent-year level. The empirical models in this part of the analysis are based
on
E[Yit|Xit] = exp(Discloseditα + SEPiβ +Xitγ) (4.2)
where Yit is either the number of USPC classes that cite patent i in year t that already
cited i in previous years (which we call “old classes”), or the number of USPC classes
15Our outcomes assume only non-negative values, and the distribution of the text-based measure
of Younge and Kuhn (2016) includes many zeros. Elasticities estimated with log-linear models in
this setting can be biased. We provide robustness checks in the appendix in which we use the
natural logarithm of CWTS and the natural logarithm of one plus the text-based similarity measure
as outcomes.
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that cite patent i in year t that never cited i before t (“new classes”). We use the
old classes to measure the deepening of inventive activity on the patent, and the new
classes for broadening. Disclosedit is a binary variable equal to one for SEPs starting
in the year of disclosure, and SEPi is a time-invariant indicator equal to one for
the SEPs. Both outcomes are nonnegative count variables, so we estimate 4.2 with
Poisson models.
The coefficient α estimates the correlation between SEP disclosure and deepening
or broadening. To reduce the threat of omitted variables in the pooled-cross-sectional
version of model 4.2, we use the same set of control variables listed above (Xit). We
also control for the number of classes that cite i before t, because the probability
of receiving citations from classes that already cited in the past (never cited the
patent before) increases (decreases) with the number of classes that cited before
t. Conditional on patent fixed effects, if one is willing to assume that there are
no unobservable time-varying factors related to SEP disclosure and the two trends
in inventive activity, α estimates the effect of SEP disclosure on the outcomes. If
companies observe factors that vary over time like changes in the technical importance
of the SEPs that we cannot include in the model and may be positively related to
both SSO endorsement and cumulative inventive activity, our estimates would be
biased upwards.
4.3.4 Samples
The differences between SEPs in this database and other patents are widely docu-
mented in Bekkers et al. (2016) and chapter 3. In the last part of this section we
provide a quick overview of our two estimation samples. Both samples are based
on matched SEPs disclosed before year 2010 and their control patents and exclude
data in years after 2009 to reduce truncation concerns in the citation data. The ci-
tation sample contains all the citations from regular utility patents to patents in the
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matched sample between the issue year and calendar year 2009 (inclusive) that occur
before the 21st year of patent age. The sample for analysis contains 168,589 citations
made between 1980 and 2009. Our two outcomes are defined for 167,707 (CWTS)
and 164,930 (text-based similarity) citations respectively.16 We report the summary
statistics for this sample in table C1, and the distributions of citations by SSO and
licensing terms in tables C2 and C3.
The patent sample contains the regular utility SEPs disclosed before year 2010 and
matched control patents issued before year 2009. We use citation data from the issue
year of the patents until year 2009 (inclusive), dropping those that occur after the 20th
year of age. The sample contains 6,198 patents (3,099 SEPs and 3,099 controls) for
a total of 58,364 patent-year observations. Table C4 provides the summary statistics
for the patents in this sample. Tables C5 and C6 report the distributions of patents
by SSO and licensing terms.
In the next section we report the results of our econometric analysis.
4.4 Results
In this section we report the results of the empirical analysis. We start with the
results of the analysis of the technological similarity between citing and cited patents
on the citation sample and then describe the results of the analysis of citations from
“old” and “new” technological classes on the patent sample.
4.4.1 Technological similarity between citing and cited patents
In the first set of models we analyze the technological similarity between citing and
cited patents utilizing our measure of similarity based on interclass citation flows and
the text-based measure of similarity developed by Younge and Kuhn (2016).
16Missing values are due to missing data for technological classes or in the data from Younge and
Kuhn (2016).
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Table 4.4 shows the results of a set of Poisson models that estimate the semi-
elasticity of CWTS with respect to the indicators for SEP disclosure and SEP status.
The unit of observation is a citation. The outcome is the CWTS between citing
and cited patents. The sample contains all citations from regular utility patents to
matched SEPs disclosed before year 2010 and control patents between the issue year
and calendar year 2009 (inclusive) that occur before the 21st year of patent age.
In the first model we only include the indicators for marginal (“disclosed”) and
selection (“SEP”) “effects”. The coefficient of the selection dummy is positive and
statistically significant at 1%, implying a CWTS 15% higher for SEPs compared with
control patents. The coefficient of disclosure is also statistically significant at 1% but
it is negative and implies a decrease by about 16% in CWTS after disclosure. The
results of this very simple model suggest that SSOs select technologies that have a
relatively narrower impact in technological space and then broaden their influence in
more diverse technological areas. In other words, deepening dominates broadening
before standardization, and broadening dominates deepening after standardization.
However, these coefficients become very small and imprecisely estimated when
we add control variables in models (2) (calendar year effects, age effects, cited patent
filing year effects and cited patent USPC class effects), (3) (controls for characteristics
of the application of the cited patent), (4) (controls for the characteristics of the cited
patent) and (5) (indicator for previous litigation of the cited patent). Model (6)
discards the SEP indicator, adds cited patent effects and replaces the age effects with
the nonlinear terms of a 4th degree polynomial of patent age.17 The coefficient of the
disclosure indicator is positive but very small and imprecisely estimated.18
17It is not possible to include cited patent effects, calendar year effects and age effects in the same
model because of collinearity between these sets of variables (Mehta et al., 2010).
18Table C7 tests the robustness of these results utilizing OLS models. The outcome for these
models is the natural logarithm of CWTS. The results of the simplest model confirm those reported
in the main text, with coefficients that are bigger in magnitude. The results of the other models
show a positive, greater and statistically significant coefficient for the selection effect.
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Table 4.5 estimates models similar to those in table 4.4 utilizing the text similarity
measure between citing and cited patents as outcome. In the simple model in column
(1), the coefficients of SEP disclosure and SEP status are both statistically significant
at 1% level; the former implies a 16% decrease in the similarity between citing and
cited patents after disclosure, while the latter implies that citations to SEPs have
a similarity 22% higher than citations to control patents. The inclusion of control
variables in models (2), (3), (4) and (5) reduces the magnitude of these estimates but
they are still statistically significant at 1%. The coefficient of the disclosure dummy
in model (6) is still negative and statistically significant at 1% level, and implies a
3% decrease in the similarity of cited and citing patents after disclosure.19 20
Bekkers et al. (2016) show that it is important to take into account differences
across SSOs and licensing terms. In tables 4.6 and 4.7 we analyze the heterogeneity of
selection and marginal effects of SSOs on the balance between deepening and broad-
ening. The models are similar to those in tables 4.4 and 4.5, but drop the disclosure
and SEP indicators and replace them with a set of interaction terms between them
and a set of indicators for groups of SSOs.21
The results in tables 4.6 and 4.7 show that the selection effect is mainly driven
19Table C8 shows the results of similar OLS models whose outcome is the natural logarithm of
one plus the text similarity measure. The results are similar and the coefficients are even greater in
size.
20We also estimate the models in tables 4.4 and 4.5 excluding the citations made by the patent
examiners. Citations made by the examiners may be less representative of the links between tech-
nologies we want to measure in this study. Also, Alcacer and Gittelman (2006) show that citations
added by the examiners are more concentrated in terms of technological classes than those provided
by the applicants, leading to possible biases in the analysis. The USPTO started to provided the
information on examiner citations in year 2001, so we restrict the analysis to patents granted after
year 2000 and drop the citations they receive from examiners. We report the results in tables C9
and C10. The pattern of results is consistent with the results reported in the main text, but the
coefficients of interests are usually smaller in size and estimated less precisely. This may be due at
least in part to the big drop in sample size.
21We group SSOs as in Bekkers et al. (2016). IEEE, ETSI and IETF have a relatively large
number of patents, so we treat them as separate groups. We group together IEC, ISO and ITU
(big international standard developing organizations, or BIG-I); CEN, CENELEC ANSI and the
Broadband Forum (ANSI+); the other SSOs are assigned to the residual group OTHER.
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by ETSI, which has the largest positive coefficient of the SEP status indicator in
all models. The disclosure policies at ETSI, not allowing blanket disclosures, may
lead companies to disclose a high number of relatively unimportant patents (Bekkers
et al., 2016). The large number of ETSI SEPs thus improves the precision of the
estimated coefficient, and the possible lower importance of the patents may explain
their narrower influence in technological space.
Regarding the marginal effects, the results in column (1) of tables 4.6 and 4.7
show that almost all the SSO groups are related to dominance of broadening over
deepening. However, they decrease in magnitude and statistical significance after
we include control variables in models (2), (3), (4) and (5) and include patent fixed
effects in the last model of each table. A partial exception is the coefficient of the
“Other” group in table 4.7, but coefficients in table 4.6 do not confirm this result.
In tables 4.8 and 4.9 we analyze the heterogeneity of selection and marginal effects
across licensing terms. The models are similar to those already described in this
section, but include a set of licensing terms dummies and their interaction terms with
the disclosure indicator.22
An interesting result of these models is that SEPs disclosed with specific licensing
terms seem to drive both the deepening related to the selection effect and the broad-
ening related to the marginal effect. The provision of specific licensing terms seems
to be related to a narrow impact before standardization but to a broad impact after.
While the coefficient of FREE is not statistically significant in some models, patents
disclosed with royalty free commitments seem to receive citations from patents that
are relatively more similar after standardization. The results for the other licensing
terms are either unstable across specifications or smaller in magnitude.
22We group all the variations of FRAND terms in the dSEP database together. Also, we consider
royalty free and non-assertion commitments as a single category. We also group together the records
without licensing commitments and those whose information is missing or unclear. SEPs with
specific licensing commitments (e.g. provision of a royalty rate) are the last group.
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So far we estimated the balance between deepening and broadening. In the re-
mainder of this section we try to separate these two different trends.
4.4.2 Separating deepening and broadening using citations from old and
new classes
In this section we try to separate the trends in deepening and broadening related
to standardization within SSOs. To do this we use two outcomes directly related
to deepening and broadening. Specifically, we discard the citation sample we used
in the first part of the empirical analysis and use a sample at patent-year level and
construct two outcomes based on patent citations. First we focus on citations from
USPC classes that already cited the focal patent before to measure deepening (“old”
classes). Then, we use citations from USPC classes that have never cited the focal
patent in the past as a measure of broadening (“new” classes).
The use of these two outcomes allows us to measure more directly deepening and
broadening. However, we lose the benefits of our measures of similarity between
citing and cited patents, that do not depend (or depend less) on the technological
classification.
The sample for this analysis is a panel at patent-year level that contains the
regular utility SEPs disclosed before year 2010 and matched control patents issued
before year 2009. Patent-year observations before the issue year and after the 20th
year of age are excluded from estimation, as well as citations that occur after year
2009 to reduce truncation concerns in the outcomes. The first set of models uses as
outcome the number of USPC classes that cite the focal patent in a given year that
cited the patent in previous years. All regressions are estimated with Poisson models.
The first column of table 4.10 shows the results of a very simple model in which
we use only the SEP status indicator and the SEP disclosure dummy as explanatory
variables. The second model includes the cumulative number of USPC classes that
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cited the focal patent in previous years. The third model includes calendar year
effects, age effects, filing year effects and USPC class effects. Model (4) adds control
variables for the characteristics of the application of the cited patent, and model (5)
adds control variables for the characteristics of the cited patent and an indicator equal
to one for patents that were litigated in the past or in the current year. Finally, the
last model utilizes cited patent fixed effects.
The disclosure dummy has a positive and statistically significant coefficient in
the first model, but the coefficient changes sign when we control for the number
of classes that cited the focal patent in the past. When we add control variables,
the coefficient of disclosure becomes positive again and statistically significant in
pooled-cross-sectional models (3)-(5). The coefficients of these models imply a 5%-
7% increase in the number of classes that already cited the patent in the past that cite
again the focal patent. In model (6) we discard the matched controls and estimate
the conditional fixed-effects Poisson model using only the matched SEPs because
patents that receive no citations are discarded from estimation, and these are more
frequent in the matched control group. The coefficient of the disclosure dummy is
still positive but it is smaller and not precisely estimated. This may be due to the
decrease in sample size, but also to a positive correlation between unobserved time-
invariant characteristics of the cited patents that are absorbed in the fixed effect,
like technical or economic value of the underlying technology. We also estimate an
unreported conditional fixed-effect Poisson model similar to the one in column (6),
retaining the control patents, and the results are similar to those of the pooled cross-
sectional models.23 Taken together, these results provide weak evidence of a deepening
effect of SSOs on technical progress on patented standardized technology. However,
we are careful to provide a causal interpretation of the results, as SEP disclosure
23As a robustness check, we estimate these models excluding the citations made by the examiners.
The results are less precise and the coefficients of interest are often statistically insignificant. See
table C11.
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and cumulative invention may be driven by factors that change over time and are
unobservable to us.
A causal interpretation of the estimates described above is more credible if we
observe that before disclosure the trends in the outcome for SEPs and control patents
are parallel. We provide a graphical representation of the difference in these trends
in figure 4·1.24 The graph reports the coefficients of the interaction terms between a
set of “years until/since disclosure” indicators and the SEP indicator from an OLS
regression similar to the model estimated in column (6) of table 4.10 on the matched
sample of SEPs and control patents and their 95% confidence intervals. We cannot
reject that the trend in citations from old classes for SEPs and control patents is the
same before disclosure, and there is an increase in the number of old classes citing the
SEPs after disclosure relative to the controls, even if the coefficients are imprecisely
estimated. While this may seem to support a causal interpretation of the results, we
are cautious in our interpretation given the low precision of the estimates and the
results of model (6) in table 4.10.
The selection dummy is not statistically significant in the simplest model in column
(1), but it is positive and statistically significant at 1% level in all other models. The
magnitude of the coefficient changes depending on the specification, but overall these
results suggest that SEPs receive between 12% and 30% more citations from old
classes than the control patents. We can conclude that SEPs are selected among
those patents that are already important in a relatively narrow technological space.
Models in table 4.11 replace the disclosure and SEP indicators with a set of SSO
group dummies and their interactions with the disclosure dummy. While the magni-
tude and sometimes the sign of the specific coefficients depend on the specification
24We match SEPs and control patents on the total number of citations before disclosure of the
SEPs. So the trends in citations from old and new classes for SEPs and controls may be different
depending on the composition of the total number of citations and how these are dispersed across
classes.
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used, the marginal effect observed in table 4.10 seems to be driven mostly by ANSI+,
IEEE and SSOs in the OTHER category. Regarding the set of selection dummies,
the most interesting set of results concerns the coefficients of the IETF dummy. In
all models this is the biggest positive coefficient and it is statistically significant at
1%. This may suggest that IETF members are particularly effective at selecting very
important technologies in their specific field. The coefficients for ETSI and the cat-
egory OTHER are also positive and statistically significant in all models. This may
be at odds with the view that many patents at ETSI have lower importance and are
disclosed only because of the stringent disclosure policies of this SSO. However, we
have to keep in mind that in this analysis we are measuring the number of classes
citing the focal patent, and not the number of citing patents.
In table 4.12 we analyze the heterogeneity across licensing terms. FRAND and
SPECIFIC terms are generally associated with an increase in the number of classes
that cite repeatedly the focal patent after disclosure. Interestingly, patents disclosed
without the provision of terms have a decrease in the number of classes that cite them
again after disclosure, even if the magnitude of the coefficients and their statistical
significance varies across models. The coefficients of the selection dummies are usually
positive and statistically significant for all the licensing terms with the exception of
those for the dummy for specific terms, which are estimated less precisely and even
change sign with the inclusion of control variables.
To isolate the relationship between SEP status, SEP disclosure and broadening
we now analyze the citations from “new” USPC classes, i.e. classes that cite the focal
patent for the first time. Table 4.13 reports the results of models similar to those
in table 4.10, utilizing the number of new classes citing the focal patent as outcome.
While the coefficient of the disclosure indicator in models (1) and (2) is negative and
statistically significant at 1%, with the inclusion of control variables in models (3),
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(4), (5) it becomes positive and statistically significant, implying an increase in the
number of new classes citing the focal patent by almost 15% after disclosure. The
result of the conditional fixed-effects Poisson model in column (6) confirm this result.
The results of an unreported model similar to the one in column (6) that does not
exclude the control patents are very similar to those reported. If one is willing to
interpret this result causally, these estimates mean that SSOs broaden the impact of
endorsed technologies as inventive inputs across technological areas.
The causal interpretation is more plausible if the pre-disclosure trends in the
outcome for SEPs and control patents are parallel. We test this graphically in figure
4·2. In this figure we plot the same coefficients we show in table 4·1 and their 95%
confidence intervals, but the model now has the number of new classes citing the
focal patent in a given year as outcome. The SEPs seem to be on a negative trend
compared with the controls before disclosure, but we cannot reject the null hypothesis
that the trend in outcomes for SEPs and control patents is the same in the years just
before disclosure. After disclosure, the SEPs receive more citations from new classes
compared with the controls, suggesting a positive relationship between disclosure and
broadening. Given these trends, if SEP disclosure is correlated with time-varying
unobservables correlated with citations from new classes, this correlation seems to be
negative, possibly leading to a downward bias in our estimated coefficient of disclosure.
The selection effect is also interesting. The coefficient of the SEP indicator in
models (1) and (2) is positive, but becomes negative when we include the control
variables in models (3)-(5), implying that SEPs receive 11% fewer citations from new
classes, ceteris paribus.25
25We also estimate these models excluding citations made by the examiners. Table C12 shows the
results. The estimates for models (1) and (2) are consistent with the first two models in table 4.13,
but the coefficients of models (3), (4) and (5) are small with very large standard errors. However,
the coefficient of disclosure in the conditional fixed-effects Poisson model in column (6) is very large
and statistically significant at 1% level, implying an increase in citations from new classes by 73%.
An unreported model similar to the one in column (6) that does not discard the control group has
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In table 4.14 we analyze the heterogeneity across groups of SSOs. The selection
effect seems to be driven mostly by ETSI. The ETSI indicator has the largest negative
and statistically significant coefficient among the selection dummies in models (3)-(5).
Interestingly, the conditional fixed-effect Poisson model in column (6) shows that
the coefficients of all the interaction terms between the disclosure dummy and the
SSO group indicators are positive, statistically significant and large in magnitude,
with a notable exception: ETSI. The coefficient for ETSI is negative and statistically
significant at 1% level. It implies an almost 19% decrease in the number of new classes
citing the focal patent after disclosure of the patent to ETSI.
In table 4.14 we analyze the heterogeneity across licensing terms. The most robust
result regarding the selection effects is the negative correlation between the FRAND
terms indicator and the outcome. FRAND terms seem to drive the negative selection
effect we estimated before. Regarding the heterogeneity of the marginal effects, these
are generally positive when we include our control variables in models (3)-(5), even
if some of them have relatively large standard errors. When we include patent fixed
effects, all the coefficients are positive and statistically significant at least at 5% level.
Interestingly, the coefficient for FRAND disclosures is the smallest one, suggesting
that the vagueness of FRAND terms may lead to a lower broadening effect compared
with other terms.
4.5 Conclusions
In this paper we use patent data to analyze the direction of inventive activity that
builds upon technologies endorsed by SSOs, distinguishing between deepening and
broadening. We use SEPs to identify technologies selected by SSOs and compare
them with similar patents having the same citation trend. We use two measures of
a coefficient of disclosure equal to 0.26, with a standard error equal to 0.15.
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similarity between citing and cited patents to estimate the balance between deepening
and broadening, and citations from classes that cited the patents in the past or never
cited the patent before to separate these two different types of technical progress.
The results show that SSOs select technologies that are important in a relatively
narrow technological area, and their adoption as input for following inventive activity
broadens after standardization.
The analysis of the heterogeneity across SSOs shows that cumulative invention
on ETSI patents is narrower than the inventive activity upon patents selected by
other SSOs. As suggested by Bekkers et al. (2016), the policies of this SSO may
lead to the disclosure of patents with lower importance, with a narrower influence
in technological space. Patents disclosed with FRAND commitments also have nar-
rower cumulative inventive improvements compared with those with other types of
commitments. The uncertainty related to FRAND terms may reduce the willing-
ness of companies in diverse technological areas to experiment on the standardized
technology. This interpretation is reinforced by the results for patents disclosed with
specific terms, which exhibit high rates of deepening and especially broadening. Cer-
tainty about the cost of access seems to be positively related to inventive activity,
and especially with experimentation in new areas.
These results are relevant for SSO policies and for the strategies of companies
participating in standard setting. The differences in the direction of inventive activity
related to rules and commitments should be taken into account in the evaluation of
the trade-offs involved in the design of policies and strategies.
This study has several limitations. SEPs and patent citations may be noisy mea-
sures of what we want to measure. Further research may try to find other, more
direct ways to measure what technologies are standardized and the cumulative in-
ventive activity upon them. Another dimension interesting to explore would be the
108
identity of the inventors that build upon standards. Also, while we try to compare
SEPs with similar patents having similar citation trends, much more could done to
move towards estimates with a causal interpretation. Another interesting direction
for further research is the comparison of the different implications for cumulative
inventive activities between SSOs and alternative ways to organize standardization.
We leave these extensions for future work.
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Tables and Figures
Table 4.1: SSOs, Deepening and Broadening: selection and marginal
effects
Deepening Broadening
Selection High-quality technologies General technologiesCompatibility within a tech. area Compatibility across tech. areas
Marginal
Cumulative innovation Cumulative innovation
Direct network effects Indirect network effects
Expectations Lower cost of access
Overcoming inertia Credible commitments
Technological forecasting Specialization
Lower risk of hold-up Unexpected new product varieties
Improvements within a tech. area Improvements across tech. areas
Table 4.2: Citation Weighted Technological Similarity between NBER
categories.
Cited category
Citing category Chemical
Comp. &
Comm.
Drugs &
Medical
Electrical &
Electronic
Mechanical Others
Chemical 0.68 0.02 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.09
Computers &
Communications
0.01 0.82 0.01 0.09 0.04 0.02
Drugs &
Medical
0.09 0.02 0.81 0.03 0.03 0.03
Electrical &
Electronic
0.05 0.11 0.02 0.72 0.06 0.04
Mechanical 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.08 0.65 0.10
Others 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.73
We compute the Citation Weighted Technological Similarity between NBER categories for
illustrative purposes. NBER categories defined as in Hall et al. (2001). The Citation Weighted
Technological Similarity is computed using all the citations made by granted regular utility
patents in Public PAIR to regular utility patents that we can match to the NBER category
data from PatentsView. The rows of the table represent the citing category and the columns
the cited category.
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Table 4.3: Text similarity of citations between NBER categories.
Cited category
Citing category Chemical
Comp. &
Comm.
Drugs &
Medical
Electrical &
Electronic
Mechanical Others
Chemical 30.06 16.27 24.42 23.88 21.66 27.04
Computers &
Communications
15.62 23.60 16.10 22.34 20.68 15.95
Drugs &
Medical
18.52 11.52 26.67 16.30 14.92 11.54
Electrical &
Electronic
23.76 22.83 18.75 31.95 23.45 23.39
Mechanical 21.30 20.63 24.90 21.15 31.70 23.83
Others 24.15 15.89 19.42 18.76 23.53 33.54
Each cell reports the mean text similarity (Younge and Kuhn, 2016) for the citations between
NBER categories (Hall et al., 2001) in the sample of citations to SEPs and patents in the same
filing year-grant year-USPC class strata. The sample contains 9,739,808 citations. The rows of
the table represent the citing category and the columns the cited category.
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Table 4.4: “Marginal/selection effects” of SSOs on Citation Weighted
Technological Similarity between cited and citing patents: Poisson
models.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome CWTS CWTS CWTS CWTS CWTS CWTS
Disclosed -0.18*** 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
SEP 0.14*** 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Year effects N Y Y Y Y Y
Age effects N Y Y Y Y N
Age2, Age3 & Age4 N N N N N Y
Filing year effects N Y Y Y Y N
USPC class effects N Y Y Y Y N
Application controls N N Y Y Y N
Patent controls N N N Y Y N
Litigated N N N N Y Y
Cited patent effects N N N N N Y
Observations 167,707 167,707 167,387 167,363 167,363 167,179
# of cited patents 6,468 6,468 6,463 6,461 6,461 5,940
The unit of observation is a citation. All regressions are estimated with Poisson
models. The sample contains all citations from regular utility patents to matched SEPs
disclosed before year 2010 and control patents between the issue year and calendar
year 2009 (inclusive) that occur before the 21st year of patent age. The outcome
in all models is the Citation Weighted Technological Similarity between cited and
citing patents. “Application controls” include indicator variables for patents that issue
from continuation applications, continuations-in-part, divisionals, claim the benefits
of provisional applications, PCT applications and foreign applications, are filed by a
small entity and are published before they issue. “Patent controls” include the natural
logarithms of the number of backward patent citations plus one, number of non-patent
literature citations plus one, number of inventors, number of claims and number of
words in 1st independent claim of the patent. Robust standard errors in parentheses,
clustered at patent level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Table 4.5: “Marginal/selection effects” of SSOs on text similarity
between cited and citing patents: Poisson models.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome
Text
Sim.
Text
Sim.
Text
Sim.
Text
Sim.
Text
Sim.
Text
Sim.
Disclosed -0.18*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.03**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
SEP 0.19*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Year effects N Y Y Y Y Y
Age effects N Y Y Y Y N
Age2, Age3 & Age4 N N N N N Y
Filing year effects N Y Y Y Y N
USPC class effects N Y Y Y Y N
Application controls N N Y Y Y N
Patent controls N N N Y Y N
Litigated N N N N Y Y
Cited patent effects N N N N N Y
Observations 164,930 164,930 164,610 163,789 163,789 164,095
# of cited patents 6,478 6,478 6,473 6,445 6,445 5,887
The unit of observation is a citation. The sample contains all citations from regular
utility patents to matched SEPs disclosed before year 2010 and control patents between
the issue year and calendar year 2009 (inclusive) that occur before the 21st year of patent
age. The outcome in all models is the text similarity between cited and citing patents
(Younge and Kuhn, 2016). All regressions estimated with Poisson models. “Application
controls” include indicator variables for patents that issue from continuation applications,
continuations-in-part, divisionals, claim the benefits of provisional applications, PCT
applications and foreign applications, are filed by a small entity and are published before
they issue. “Patent controls” include the natural logarithms of the number of backward
patent citations plus one, number of non-patent literature citations plus one, number of
inventors, number of claims and number of words in 1st independent claim of the patent.
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at cited patent level. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Table 4.6: Heterogeneity of “marginal/selection effects” of SSOs on
Citation Weighted Technological Similarity between cited and citing
patents by SSO group: Poisson models.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome CWTS CWTS CWTS CWTS CWTS CWTS
ANSI+*disclosed -0.25*** -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.03
(0.09) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
BIG-I*disclosed -0.14*** 0.10** 0.10** 0.10** 0.09* 0.02
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
ETSI*disclosed -0.14*** 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
IEEE*disclosed -0.18*** -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 0.04
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
IETF*disclosed -0.15* 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.09***
(0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
OTHER*disclosed 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.03
(0.08) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
ANSI+ 0.01 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05
(0.09) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
BIG-I 0.02 -0.07* -0.08* -0.10** -0.09**
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
ETSI 0.22*** 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.06***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
IEEE 0.14*** 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
IETF 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04
(0.08) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
OTHER -0.16** -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05
(0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Year effects N Y Y Y Y Y
Age effects N Y Y Y Y N
Age2, Age3 & Age4 N N N N N Y
Filing year effects N Y Y Y Y N
USPC class effects N Y Y Y Y N
Application controls N N Y Y Y N
Patent controls N N N Y Y N
Litigated N N N N Y Y
Cited patent effects N N N N N Y
Observations 167,707 167,707 167,387 167,363 167,363 167,179
# of cited patents 6,468 6,468 6,463 6,461 6,461 5,940
The unit of observation is a citation. The outcome in all models is the Citation
Weighted Technological Similarity between cited and citing patents. All regressions
estimated with Poisson models. Sample and control variables are described in the main
text and in the note to table 4.4. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at
cited patent level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Table 4.7: Heterogeneity of “marginal/selection effects” of SSOs on
text similarity between cited and citing patents by SSO group: Poisson
models.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome
Text
Sim.
Text
Sim.
Text
Sim.
Text
Sim.
Text
Sim.
Text
Sim.
ANSI+*disclosed -0.20*** -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.02
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
BIG-I*disclosed -0.05 0.07** 0.08** 0.07** 0.08** 0.00
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
ETSI*disclosed -0.14*** -0.03* -0.03* -0.04** -0.04** -0.03*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
IEEE*disclosed -0.17*** -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.00
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
IETF*disclosed -0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
OTHER*disclosed -0.34*** -0.26*** -0.27*** -0.28*** -0.28*** -0.24***
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04)
ANSI+ 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
BIG-I 0.07 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
ETSI 0.26*** 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.19***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
IEEE 0.15*** 0.06* 0.06* 0.06* 0.06*
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
IETF 0.10* 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
OTHER 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Year effects N Y Y Y Y Y
Age effects N Y Y Y Y N
Age2, Age3 & Age4 N N N N N Y
Filing year effects N Y Y Y Y N
USPC class effects N Y Y Y Y N
Application controls N N Y Y Y N
Patent controls N N N Y Y N
Litigated N N N N Y Y
Cited patent effects N N N N N Y
Observations 164,930 164,930 164,610 163,789 163,789 164,095
# of cited patents 6,478 6,478 6,473 6445 6445 5,887
The unit of observation is a citation. The outcome in all models is the text similarity
between cited and citing patents (Younge and Kuhn, 2016). All regressions estimated
with Poisson models. Sample and control variables are described in the main text and
in the note to table 4.5. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at cited patent
level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
115
Table 4.8: Heterogeneity of “marginal/selection effects” of SSOs on
Citation Weighted Technological Similarity of cited and citing patents
by licensing terms: Poisson models.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome CWTS CWTS CWTS CWTS CWTS CWTS
FRAND*disclosed -0.17*** 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
FREE*disclosed 0.06 0.16* 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.13**
(0.12) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.05)
NONE*disclosed -0.18* 0.12 0.15* 0.16* 0.15 0.08*
(0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.05)
SPECIFIC*disclosed -0.53*** -0.32*** -0.32*** -0.34*** -0.34*** -0.22**
(0.14) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
FRAND 0.15*** 0.03* 0.03* 0.03 0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
FREE -0.10 -0.05 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03
(0.12) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
NONE -0.09 -0.25*** -0.27*** -0.28*** -0.28***
(0.10) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
SPECIFIC 0.22* 0.20** 0.20** 0.22** 0.22**
(0.13) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Year effects N Y Y Y Y Y
Age effects N Y Y Y Y N
Age2, Age3 & Age4 N N N N N Y
Filing year effects N Y Y Y Y N
USPC class effects N Y Y Y Y N
Application controls N N Y Y Y N
Patent controls N N N Y Y N
Litigated N N N N Y Y
Cited patent effects N N N N N Y
Observations 167,707 167,707 167,387 167,363 167,363 167,179
# of cited patents 6,468 6,468 6,463 6,461 6,461 5,940
The unit of observation is a citation. The outcome in all models is the Citation Weighted
Technological Similarity between cited and citing patents. All regressions estimated with
Poisson models. Sample and control variables are described in the main text and in the
note to table 4.4. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at cited patent level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Table 4.9: Heterogeneity of “marginal/selection effects” of SSOs on
text similarity between cited and citing patents by licensing terms:
Poisson models.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome
Text
Sim.
Text
Sim.
Text
Sim.
Text
Sim.
Text
Sim.
Text
Sim.
FRAND*disclosed -0.18*** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.03**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
FREE*disclosed 0.15* 0.20*** 0.18** 0.19** 0.19** 0.02
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.06)
NONE*disclosed -0.28*** -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.03
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05)
SPECIFIC*disclosed -0.30*** -0.15 -0.16 -0.23** -0.23** -0.15
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10)
FRAND 0.20*** 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.13***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
FREE 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05
(0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
NONE 0.13** -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
SPECIFIC 0.16* 0.19** 0.20** 0.27*** 0.27***
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10)
Year effects N Y Y Y Y Y
Age effects N Y Y Y Y N
Age2, Age3 & Age4 N N N N N Y
Filing year effects N Y Y Y Y N
USPC class effects N Y Y Y Y N
Application controls N N Y Y Y N
Patent controls N N N Y Y N
Litigated N N N N Y Y
Cited patent effects N N N N N Y
Observations 164,930 164,930 164,610 163,789 163,789 164,095
# of cited patents 6,478 6,478 6,473 6445 6445 5,887
The unit of observation is a citation. The outcome in all models is the text similarity
between cited and citing patents (Younge and Kuhn, 2016). All regressions estimated
with Poisson models. Sample and control variables are described in the main text and
in the note to table 4.5. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at cited patent
level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Table 4.10: “Marginal/selection effects” of SSOs on citations from
old USPC classes (deepening): Poisson models.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome
Old
Classes
Old
Classes
Old
Classes
Old
Classes
Old
Classes
Old
Classes
Sample
Matched
sample
Matched
sample
Matched
sample
Matched
sample
Matched
sample
Matched
SEPs
Disclosed 0.10*** -0.16*** 0.07*** 0.05*** 0.05** 0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
SEP 0.04 0.26*** 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.11***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Past classes N Y Y Y Y Y
Year effects N N Y Y Y Y
Age effects N N Y Y Y N
Age2, Age3 & Age4 N N N N N Y
Filing year effects N N Y Y Y N
USPC class effects N N Y Y Y N
Application controls N N N Y Y N
Patent controls N N N N Y N
Litigated N N N N Y Y
Patent fixed effects N N N N N Y
Observations 58,364 58,364 58,364 58,364 57,556 27,134
# of cited patents 6,198 6,198 6,198 6,198 6,156 2,737
The unit of observation is a patent-year. The sample contains the regular utility SEPs
disclosed before year 2010 and matched control patents issued before year 2009. Patent-year
observations before the issue year and after the 20th year of age are excluded from estima-
tion, as well as citations that occur after year 2009. The outcome in all models is the number
of USPC classes that cite the focal patent in a given year that cited the patent in previous
years. “Past classes” is the number of USPC classes that cited the focal patent before a given
year. All regressions estimated with Poisson models. “Application controls” include indi-
cator variables for patents that issue from continuation applications, continuations-in-part,
divisionals, claim the benefits of provisional applications, PCT applications and foreign ap-
plications, are filed by a small entity and are published before they issue. “Patent controls”
include the natural logarithms of the number of backward patent citations plus one, number
of non-patent literature citations plus one, number of inventors, number of claims and num-
ber of words in 1st independent claim of the patent. Robust standard errors in parentheses,
clustered at cited patent level, with the exception of model (6), which has regular standard
errors. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Table 4.11: Heterogeneity of “marginal/selection effects” of SSOs on
citations from old USPC classes (deepening) by SSO group: Poisson
models.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome
Old
Classes
Old
Classes
Old
Classes
Old
Classes
Old
Classes
Old
Classes
Sample
Matched
sample
Matched
sample
Matched
sample
Matched
sample
Matched
sample
Matched
SEPs
ANSI+*disclosed 0.62*** 0.12 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.25*** 0.13*
(0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07)
BIG-I*disclosed 0.09 -0.19*** 0.04 0.02 -0.00 0.04
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
ETSI*disclosed -0.08*** -0.21*** 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
IEEE*disclosed 0.35*** -0.04 0.19*** 0.18*** 0.20*** 0.09**
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
IETF*disclosed 0.02 -0.23*** 0.03 -0.01 0.01 -0.02
(0.08) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
OTHER*disclosed 0.37*** -0.04 0.13** 0.14** 0.13** 0.20***
(0.09) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06)
ANSI+ -0.39*** -0.06 -0.03 -0.06 -0.10
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
BIG-I -0.16*** 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.04
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
ETSI 0.08*** 0.33*** 0.14*** 0.16*** 0.15***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
IEEE -0.05 0.17*** 0.04 0.02 0.00
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
IETF 0.53*** 0.57*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.28***
(0.09) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
OTHER 0.23*** 0.31*** 0.14*** 0.11** 0.11**
(0.08) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Past classes N Y Y Y Y Y
Year effects N N Y Y Y Y
Age effects N N Y Y Y N
Age2, Age3 & Age4 N N N N N Y
Filing year effects N N Y Y Y N
USPC class effects N N Y Y Y N
Application controls N N N Y Y N
Patent controls N N N N Y N
Litigated N N N N Y Y
Patent fixed effects N N N N N Y
Observations 58,364 58,364 58,364 58,364 57,556 27,134
# of cited patents 6,198 6,198 6,198 6,198 6,156 2,737
The unit of observation is a patent-year. The outcome in all models is the number of USPC
classes that cite the focal patent in a given year that cited the patent in previous years. All
regressions estimated with Poisson models. Sample and control variables are described in
the main text and in the note to table 4.10. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered
at cited patent level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Table 4.12: Heterogeneity of “marginal/selection effects” of SSOs on
citations from old USPC classes (deepening) by licensing terms: Poisson
models.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome
Old
Classes
Old
Classes
Old
Classes
Old
Classes
Old
Classes
Old
Classes
Sample
Matched
sample
Matched
sample
Matched
sample
Matched
sample
Matched
sample
Matched
SEPs
FRAND*disclosed 0.09*** -0.15*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
FREE*disclosed -0.11 -0.26* -0.03 -0.05 -0.06 -0.16
(0.17) (0.13) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10)
NONE*disclosed 0.02 -0.42*** -0.15* -0.17** -0.16* -0.02
(0.12) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
SPECIFIC*disclosed 0.77*** 0.12 0.18* 0.19* 0.30*** 0.23*
(0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12)
FRAND 0.03 0.26*** 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.10***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
FREE 0.49** 0.48*** 0.33*** 0.29*** 0.28***
(0.20) (0.13) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09)
NONE 0.19 0.36*** 0.25*** 0.26*** 0.24***
(0.12) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06)
SPECIFIC -0.31*** 0.06 0.21** 0.13 0.03
(0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Past classes N Y Y Y Y Y
Year effects N N Y Y Y Y
Age effects N N Y Y Y N
Age2, Age3 & Age4 N N N N N Y
Filing year effects N N Y Y Y N
USPC class effects N N Y Y Y N
Application controls N N N Y Y N
Patent controls N N N N Y N
Litigated N N N N Y Y
Patent fixed effects N N N N N Y
Observations 58,364 58,364 58,364 58,364 57,556 27,134
# of cited patents 6,198 6,198 6,198 6,198 6,156 2,737
The unit of observation is a patent-year. The outcome in all models is the number of USPC
classes that cite the focal patent in a given year that cited the patent in previous years. All
regressions estimated with Poisson models. Sample and control variables are described in
the main text and in the note to table 4.10. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered
at cited patent level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Table 4.13: “Marginal/selection effects” of SSOs on citations from
new USPC classes (broadening): Poisson models.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome
New
Classes
New
Classes
New
Classes
New
Classes
New
Classes
New
Classes
Sample
Matched
sample
Matched
sample
Matched
sample
Matched
sample
Matched
sample
Matched
SEPs
Disclosed -0.49*** -0.54*** 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.15***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
SEP 0.26*** 0.30*** -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.12***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Past classes N Y Y Y Y Y
Year effects N N Y Y Y Y
Age effects N N Y Y Y N
Age2, Age3 & Age4 N N N N N Y
Filing year effects N N Y Y Y N
USPC class effects N N Y Y Y N
Application controls N N N Y Y N
Patent controls N N N N Y N
Litigated N N N N Y Y
Patent fixed effects N N N N N Y
Observations 58,364 58,364 58,364 58,364 57,556 25,687
# of cited patents 6,198 6,198 6,198 6,198 6,156 2,499
The unit of observation is a patent-year. The sample contains the regular utility SEPs
disclosed before year 2010 and matched control patents issued before year 2009. Patent-year
observations before the issue year and after the 20th year of age are excluded from esti-
mation, as well as citations that occur after year 2009. The outcome in all models is the
number of USPC classes that cite the focal patent in a given year that never cited the patent
before. “Past classes” is the number of USPC classes that cited the focal patent before a
given year. All regressions estimated with Poisson models. “Application controls” include
indicator variables for patents that issue from continuation applications, continuations-in-
part, divisionals, claim the benefits of provisional applications, PCT applications and foreign
applications, are filed by a small entity and are published before they issue. “Patent con-
trols” include the natural logarithms of the number of backward patent citations plus one,
number of non-patent literature citations plus one, number of inventors, number of claims
and number of words in 1st independent claim of the patent. Robust standard errors in
parentheses, clustered at cited patent level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Table 4.14: Heterogeneity of “marginal/selection effects” of SSOs on
citations from new USPC classes (broadening) by SSO group: Poisson
models.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome
New
Classes
New
Classes
New
Classes
New
Classes
New
Classes
New
Classes
Sample
Matched
sample
Matched
sample
Matched
sample
Matched
sample
Matched
sample
Matched
SEPs
ANSI+*disclosed -0.30*** -0.38*** 0.19** 0.17** 0.18** 0.49***
(0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.14)
BIG-I*disclosed -0.52*** -0.56*** -0.00 -0.02 -0.04 0.30***
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.09)
ETSI*disclosed -0.70*** -0.72*** 0.05 0.05 0.05 -0.21***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06)
IEEE*disclosed -0.39*** -0.46*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.21*** 0.21***
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
IETF*disclosed -0.56*** -0.59*** 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.49***
(0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.12)
OTHER*disclosed -0.21** -0.28*** 0.27*** 0.28*** 0.27*** 0.70***
(0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.12)
ANSI+ 0.47*** 0.52*** 0.04 0.01 -0.03
(0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
BIG-I 0.38*** 0.41*** 0.07* 0.10** 0.09**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
ETSI 0.08** 0.12*** -0.27*** -0.28*** -0.28***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
IEEE 0.40*** 0.43*** -0.05 -0.08 -0.10*
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
IETF 0.66*** 0.66*** 0.09 0.07 0.07
(0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
OTHER 0.47*** 0.48*** 0.05 0.03 0.04
(0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Past classes N Y Y Y Y Y
Year effects N N Y Y Y Y
Age effects N N Y Y Y N
Age2, Age3 & Age4 N N N N N Y
Filing year effects N N Y Y Y N
USPC class effects N N Y Y Y N
Application controls N N N Y Y N
Patent controls N N N N Y N
Litigated N N N N Y Y
Patent fixed effects N N N N N Y
Observations 58,364 58,364 58,364 58,364 57,556 25,687
# of cited patents 6,198 6,198 6,198 6,198 6,156 2,499
The unit of observation is a patent-year. The outcome in all models is the number of USPC
classes that cite the focal patent in a given year that never cited the patent before. All
regressions estimated with Poisson models. Sample and control variables are described in
the main text and in the note to table 4.13. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered
at cited patent level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Table 4.15: Heterogeneity of “marginal/selection effects” of SSOs
on citations from new USPC classes (broadening) by licensing terms:
Poisson models.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome
New
Classes
New
Classes
New
Classes
New
Classes
New
Classes
New
Classes
Sample
Matched
sample
Matched
sample
Matched
sample
Matched
sample
Matched
sample
Matched
SEPs
FRAND*disclosed -0.52*** -0.57*** 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.12***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
FREE*disclosed -0.30 -0.33* 0.21 0.21 0.18 0.40**
(0.19) (0.18) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.17)
NONE*disclosed -0.49*** -0.57*** 0.07 0.05 0.02 0.45***
(0.13) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.17)
SPECIFIC*disclosed -0.01 -0.15 0.39*** 0.41*** 0.47*** 0.48**
(0.16) (0.16) (0.14) (0.13) (0.15) (0.21)
FRAND 0.24*** 0.28*** -0.12*** -0.13*** -0.13***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
FREE 0.44** 0.43*** -0.05 -0.11 -0.11
(0.17) (0.16) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13)
NONE 0.63*** 0.66*** 0.18** 0.15 0.16*
(0.11) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
SPECIFIC 0.34** 0.41*** -0.11 -0.17 -0.24*
(0.13) (0.13) (0.11) (0.11) (0.13)
Past classes N Y Y Y Y Y
Year effects N N Y Y Y Y
Age effects N N Y Y Y N
Age2, Age3 & Age4 N N N N N Y
Filing year effects N N Y Y Y N
USPC class effects N N Y Y Y N
Application controls N N N Y Y N
Patent controls N N N N Y N
Litigated N N N N Y Y
Patent fixed effects N N N N N Y
Observations 58,364 58,364 58,364 58,364 57,556 25,687
# of cited patents 6,198 6,198 6,198 6,198 6,156 2,499
The unit of observation is a patent-year. The outcome in all models is the number of USPC
classes that cite the focal patent in a given year that never cited the patent before. All
regressions estimated with Poisson models. Sample and control variables are described in
the main text and in the note to table 4.13. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered
at cited patent level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Figure 4·1: Pre- and post-disclosure trend in citations from old USPC
classes (deepening).
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This figure plots the coefficients of the interaction terms between SEP disclosure
(equal to one from the year of disclosure for the SEPs, zero for the SEPs before
disclosure and the matched control patents) and a set of “year until/since” disclosure
indicator variables (blue solid line), together with their 95% confidence intervals
(red dashed lines). The omitted category for this set of interaction terms is the
interaction for the year before disclosure (year -1 in the graph). The model is
estimated with an OLS regression with patent fixed effects in which the unit of
observation is a patent-year and the outcome is the number of USPC classes that
cite the focal patent in a given year that cited the patent in previous years. The
model also includes a set of calendar year indicators, the non-linear terms of a fourth
degree polynomial of age since the issue year, the number of USPC classes that cited
the focal patent before a given year and an indicator equal to one from the year the
focal patent is litigated for the first time in a U.S. district court. Standard errors
are clustered at patent level. The sample contains the regular utility SEPs disclosed
before year 2010 and matched control patents issued before year 2009. Patent-year
observations before the issue year and after the 20th year of age are excluded from
estimation, as well as citations that occur after year 2009.
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Figure 4·2: Pre- and post-disclosure trend in citations from new USPC
classes (broadening).
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This figure plots the coefficients of the interaction terms between SEP disclosure
(equal to one from the year of disclosure for the SEPs, zero for the SEPs before
disclosure and the matched control patents) and a set of “year until/since” disclosure
indicator variables (blue solid line), together with their 95% confidence intervals
(red dashed lines). The omitted category for this set of interaction terms is the
interaction for the year before disclosure (year -1 in the graph). The model is
estimated with an OLS regression with patent fixed effects in which the unit of
observation is a patent-year and the outcome is the number of USPC classes that
cite the focal patent in a given year that never cited the patent in previous years.
The model also includes a set of calendar year indicators, the non-linear terms of a
fourth degree polynomial of age since the issue year, the number of USPC classes
that cited the focal patent before a given year and an indicator equal to one from the
year the focal patent is litigated for the first time in a U.S. district court. Standard
errors are clustered at patent level. The sample contains the regular utility SEPs
disclosed before year 2010 and matched control patents issued before year 2009.
Patent-year observations before the issue year and after the 20th year of age are
excluded from estimation, as well as citations that occur after year 2009.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
This dissertation studies a key stage of the production of patents, i.e. the assignment
of applications to examiners, in chapter 2, the strategic behavior of applicants for
SEPs in chapter 3 and uses SEPs to study the influence of SSOs on the direction of
cumulative inventive activity in chapter 4.
Chapter 2 studies the matching of patent applications to examiners at the USPTO.
Using statistical tests originally developed to study industry agglomeration, the anal-
ysis finds strong evidence that examiners specialize in particular technologies, even
within relatively homogeneous art units. Examiner specialization is more pronounced
in the biotechnology and chemistry fields, and less in computers and software. Evi-
dence of specialization becomes weaker, but does not completely disappear, condition-
ing on technology sub-classes. There is no evidence that certain examiners specialize
in applications that have greater importance or broader claims. Finally, the study
shows that more specialized examiners have a lower grant rate and produce a larger
narrowing of claim-scope during the examination process.
To measure the technological specialization we utilize the technological classes
and subclass assigned to applications by the USPTO. However, technological clas-
sifications can only partially capture real technological differences across patent ap-
plications. The analysis could be extended applying recent developments in auto-
mated text analysis to measure technological similarities using the text of patent
applications. This extension may help to capture technological differences currently
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unobserved. Another interesting area for further research would be the study of the
implications of technological specialization for the outcomes of the examination pro-
cess. The analysis we provided in chapter 2 is only a first attempt to understand the
consequences of technological specialization. It is important to understand the impli-
cations of specialization not only for examination outcomes, but also for post-grant
outcomes such as cumulative inventive activity and patent litigation.
Chapter 3 studies the strategic behavior of applicants for SEPs at the USPTO. I
compare SEPs with similar applications and find that applicants for SEPs use more
often mechanisms provided by the U.S. patent system to delay issuance. This leads
to longer lags between priority and issuance. Companies that rely more on patents to
generate revenues exploit these mechanisms more aggressively. I also analyze how the
scope of the claims changes over time and find that owners of SEPs may delay issuance
to obtain the right balance between patent breadth and strength. Furthermore, I find
that the probability of issuance increases significantly after SEP disclosure and that
the latter is positively correlated with the filing of continuation applications. These
results are consistent with the idea that companies prolong the prosecution of their
SEPs until the standard is set, possibly to cover the standard with additional claims.
Finally, I find that a 10% increase in the lag between priority and issuance of SEPs
is correlated with an increase in the probability of litigation by almost 1%. This
suggests that owners of SEPs may delay issuance to obtain patents that are more
valuable, or that longer lags are associated with failures in licensing negotiations.
The ideas proposed in this chapter could be utilized to understand the strategic
behavior of patent applicants more generally. While SEPs are an important subsample
of patents, there are other areas in which applicants may exploit the patent system
strategically. Further research may generalize the analysis in chapter 3, analyzing how
applicants react to the introduction of new products by competitors and exploring
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the consequences in terms of welfare of strategic behavior in prosecution. Another
interesting topic for further research could be combining the insights of chapters 2 and
3 and try to model the interaction between examiners and applicants more formally,
and explore the implications in terms of welfare of the outcomes of this interaction.
In chapter 4 we study the relationship between technology endorsement by SSOs
and the the direction of inventive activity. We introduce the concepts of “deepening”
and “broadening” and relate them to the activities of SSOs. In the empirical analysis,
we exploit the disclosure of SEPs as a window on standardization within SSOs and
compare the dispersion of patent citation flows to SEPs and similar patents. In
the first part of the analysis we use a measure of patent-to-patent text similarity
and a new measure that takes into account the probability of inter-class citations
to estimate the balance between deepening and broadening. In the second part of
the analysis we separate deepening and broadening using citations from technological
classes that repeatedly cite a patent as a measure of deepening and citation from new
classes as a measure of broadening. The results provide evidence that both trends are
occurring. The overall pattern of results suggests that SSOs select technologies that
are important in a relatively narrow technological area, and their adoption as input
for following inventive activity broadens after standardization. We also explore the
heterogeneity across SSOs and licensing terms and find substantial differences.
Further research in this area may study more explicitly the implications of differ-
ent SSO policies on standard adoption and cumulative inventive activity. Another
interesting area for further research would be the comparison of the performance of
different ways to organize standardization in terms of adoption and inventive activ-
ity. More generally, further research may explore how other ways to respond to the
hold-up problem affect the rate and direction of inventive activity.
I see this dissertation as my first attempt to contribute to our understanding of
128
the patent system, the related institutions and company strategies. I look forward
to further develop the work included in this dissertation, the related ideas described
here and other projects that hopefully will increase our knowledge of the implications
of the patent system for innovation and growth.
129
Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 2
Figure A1: Distribution of applications by Technology Center.
5.736%
7.794%
8.125%
12.27%
13.26%
13.56%
15.74%
23.51%
Comp/Comm (TC 2400) Comp/Comm (TC 2100)
Biotechnology (TC 1600) Comp/Comm (TC 2600)
Chemicals (TC 1700) Miscellaneous (TC 3600)
Mechanical (TC 3700) Electrical (TC 2800)
The labels in the legend of the chart correspond to the type of technologies examined by each
technology center as reported in Graham et al. (2015). The full names of the eight technology
centers currently responsible for the examination of utility patent applications are:
• 1600 - Biotechnology and Organic Chemistry
• 1700 - Chemical and Materials Engineering
• 2100 - Computer Architecture, Software, and Information Security
• 2400 - Computer Networks, Multiplex communication, Video Distribution, and Security
• 2600 - Communications
• 2800 - Semiconductors, Electrical and Optical Systems and Components
• 3600 - Transportation,Construction, Electronic Commerce, Agriculture, National Security
and License & Review
• 3700 - Mechanical Engineering, Manufacturing, Products
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Figure A2: Distribution of P-values from D-index (top) and MTAD
(bottom) for USPC subclass and Assignee (lower thresholds).
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Tests on subsamples with more than 10 applications for D-index and 25 applications
for MTAD. Vertical red lines are standard thresholds for statistical significance
(0.01, 0.05 and 0.10).
131
Figure A3: Quantile-Quantile Plots of D-index (top) and MTAD (bot-
tom) by Art-Unit-Year (left) and Art-Unit-Year-USPC-Subclass (right)
for Assignee (lower thresholds).
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Each panel plots the quantiles of the D-index (top row) or MTAD statistic (bottom
row) for the observed distribution (X-axis) against a simulated distribution under
random assignment (Y-axis). Tests on subsamples with more than 10 applications
for D-index and 25 applications for MTAD. If the observed distribution is random,
the quantiles should be the same and the scatter points will fall along the 45-degree
line. We observe large deviations from random assignment at the art-unit-year level,
but much less evidence within art-unit-year-USPC-subclasses.
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Figure A4: Quantile-Quantile Plots of D-index (top) and MTAD (bot-
tom) by Art-Unit-Year (left) and Art-Unit-Year-USPC-Subclass (right)
for DOCDB Family Size.
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Each panel plots the quantiles of the D-index (top row) or MTAD statistic (bottom
row) for the observed distribution (X-axis) against a simulated distribution under
random assignment (Y-axis). Tests on subsamples with more than 20 applications
for D-index and 50 applications for MTAD. If the observed distribution is random,
the quantiles should be the same and the scatter points will fall along the 45-degree
line. We observe some deviations from random assignment at the art-unit-year level,
but almost no evidence within art-unit-year-USPC-subclasses.
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Figure A5: Quantile-Quantile Plots of D-index (top) and MTAD (bot-
tom) by Art-Unit-Year (left) and Art-Unit-Year-USPC-Subclass (right)
for Words in 1st Claim.
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Each panel plots the quantiles of the D-index (top row) or MTAD statistic (bottom
row) for the observed distribution (X-axis) against a simulated distribution under
random assignment (Y-axis). Tests on subsamples with more than 20 applications
for D-index and 50 applications for MTAD. If the observed distribution is random,
the quantiles should be the same and the scatter points will fall along the 45-degree
line. We observe small deviations from random assignment at the art-unit-year
level, and almost no evidence within art-unit-year-USPC-subclasses.
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Table A1: Summary statistics for sample of applications.
Panel A: categorical variables
Variable
# of
categories
Applications per category
Mean Std dev Min
5th
percentile
Median
95th
percentile
Max
Examiners 12,389 236.64 251.13 1 2 165 780 1,932
Art units 590 4,969.01 4,280.04 3 487 3,411 14,548 23,275
USPC
subclasses
104,289 28.11 121.90 1 1 6 106 12,605
Assignees 173,242 13.06 299.50 1 1 1 19 60,177
Panel B: quantitative variables
Variable N Mean Std dev Min
5th
percentile
Median
95th
percentile
Max
DOCDB
family size
2,904,291 2.83 5.55 1 1 2 8 378
Words in
1st claim
2,712,401 124.95 128.00 1 35 103 269 46,194
The number of applications characterized by a big DOCDB family and a low number of words in
the first independent claim are respectively 115,068 and 116,667.
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Table A2: Summary statistics for examiners’ specialization and ex-
amination outcomes.
Variable N Mean Std dev Min Median Max
Shareijt 1,985,470 0.06 0.13 0.00 0.01 1
Granted 1,936,297 0.67 0.47 0 1 1
Days 1,935,940 907.73 518.23 0 812 17,835
Words 1,077,041 49.21 87.73 -10,351 30 9,248
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Appendix to Chapter 3
Table B1: Descriptive statistics for SEPs.
Variable N Mean Sd Min Median Max
Litigated a 4,346 0.09 0.28 0 0 1
Cites a 4,346 45.38 82.87 0 17 1,563
Granted 4,479 0.97 0.17 0 1 1
Abandoned 4,479 0.02 0.14 0 0 1
Words in patent’s 1st ind. claim a 4,330 164.09 88.45 26 144 1,156
Claims in patent a 4,330 23.74 19.08 1 20 293
Reissue a 4,346 0.02 0.13 0 0 1
Reexamination a 4,346 0.02 0.13 0 0 1
CON children 4,479 0.92 2.09 0 0 32
CIP children 4,479 0.25 1.62 0 0 53
DIV children 4,479 0.18 0.99 0 0 16
Days earliest priority-issue (all) a 4,345 1,690.21 866.15 223 1,530 8,009
Days earliest priority-issue (continuity) a 4,345 1,611.21 858.38 223 1,434 8,009
Days filing-issue a 4,345 1,185.44 575.85 175 1,079 4,296
Days to respond to non-final rejection b 3,723 111.04 62.96 0 95 1,559
Requests for extension of time 4,479 0.73 1.09 0 0 9
RCE after notice of allowance c 4,363 0.05 0.22 0 0 1
Applicant delays (days) d 1,996 74.84 119.81 0 33 1,782
USPTO delays (days) d 1,997 538.01 483.43 0 478 3,528
CON 4,479 0.20 0.40 0 0 1
CIP 4,479 0.09 0.29 0 0 1
DIV 4,479 0.06 0.24 0 0 1
Provisional application e 4,479 0.21 0.40 0 0 1
PCT application f 4,479 0.06 0.24 0 0 1
Published 4,479 0.38 0.49 0 0 1
Words in application’s 1st ind. claim g 1,700 117.88 69.83 12 103 1,164
Claims in application g 1,704 26.65 20.93 1 21 205
Small entity 4,479 0.04 0.19 0 0 1
Foreign priority 4,479 0.21 0.41 0 0 1
Priority year 4,478 1,997.52 5.60 1,971 1,998 2,010
Filing year 4,478 1,998.71 5.70 1,971 1,999 2,011
Issue year 4,345 2,001.74 6.39 1,974 2,002 2,015
Disclosure year 4,456 2,004.89 4.59 1,974 2,006 2,012
a Variable defined only for issued patents. b Variable defined only for applications with a reply
to the first non-final rejection. c Variable defined only for applications that receive a notice of
allowance. d Variable defined only for applications filed after May 29, 2000. e Provisional appli-
cations available since June 8, 1995. f USA joined the PCT in 1978. g Variable defined only for
published applications.
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Table B2: SEPs by Technology Center.
Technology Center N %
TC 2600 - Computers/Communications 2,252 50.30
TC 2700 - Computers/Communications a 670 14.97
TC 2400 - Computers/Communications 435 9.72
TC 2100 - Computers/Communications/Electrical b 423 9.45
TC 2200 - Electrical a 173 3.86
TC 2800 - Electrical 166 3.71
TC 2300 - Computers/Communications a 158 3.53
TC 3600 - Miscellaneous 115 2.57
Other TCs 85 1.88
Total 4,477 100.00
a Technology Center no longer active. b Prior to 1998 TC 2100 examined
applications in the Electrical area. After 1998 it examines applications
in the Computers and Communications area. See Graham et al. (2015)
and Kesan et al. (2014) for mapping Technology Centers of the USPTO
to broad technological areas.
Table B3: Business Models of Big SEP assignees.
SEP assignee N Business Model
NOKIA 428 Downstream
MOTOROLA 356 Downstream
ERICSSON 326 Downstream
QUALCOMM 263 Upstream
CISCO SYSTEMS 148 Downstream
INTERDIGITAL 97 Upstream
NORTEL NETWORKS 89 Downstream
AT&T 72 Downstream
MICROSOFT 70 Downstream
IBM 66 Downstream
APPLE 61 Downstream
ALCATEL 44 Downstream
KINETO WIRELESS 43 Downstream
TEXAS INSTRUMENTS 42 Upstream
SIEMENS 41 Downstream
HEWLETT PACKARD 40 Downstream
DIGITAL FOUNTAIN 38 Upstream
JUNIPER NETWORKS 38 Downstream
INTEL 36 Upstream
PHILIPS 36 Downstream
MATSUSHITA ELECTRIC INDUSTRIAL 32 Downstream
Assignees with more than 30 SEPs.
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Table B4: Comparison of SEPs with population of regular utility
patent applications.
Variable
Mean
other
applications
Mean
SEPs
p-value
t-test
Normalized
difference
Litigated a 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.36
Cites a 10.40 45.38 0.00 0.57
Granted 0.67 0.97 0.00 0.84
Abandoned 0.20 0.02 0.00 -0.61
Words in patent’s 1st ind. claim a 175.97 164.09 0.00 -0.13
Claims in patent a 15.61 23.74 0.00 0.51
Reissue a 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.14
Reexamination a 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.15
CON children 0.22 0.92 0.00 0.42
CIP children 0.11 0.25 0.00 0.11
DIV children 0.08 0.18 0.00 0.11
Days earliest priority-issue (all) a 1,419.84 1,690.21 0.00 0.32
Days earliest priority-issue (continuity) a 1,282.31 1,611.21 0.00 0.39
Days filing-issue a 944.1 1,185.44 0.00 0.44
Days to respond to non-final rejection b 107.75 111.04 0.00 0.05
Requests for extension of time 0.57 0.73 0.00 0.15
RCE after notice of allowance c 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.13
Applicant delays (days) d 30.78 74.84 0.00 0.43
USPTO delays (days) d 199.24 538.01 0.00 0.79
CON 0.12 0.20 0.00 0.21
CIP 0.07 0.09 0.00 0.09
DIV 0.07 0.06 0.04 -0.03
Provisional application e 0.15 0.21 0.00 0.15
PCT application f 0.13 0.06 0.00 -0.24
Published 0.57 0.38 0.00 -0.39
Words in application’s 1st ind. claim g 126.31 117.88 0.00 -0.10
Claims in application g 20.02 26.65 0.00 0.27
Inventors 2.81 2.76 0.12 -0.02
Small entity 0.24 0.04 0.00 -0.61
Foreign priority 0.40 0.21 0.00 -0.40
Filing year 2,001.3 1,998.71 0.00 -0.34
Sample includes all regular utility patent applications filed at the USPTO and available in
Public PAIR as of January 24, 2015 (4,479 SEP applications and 7,026,494 other applications).
The samples used for individual tests may be different because of variable definitions and
missing values. Details on the samples for each test are available upon request. a Variable
defined only for issued patents. b Variable defined only for applications that receive a non-
final rejection. c Variable defined only for applications that receive a notice of allowance.
d Variable defined only for applications filed after May 29, 2000. e Provisional applications
available since June 8, 1995. f USA joined the PCT in 1978. g Variable defined only for
published applications.
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Table B5: Comparison of SEP applications to upstream and down-
stream organizations (unclassified and upstream pooled together): OLS
regressions.
Outcome
Coefficient
upstream
Standard
error
upstream
p-value
upstream
Litigated a 0.04 0.01 0.01
Cites (log) a 0.07 0.08 0.42
Granted -0.01 0.02 0.47
Abandoned 0.01 0.01 0.44
Words in patent’s 1st ind. claim a -0.03 0.02 0.12
Claims in patent a -0.04 0.04 0.26
Reissue a 0.01 0.01 0.29
Reexamination a 0.00 0.00 1.00
CON children (log) 0.16 0.03 0.00
CIP children (log) 0.02 0.02 0.44
DIV children (log) 0.03 0.02 0.05
Days earliest priority-issue (all) a (log) 0.26 0.03 0.00
Days earliest priority-issue (continuity) a (log) 0.26 0.03 0.00
Days filing-issue a (log) -0.07 0.03 0.01
Days to respond to non-final rejection b (log) 0.14 0.03 0.00
Requests for extension of time (log) 0.06 0.03 0.08
RCE after notice of allowance c 0.05 0.02 0.02
Applicant delays (days) (log) 0.40 0.12 0.00
USPTO delays (days) (log) -0.43 0.17 0.01
CON 0.24 0.03 0.00
CIP 0.07 0.02 0.00
DIV 0.07 0.02 0.00
Provisional application 0.12 0.03 0.00
PCT application -0.01 0.02 0.33
The sample contains only regular utility SEP applications. “Upstream” organizations
and those unclassified are pooled together. The sample contains 946 SEP applications
assigned to downstream organizations and 754 SEP applications assigned to upstream or
unclassified organizations. The samples used for individual regressions may be different
because of variable definitions and missing values. Outcomes taken in logarithms may
be either the natural logarithm of the variable or the natural logarithm of one plus
the variable if the latter contain zeros. Details on samples, variables and regressions
are available upon request. All regressions are estimated by OLS and include art unit
effects, filing year effects, indicators for small entity status and foreign priority and
control for the natural logarithms of the number of words in the first independent
claim of the application, the number of claims in the application and the number of
inventors. Applications with missing values for these variables are excluded from the
sample. Robust standard errors are clustered at art unit level. a Variable defined only
for issued patents. b Variable defined only for applications with a reply to the first
non-final rejection. c Variable defined only for applications that receive a notice of
allowance.
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Table B6: Individual strategies and issuance lag of SEP applications:
Poisson regressions.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Outcome
Issuance
lag (days)
Issuance
lag (days)
Issuance
lag (days)
Issuance
lag (days)
Issuance
lag (days)
Serialized Continuation 0.47*** 0.47*** 0.53*** 0.53*** 0.45***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Provisional application 0.21*** 0.10*** 0.06*** 0.03 0.10***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
PCT application 0.43*** 0.24*** 0.26*** 0.21*** 0.31***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Requests for extension of time 0.13*** 0.10*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.06***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
RCE after NOA 0.29*** 0.16*** 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.10***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Upstream 0.06**
(0.02)
Filing year effects N Y Y Y Y
Art unit effects N Y Y Y Y
Small entity N Y Y Y Y
Foreign priority N Y Y Y Y
Inventors N Y Y Y Y
Applicant delay (days) N N Y Y Y
Applicant delay (binary) N N Y Y Y
USPTO delay (days) N N Y Y Y
USPTO delay (binary) N N Y Y Y
Words & Claims N N N Y Y
Observations 4,344 4,340 1,868 1,535 1,167
All regressions estimated with Poisson models on the sample of granted SEPs. Outcome in all
regressions is the number of days between the earliest priority and the issue date of the SEP. The
variables “Applicant delay (days)”, “USPTO delay (days)”, “Inventors”, “Words” and “Claims”
are the natural logarithms of, respectively, one plus the number of days of applicant delay for the
computation of the patent term adjustment, one plus the number of non-overlapping days due to
delay of the USPTO for the computation of the patent term adjustment, the number of inventors,
the number of words in the first independent claim of the application and the number of claims
in the application. The variables “Applicant delay (binary)” and “USPTO delay (binary)” are
binary indicators equal to one if the application has days of, respectively, applicant delay and
USPTO delay (zero otherwise). Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at art unit level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Table B7: Prosecution time and claim changes, only SEPs disclosed
before issuance.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Outcome
Words
added
Words
added
Words
added
Words
added
Days filing-issue (log) 89.95*** 108.58*** 46.89** 29.45
(12.29) (13.79) (21.77) (20.56)
USPTO delay (binary & days) Y Y Y Y
Filing year effects N Y Y Y
Serialized continuation N Y Y Y
Provisional application N Y Y Y
PCT application N Y Y Y
Small entity N Y Y Y
Foreign priority N Y Y Y
Inventors N Y Y Y
Art unit effects N N Y Y
Words & Claims N N N Y
Observations 521 521 521 521
All regressions estimated by OLS on the sample of granted SEPs filed on or after
November 29, 2000, published before issuance and disclosed as essential while still
pending. Outcome in all regressions is the number of words added to the first
independent claim between the published application and the issued patent. The
variables “USPTO delay (days)”, “Inventors”, “Words” and “Claims” are the
natural logarithms of, respectively, one plus the number of non-overlapping days
due to delay of the USPTO for the computation of the patent term adjustment,
the number of inventors, the number of words in the first independent claim of the
application and the number of claims in the application. The variable “USPTO
delay (binary)” is a binary indicator equal to one if the application has days of
USPTO delay (zero otherwise). Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered
at art unit level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Table B8: SEP disclosure and patent issuance, excluding ETSI.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome Issued Issued Issued Issued Issued Issued
Sample
Matched
sample
Matched
sample
Matched
sample
SEPs SEPs SEPs
Disclosed 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.010***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
SEP -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Month effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Age effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Art unit effects N Y Y N Y Y
Serialized Continuation N Y Y N Y Y
Provisional application N Y Y N Y Y
PCT application N Y Y N Y Y
Small entity N Y Y N Y Y
Foreign priority N Y Y N Y Y
Inventors N Y Y N Y Y
Words and Claims N N Y N N Y
Observations 60,260 60,260 60,260 40,957 40,794 38,080
Number of applications 1,030 1,030 1,030 675 673 623
All regressions estimated by OLS. ETSI SEPs and their controls are not included in the samples
for this table. Unit of observation is application-month. The matched sample contains SEPs
declared before their issue date and matched control applications filed on or after November 29,
2000, that were published as applications. SEP and control applications are matched on filing
year, art unit, examiner, USPC class, foreign priority and small entity applicant. Applications
with missing values for variables used to match or control variables are dropped from potential
matches. The SEPs sample contains only SEPs declared before their issue date with filing date on
or after November 29, 2000. Applications at risk of issuance from their filing month and observed
until issuance month or abandonment month or end of calendar year 2014 if they do not issue as
patents. Outcome in all regressions is an indicator variable equal to one in the month of issue.
The variables “Inventors”, “Words” and “Claims” are the natural logarithms of, respectively, the
number of inventors, the number of words in the first independent claim of the application and
the number of claims of the application. Robust standard errors are clustered at art unit level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Table B9: SEP disclosure and continuation application filings, exclud-
ing ETSI.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Outcome
# of CON
children
# of CON
children
# of CON
children
# of CON
children
Sample
Matched
sample
Matched
sample
SEPs SEPs
Disclosed -0.15 0.15 0.16 0.82***
(0.16) (0.18) (0.15) (0.21)
SEP 0.32**
(0.14)
Month effects N Y N Y
Age2, Age3 and Age4 N Y N Y
Application Fixed Effects N Y N Y
Observations 56,551 18,850 38,464 15,007
Number of applications 1,030 350 675 262
Unit of observation is application-month. ETSI SEPs and their controls are not
included in the samples for this table. All models estimated with Poisson re-
gressions. The matched sample contains SEPs declared before their issue date
and matched control applications filed on or after November 29, 2000, that were
published as applications. SEP and control applications are matched on filing
year, art unit, examiner, USPC class, foreign priority and small entity applicant.
Applications with missing values for variables used to match or control variables
are dropped from potential matches. The SEPs sample contains only SEPs de-
clared before their issue date with filing date on or after November 29, 2000.
Applications at risk of filing continuation applications from their filing month and
observed until their issue month or their abandon month or the end of calen-
dar year 2012 if they are still pending. Robust standard errors in parentheses,
clustered at application level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Table B10: SEP’s issuance lag and litigation, excluding ETSI.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Outcome Litigated Litigated Litigated Litigated
Issuance lag (log) 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.07***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Issue year effects Y Y Y Y
Small entity N Y Y Y
Foreign priority N Y Y Y
Inventors N Y Y Y
Words & Claims N N Y Y
USPC class effects N N N Y
Observations 646 644 640 640
All regressions estimated by OLS. Unit of observation is a SEP. Sam-
ple contains only SEPs declared before the issue date. SEPs declared
to ETSI are excluded. Outcome in all regressions is an indicator
variable equal to one if the patent is litigated before year 2015. The
variables “Inventors”, “Words” and “Claims” are the natural loga-
rithms of, respectively, the number of inventors, the number of words
in the first independent claim of the patent and the number of claims
of the patent. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Table B11: SEP’s issuance lag and litigation, 5-year window.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Outcome Litigated Litigated Litigated Litigated
Issuance lag (log) 0.06* 0.05 0.06 0.07*
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Issue year effects Y Y Y Y
Small entity N Y Y Y
Foreign priority N Y Y Y
Inventors N Y Y Y
Words & Claims N N Y Y
USPC class effects N N N Y
Observations 328 328 328 328
All regressions estimated by OLS. Unit of observation is a SEP. Sam-
ple contains only SEPs declared before the issue date and granted
before year 2010. Outcome in all regressions is an indicator variable
equal to one if the patent is litigated within 5 years from issuance.
The variables “Inventors”, “Words” and “Claims” are the natural
logarithms of, respectively, the number of inventors, the number of
words in the first independent claim of the patent and the number
of claims of the patent. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 4
Table C1: Summary statistics for the citation sample.
Variable N Mean Sd Min Median Max
CWTS 167,707 21.71 20.15 0.00 11.09 84.08
Text-based similarity 164,930 24.25 19.22 0.00 23.67 100.00
SEP 168,589 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00
SEP disclosed 168,589 0.35 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00
SEP disclosure year 89,045 2,001.72 4.50 1,982.00 2,002.00 2,009.00
Citation year 168,589 2,003.00 4.43 1,980.00 2,004.00 2,009.00
Patent age at citation 168,589 4.99 4.02 0.00 4.00 19.00
Litigated 168,589 0.05 0.21 0.00 0.00 1.00
Backward NPL citations 168,269 4.42 13.54 0.00 1.00 422.00
Backward patent citations 168,269 13.61 22.91 0.00 8.00 782.00
Inventors 167,457 2.57 1.73 1.00 2.00 16.00
Words in 1st claim 167,455 175.58 92.83 20.00 155.00 1,054.00
Claims 167,468 23.50 21.57 1.00 19.00 374.00
CON 168,269 0.16 0.37 0.00 0.00 1.00
CIP 168,269 0.09 0.29 0.00 0.00 1.00
DIV 168,269 0.05 0.22 0.00 0.00 1.00
Provisional application 168,269 0.08 0.28 0.00 0.00 1.00
PCT application 168,269 0.03 0.18 0.00 0.00 1.00
Foreign priority 168,269 0.22 0.42 0.00 0.00 1.00
Small entity 168,269 0.07 0.25 0.00 0.00 1.00
Published application 168,269 0.08 0.27 0.00 0.00 1.00
Issue year 168,269 1,998.01 4.75 1,980.00 1,999.00 2,009.00
Filing year 168,589 1,995.43 4.29 1,978.00 1,996.00 2,007.00
The sample contains all citations from regular utility patents to matched SEPs disclosed be-
fore year 2010 and control patents between the issue year and calendar year 2009 (inclusive)
that occur before the 21st year of patent age. NPL means “Non-Patent Literature”.
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Table C2: Citation sample by SSO.
SSO # of citations # of cited patents
ANSI 6,212 179
ATIS 2,515 33
BBF 37 2
CEN 1 1
CENELEC 437 6
ETSI 38,883 1,695
IEC 299 27
IEC - JTC1 1,918 27
IEEE 13,615 432
IETF 8,241 280
ISO 1,028 27
ISO - JTC1 1,486 58
ITU 8,372 301
OMA 4,355 111
TIA 1,646 46
CONTROLS 79,544 3,196
Total 168,589 6,495
The sample contains all citations from regular utility
patents to matched SEPs disclosed before year 2010
and control patents between the issue year and cal-
endar year 2009 (inclusive) that occur before the 21st
year of patent age.
Table C3: Citation sample by licensing terms.
SSO # of citations # of cited patents
FRAND 80,617 3,042
FREE 2,568 114
NONE 3,040 88
SPECIFIC 2,820 55
CONTROLS 79,544 3,196
Total 168,589 6,495
The sample contains all citations from regular utility
patents to matched SEPs disclosed before year 2010
and control patents between the issue year and cal-
endar year 2009 (inclusive) that occur before the 21st
year of patent age.
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Table C4: Summary statistics for the patent sample.
Variable N Mean Sd Min Median Max
Citing classes 6,198 3.40 3.64 0.00 2.00 39.00
SEP 6,198 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.50 1.00
SEP disclosure year 3,099 2,003.03 3.98 1,982.00 2,004.00 2,008.00
Litigated 6,198 0.04 0.19 0.00 0.00 1.00
Backward NPL citations 6,198 3.98 12.56 0.00 1.00 282.00
Backward patent citations 6,198 13.15 21.51 0.00 8.00 479.00
Inventors 6,171 2.53 1.71 1.00 2.00 16.00
Words in 1st claim 6,171 167.58 86.26 6.00 149.00 1,054.00
Claims 6,172 21.01 17.65 1.00 18.00 374.00
CON 6,198 0.19 0.39 0.00 0.00 1.00
CIP 6,198 0.07 0.26 0.00 0.00 1.00
DIV 6,198 0.07 0.25 0.00 0.00 1.00
Provisional application 6,198 0.12 0.32 0.00 0.00 1.00
PCT application 6,198 0.06 0.24 0.00 0.00 1.00
Foreign priority 6,198 0.32 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00
Small entity 6,198 0.06 0.24 0.00 0.00 1.00
Published application 6,198 0.25 0.44 0.00 0.00 1.00
Issue year 6,198 2,000.44 5.25 1,980.00 2,001.00 2,008.00
Filing year 6,198 1,997.47 4.71 1,978.00 1,998.00 2,007.00
The sample contains the regular utility SEPs disclosed before year 2010 and matched
control patents issued before year 2009. NPL means “Non-Patent Literature”.
Table C5: Patent sample by SSO.
SSO # of patents
ANSI 178
ATIS 30
BBF 2
CENELEC 6
ETSI 1,578
IEC 22
IEC - JTC1 109
IEEE 408
IETF 232
ISO 27
ISO - JTC1 57
ITU 312
OMA 90
TIA 48
CONTROLS 3,099
Total 6,198
The sample contains the reg-
ular utility SEPs disclosed be-
fore year 2010 and matched
control patents issued before
year 2009.
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Table C6: Patent sample by licensing terms.
SSO # of patents
FRAND 2,879
FREE 79
NONE 85
SPECIFIC 56
CONTROLS 3,099
Total 6,198
The sample contains the reg-
ular utility SEPs disclosed be-
fore year 2010 and matched
control patents issued before
year 2009.
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Table C7: “Marginal/selection effects” of SSOs on Citation Weighted
Technological Similarity between cited and citing patents: OLS models.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome CWTS CWTS CWTS CWTS CWTS CWTS
Disclosed -0.23*** 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
SEP 0.25*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.10*** 0.10***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Year effects N Y Y Y Y Y
Age effects N Y Y Y Y N
Age2, Age3 & Age4 N N N N N Y
Filing year effects N Y Y Y Y N
USPC class effects N Y Y Y Y N
Application controls N N Y Y Y N
Patent controls N N N Y Y N
Litigated N N N N Y Y
Cited patent effects N N N N N Y
Observations 167,707 167,707 167,387 167,363 167,363 167,707
# of cited patents 6,468 6,468 6,463 6,461 6,461 6,468
The unit of observation is a citation. The sample contains all citations from regular
utility patents to matched SEPs disclosed before year 2010 and control patents between
the issue year and calendar year 2009 (inclusive) that occur before the 21st year of
patent age. The outcome in all models is the natural logarithm of Citation Weighted
Technological Similarity between cited and citing patent. All regressions estimated
with OLS models. “Application controls” include indicator variables for patents that
issue from continuation applications, continuations-in-part, divisionals, claim the ben-
efits of provisional applications, PCT applications and foreign applications, are filed
by a small entity and are published before they issue. “Patent controls” include the
natural logarithms of the number of backward patent and non-patent literature cita-
tions plus one, number of inventors, number of claims and number of words in 1st
independent claim of the patent. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at
cited patent level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Table C8: “Marginal/selection effects” of SSOs on text similarity
between cited and citing patents: OLS models.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome
Text
Sim.
Text
Sim.
Text
Sim.
Text
Sim.
Text
Sim.
Text
Sim.
Disclosed -0.34*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.13*** -0.12*** -0.05**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
SEP 0.31*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Year effects N Y Y Y Y Y
Age effects N Y Y Y Y N
Age2, Age3 & Age4 N N N N N Y
Filing year effects N Y Y Y Y N
USPC class effects N Y Y Y Y N
Application controls N N Y Y Y N
Patent controls N N N Y Y N
Litigated N N N N Y Y
Cited patent effects N N N N N Y
Observations 164,930 164,930 164,610 163,789 163,789 164,930
# of cited patents 6,478 6,478 6,473 6,445 6,445 6,478
The unit of observation is a citation. The sample contains all citations from regular
utility patents to matched SEPs disclosed before year 2010 and control patents between
the issue year and calendar year 2009 (inclusive) that occur before the 21st year of patent
age. The outcome in all models is the natural logarithm of one plus the text similarity
between cited and citing patent (Younge and Kuhn, 2016). All regressions estimated
with OLS models. “Application controls” include indicator variables for patents that
issue from continuation applications, continuations-in-part, divisionals, claim the benefits
of provisional applications, PCT applications and foreign applications, are filed by a
small entity and are published before they issue. “Patent controls” include the natural
logarithms of the number of backward patent and non-patent literature citations plus one,
number of inventors, number of claims and number of words in 1st independent claim of
the patent. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at cited patent level. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Table C9: “Marginal/selection effects” of SSOs on Citation Weighted
Technological Similarity between cited and citing patents: Poisson
models, excluding citations made by the examiners.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome CWTS CWTS CWTS CWTS CWTS CWTS
Disclosed -0.01 0.05* 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
SEP 0.09** 0.06* 0.06* 0.05 0.05
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Year effects N Y Y Y Y Y
Age effects N Y Y Y Y N
Age2, Age3 & Age4 N N N N N Y
Filing year effects N Y Y Y Y N
USPC class effects N Y Y Y Y N
Application controls N N Y Y Y N
Patent controls N N N Y Y N
Litigated N N N N Y Y
Cited patent effects N N N N N Y
Observations 35,630 35,630 35,481 35,471 35,471 35,046
# of cited patents 3,159 3,159 3,156 3,155 3,155 2,575
The unit of observation is a citation. The sample contains the citations from regu-
lar utility patents to matched SEPs disclosed before year 2010 and control patents
between the issue year and calendar year 2009 (inclusive) that occur before the
21st year of patent age, excluding those made by the examiners. We include only
cited patents granted after year 2000 because information on examiners’ citations
is available starting from year 2001. The outcome in all models is the Citation
Weighted Technological Similarity between cited and citing patent. All regres-
sions estimated with Poisson models. “Application controls” include indicator
variables for patents that issue from continuation applications, continuations-in-
part, divisionals, claim the benefits of provisional applications, PCT applications
and foreign applications, are filed by a small entity and are published before they
issue. “Patent controls” include the natural logarithms of the number of backward
patent and non-patent literature citations plus one, number of inventors, number
of claims and number of words in 1st independent claim of the patent. Robust
standard errors in parentheses, clustered at cited patent level. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Table C10: “Marginal/selection effects” of SSOs on Citation
Weighted Technological Similarity between cited and citing patents:
Poisson models, excluding citations made by the examiners.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome
Text
Sim.
Text
Sim.
Text
Sim.
Text
Sim.
Text
Sim.
Text
Sim.
Disclosed -0.10*** -0.05 -0.05* -0.06* -0.05 0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
SEP 0.15*** 0.12*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Year effects N Y Y Y Y Y
Age effects N Y Y Y Y N
Age2, Age3 & Age4 N N N N N Y
Filing year effects N Y Y Y Y N
USPC class effects N Y Y Y Y N
Application controls N N Y Y Y N
Patent controls N N N Y Y N
Litigated N N N N Y Y
Cited patent effects N N N N N Y
Observations 34,357 34,357 34,208 34,198 34,198 33,496
# of cited patents 3,134 3,134 3,131 3,130 3,130 2,488
The unit of observation is a citation. The sample contains the citations from regu-
lar utility patents to matched SEPs disclosed before year 2010 and control patents
between the issue year and calendar year 2009 (inclusive) that occur before the 21st
year of patent age, excluding those made by the examiners. We include only cited
patents after year 2000 because information on examiners’ citations is available start-
ing from year 2001. The outcome in all models is the text similarity between cited
and citing patent (Younge and Kuhn, 2016). All regressions estimated with Pois-
son models. “Application controls” include indicator variables for patents that issue
from continuation applications, continuations-in-part, divisionals, claim the benefits
of provisional applications, PCT applications and foreign applications, are filed by
a small entity and are published before they issue. “Patent controls” include the
natural logarithms of the number of backward patent and non-patent literature ci-
tations plus one, number of inventors, number of claims and number of words in 1st
independent claim of the patent. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at
cited patent level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Table C11: “Marginal/selection effects” of SSOs on citations from old
USPC classes (deepening): Poisson models, excluding citations made
by the examiners.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome
Old
Classes
Old
Classes
Old
Classes
Old
Classes
Old
Classes
Old
Classes
Sample
Matched
sample
Matched
sample
Matched
sample
Matched
sample
Matched
sample
Matched
SEPs
Disclosed 0.63*** 0.18* 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.09
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.09)
SEP -0.35** 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.01
(0.14) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Past classes N Y Y Y Y Y
Year effects N N Y Y Y Y
Age effects N N Y Y Y N
Age2, Age3 & Age4 N N N N N Y
Filing year effects N N Y Y Y N
USPC class effects N N Y Y Y N
Application controls N N N Y Y N
Patent controls N N N N Y N
Litigated N N N N Y Y
Patent fixed effects N N N N N Y
Observations 7,070 7,070 7,070 7,070 7,070 1,788
# of cited patents 1,680 1,680 1,680 1,680 1,680 386
The unit of observation is a patent-year. The sample contains the regular utility SEPs
disclosed before year 2010 and matched control patents filed after year 2000 and issued
before year 2009. Patent-year observations before the issue year and after the 20th year
of age are excluded from estimation, as well as citations that occur after year 2009. The
outcome in all models is the number of USPC classes that cite the focal patent in a given
year that cited the patent in previous years, excluding those originating from examiner
citations. “Past classes” is the number of USPC classes that cited the focal patent before
a given year, excluding those originating from examiner citations. All regressions estimated
with Poisson models. “Application controls” include indicator variables for patents that
issue from continuation applications, continuations-in-part, divisionals, claim the benefits
of provisional applications, PCT applications and foreign applications, are filed by a small
entity and are published before they issue. “Patent controls” include the natural logarithms
of the number of backward patent and non-patent literature citations plus one, number of
inventors, number of claims and number of words in 1st independent claim of the patent.
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at cited patent level. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Table C12: “Marginal/selection effects” of SSOs on citations from
new USPC classes (broadening): Poisson models, excluding citations
made by the examiners.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome
New
Classes
New
Classes
New
Classes
New
Classes
New
Classes
New
Classes
Sample
Matched
sample
Matched
sample
Matched
sample
Matched
sample
Matched
sample
Matched
SEPs
Disclosed -0.24** -0.35*** -0.00 0.04 0.06 0.55***
(0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.16)
SEP 0.22** 0.30*** 0.02 -0.01 -0.06
(0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Past classes N Y Y Y Y Y
Year effects N N Y Y Y Y
Age effects N N Y Y Y N
Age2, Age3 & Age4 N N N N N Y
Filing year effects N N Y Y Y N
USPC class effects N N Y Y Y N
Application controls N N N Y Y N
Patent controls N N N N Y N
Litigated N N N N Y Y
Patent fixed effects N N N N N Y
Observations 7,070 7,070 7,070 7,070 7,070 2,312
# of cited patents 1,680 1,680 1,680 1,680 1,680 509
The unit of observation is a patent-year. The sample contains the regular utility SEPs
disclosed before year 2010 and matched control patents filed after year 2000 and issued
before year 2009. Patent-year observations before the issue year and after the 20th year
of age are excluded from estimation, as well as citations that occur after year 2009. The
outcome in all models is the number of USPC classes that cite the focal patent in a given
year that never cited the patent before, excluding those originating from examiner citations.
“Past classes” is the number of USPC classes that cited the focal patent before a given
year, excluding those originating from examiner citations. All regressions estimated with
Poisson models. “Application controls” include indicator variables for patents that issue from
continuation applications, continuations-in-part, divisionals, claim the benefits of provisional
applications, PCT applications and foreign applications, are filed by a small entity and are
published before they issue. “Patent controls” include the natural logarithms of the number
of backward patent and non-patent literature citations plus one, number of inventors, number
of claims and number of words in 1st independent claim of the patent. Robust standard
errors in parentheses, clustered at cited patent level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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